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Which material things allow us to speak about them in the irst place? 
Does a speciic way of conceiving musical works limit their performative 
potentials? What alternative, more productive images of musical work 
can be devised?
ontological discourses, challenging dominant musicological accounts, 
questioning their authoritative foundation, and moving towards dynamic 
perspectives devised by music practitioners and artist researchers. 
Speciic attention is given to the relationship between the virtual 
multiplicities that enable the construction of an image of a musical work, 
and the actual, concrete materials that make such a construction possible. 
With contributions by prominent scholars, this book is a wide-ranging and 
fascinating collection of essays, which will be of great interest for artistic 
research, contemporary musicology, music philosophy, performance 
studies, and music pedagogy alike. 
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for their willingness to be part of this project even without having attended 
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ful to Heloisa Amaral and Lucia D’Errico, two advanced doctoral students who 
enormously helped me in designing, preparing, and running the Orpheus 
Academy 2016. Their professionalism and affability in communicating with 
the faculty members during the Academy contributed greatly to the success-
ful unfolding of the discourse. My thanks also go to Juan Parra Cancino for 
his creative collaboration in the musical performances and his technical assis-
tance throughout the Academy. Last but not least, I am grateful to the Orpheus 
Institute’s front-desk collaborators Heike Vermeire and Kathleen Snyers, who 
highly efficiently communicated with the faculty before, during, and after the 
Academy on any practical and logistical matter. Regarding this book, I am 
grateful to the Orpheus Institute’s series editor, William Brooks, who enthusi-
astically embraced this publication from my very first proposal, and to Edward 
Crooks, who copy-edited the complete volume with the highest professional-
ism and intelligence. Finally, great thanks go to Peter Dejans, the director of 
the Orpheus Institute, who consistently facilitated and created all necessary 











On the morning of 4 April 2016, at the outset of the Orpheus Academy for 
Music and Theory 2016, together with other musicians of the ME21 Collective,1 
I performed a new iteration of Rasch, an artistic research project around Robert 
Schumann’s piano fantasy Kreisleriana (1838, 1850).2 Under the title Rasch14: 
Loving Barthes(3), the complete musical score of Schumann’s piece was played on 
a modern grand piano. Additionally, the performance included pre-recorded 
sounds and live electronics, as well as video projections of texts, images, and 
film fragments. The performance had no perceptible beginning: when the 
doors opened, a sonic installation based upon a recorded reading of Roland 
Barthes’s 1979 essay “Loving Schumann” was diffused over four loudspeak-
ers. Another essay by Barthes—“Rasch,” from 1975—functioned as a constant, 
recurrent conceptual layer throughout the complete performance, fragments 
of which were projected onto the walls or heard through the loudspeakers. At 
some points, the pianist, while scrupulously playing all the notes prescribed in 
the score, played them in extreme slow motion. At other times he sustained a 
chord, or even stopped playing for more than a minute. Other pieces of music 
were played live or through the loudspeakers at specific moments of the per-
formance: Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte (especially number 6, “Nimm sie hin 
denn, diese Lieder,” at the end of Kreisleriana no. 2), Ignaz Moscheles’s Etude car-
actéristique pour piano, op. 95, no. 1 (immediately before Kreisleriana no. 5), Bach’s 
Gigue from the second French Suite, BWV 813 (as a lead-in to Kreisleriana no. 
 1 The ME21 Collective is composed of artistic researchers involved in or collaborating with the research 
project MusicExperiment21, a five-year programme on practice-based research in music. The project 
brings together diverse artistic, performative, historical, methodological, epistemological, and philo-
sophical approaches, creating experimental performance practices and new modes of thinking about 
music and its performance. The project crucially moves from interpretation towards experimentation, a 
term that is not used in relation to measurable phenomena, but rather to an attitude, to a willingness 
to constantly reshape thoughts and practices, to operate new redistributions of music materials, and to 
afford unexpected reconfigurations of music. The project is funded by the European Research Council 
and is hosted at the Orpheus Institute. The ME21 Collective is its performative extension. It is made of 
musicians, performers, composers, dancers, actors, and philosophers, and it has no stable formation. 
Its modes of communication include conventional formats such as concerts, performances, and instal-
lations, but also lectures, publications, and web expositions. It has performed in Argentina, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 
 2 Rasch is a series of mutational performances, lectures, and essays grounded upon two fundamental 
materials: Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana, op. 16 (1838, 1850), and Roland Barthes’s essays on the music 
of Schumann, written in 1970, 1975, and 1979 (see Barthes 1985a, 1985b, 1985c), particularly “Rasch,” a 
text exclusively dedicated to Schumann’s Kreisleriana. To these materials other components are added 
for each particular version: visual elements, other texts, or further aural elements. An overview of the 
complete instantiations of the Rasch series is available at Research Catalogue, https://www.researchcat-
alogue.net/view/64319/64320. A full-length video recording of Rasch111: Loving Barthes[1], can be watched 
online at https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/99320/99321.
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8), and very short fragments of the Goldberg Variations, BWV 988 (during the 
pre-performance sound installation), and also recordings of pianists like Yves 
Nat and Vladimir Horowitz playing Schumann’s Kreisleriana. Instead of the cus-
tomary thirty or so minutes of a rendering of Kreisleriana, this performance had 
a duration of around fifty-five minutes. 
Clearly, this was not a performance “of ” Kreisleriana, though all its pitches, 
rhythms, dynamics, and formal “proportions” have been played and “faithfully” 
respected. It was also not a performance “about” Kreisleriana, as it had no ped-
agogical intention of revealing to the audience anything it didn’t know before 
(even if that happened as a side effect). And it was also not a performance “after” 
Kreisleriana, for the simple reason that the full score was played in an intended 
mainstream, modern mode of musical interpretation. Significantly, all mater-
ials external to Schumann’s score, all the various layers that were brought into 
dialogue with it, were not chosen incidentally or “associatively,” but rather fol-
lowing a precise and rigorous research process. Every single component of the 
performance had a close relation to Schumann’s piece, be it prior to the com-
position as a fertile humus that had an impact on the compositional process, or 
a posteriori, as reflective exercises directly inspired by the piece. As ex amples of 
such materials, one can mention the following: Roland Barthes’s essay “Rasch,” 
which is exclusively dedicated to Kreisleriana (see Barthes 1985b); his text “Loving 
Schumann,” which not only is devoted to the German composer but also was 
published as the introduction to Marcel Beaufils’s monograph on Schumann’s 
piano music (see Barthes 1985a; Beaufils 1979); Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte, 
which is literally quoted in Schumann’s Fantasie, op. 17 (composed immediately 
before Kreisleriana), in a passage with close melodic resemblance to the end of 
Kreisleriana no. 2; Moscheles’s piano study Zorn [Anger] that served as direct 
inspiration for Kreisleriana no. 5 (see Rostagno 2007, 98–102); and Bach’s Gigue 
from the second French Suite, whose rhythmical pattern is exactly the same as 
the rhythm of the main theme of Kreisleriana no. 8. 
Kreisleriana, a famous piece of the mainstream pianistic repertoire, is regarded 
as well known; thus, normally, there would be many “fully qualified”3 perfor-
mances and recordings of it. However, we now know, at least since Antonio 
Rostagno’s (2007) exhaustive account of the compositional and editorial his-
tory of this piece, that this is not the case. Not only are there two versions of 
the score (the first from 1838, the second from 1850), but also four different 
editions were printed in the nineteenth century, two prepared by Schumann, 
the other two by Clara Schumann (see Rostagno 2007, 205–8). In the twentieth 
century, attempts were made to offer the reader a combination of all these dis-
parate bits of information. The result was that, with the exception of Charles 
Rosen, every single pianist plays the version of 1850, but does not really play 
everything as it was notated by Schumann—some possible alternative passages 
from the 1838 version “infiltrate” these renderings, so that most performances 
 3 On the notion of “fully qualified” performances, see David Davies in this volume, p. 47, where he states 
that “something is fully qualified to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork X at a 
time t just in case at t it possesses all those experienceable properties that are necessary, according to the 
practices of the art form in question, to fully play this role.”
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we hear today are of a musical object that was not exactly designed in that man-
ner by the composer. So much for “fully qualified” illusions.4
But, beyond the specific problem of “the score,” the question that the per-
formance made by the ME21 Collective raises is of a different nature: what kind 
of relation is there between all these things—that were part of the performance 
and that have an umbilical relation with the piece—and Schumann’s work? 
What are these things in relation to this piece? In an orthodox ontological 
account, they have nothing to do with Kreisleriana.5 Still, they obviously do 
concern it. Ontological questions were not part of the original research plan 
of MusicExperiment21, and we did not turn to them from a philosophical will 
to clarify the nature of our objects of daily work. Nor did we aim at developing 
a new aesthetic model for the reception of past musical works. More simply, 
but—I suspect—with deeper consequences, we found ourselves in a situation 
where our own practices could not be aesthetically assessed on the basis of 
existing ontological accounts, and where our ways of working with the mater-
ials started suggesting new and alternative views of what a musical work is, 
which component parts it might have, and how its material constitutive parts 
allow for the individual and collective construction of an “image of work.”
Crucially, our mode of operating clearly considers the performative moment 
not as a place for representation of already known sound structures, but of a 
critical problematisation of the musical objects under consideration. With the 
project Rasch, a major breakthrough happened: it seemed to us that musical 
works could be considered from a completely new perspective, moving beyond 
currently available music ontologies, which are based on a representational mode 
of thinking about musical works.6 Is there a possibility to think about those 
 4 I am referring here to those ontological accounts that determine a work’s “qualification” solely on the 
basis of a score or a plurality of scores, per se. This view must be differentiated from other accounts 
(such as the one mentioned in the preceding footnote) that are less essentialist, including the modal-
ities through which a given musical community frames and receives performance practices. I thank 
David Davies for calling my attention to this important differentiation. 
 5 David Davies has pointed out that this statement depends on which particular ontological account I am 
referring to. As Davies wrote (pers. comm.): “For a contextualist like Levinson or myself, at least some 
of the things included in the performance do enter into the work. To cite the most obvious example, the 
Beethoven passage quoted by Schumann in the earlier piece [Fantasie, op. 17] would, for the contextual-
ist, be partly constitutive of the earlier piece, in the sense that the passage features in Schumann’s work 
as a quotation, and a failure to grasp this is a flaw in a listener’s grasp of that piece. Whether this also 
extends to Kreisleriana will depend, for the contextualist, on how [he or] she takes this to itself relate to 
the earlier piece.” In any case, Davies agrees with me in that “even for such a contextualist, most of the 
things incorporated into the performance of Rasch would not enter into the appreciation of Kreisleriana 
as a work.” As an example of relative openness to the inclusion of heterogeneous components into a 
work, Davies mentions Jerrold Levinson, who “thinks that the ways in which future composers or per-
formers take up elements in a given piece do enter into a full engagement with the latter.” I thank David 
for this precise and crucial remark.
 6 With “representation,” I am referring to the performance “of ” something, or, more precisely, to the 
performance of something “as” something, which implies the existence of something “original,” prior 
to the performance, something that is then rendered perceptible through some sort of “representation” 
in the moment of the performance. In this sense, the performance functions as a “representation” of 
something exterior to it. Thus, I am not referring to the old aesthetic question of music’s “resistance to 
representation,” related to the absence of the signified in musical pitches, rhythms, or formal structures. 
In any case, music theory and music philosophy have a long tradition of thinking about musical entities 
in representational terms. As Christopher Hasty (2010, 4) has put it, “[even] if music seems to defy rep-
resentation and has occasionally challenged the claims of representation, music theory has embraced 
representation as a way of fixing the musical object.” 
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entities that we usually call “musical works” in another way? Is there another 
way of conceiving musical renderings of past musical objects? Is it possible to 
move beyond the classical paradigm of music performance and reception? How 
could all those materials that are not supposed to be played in a performance, 
but which obviously relate to a given “musical work,” be considered as being 
part of that work? What kind of “image of work” would that imply? It seemed to 
me that there are multiple ways of thinking about, and of conceiving, musical 
works. And every specific image of work has implications for its renderings 
in concerts, recordings, performances, or installations. All of a sudden, in 
the middle of the MusicExperiment21 project, and to my own surprise, I saw 
myself obliged to address ontological questions, as new views on ontological 
issues seemed to be necessary. And this was the reason to organise the Orpheus 
Academy 2016 on this topic, to which we invited some of the leading experts in 
the field. 
The Thirteenth International Orpheus Academy for 
Music and Theory 
The International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory is the annual 
conference organised by the Orpheus Research Centre. For the Academy, a 
selected guest faculty with outstanding expertise in a specific topic is invited 
to attend a series of lectures and to write an individual essay. All researchers 
from the Orpheus Research Centre, as well as the doctoral students from the 
docARTES programme, are invited to participate, and have the opportunity to 
present aspects of their research to a high-level group of experts. In its first 
eight editions, from 2003 until 2011, the Orpheus Academy was particularly 
oriented towards music theory and historical musicology, and all those acade-
mies had a profoundly historical perspective, focusing on particular periods of 
Western art music. Their faculty constitution was impressive, and the Academy 
gained international recognition as an important event for musicians, per-
formers, composers, musicologists, and music theorists alike. Since 2012, a 
reorientation took place and the academies primarily addressed transhistorical 
aspects of the utmost relevance for artistic research of less relevance for histor-
ical musicology or applied music theory. This development was clearly in line 
with the overall growth of the Orpheus Institute as an international centre of 
excellence for artistic research, thus attracting audiences and faculty members 
from wider areas of research and from diverse fields of knowledge. More than 
reducing knowledge production to a narrow period in history, these academies 
aimed at opening horizons of thought for future creative developments.
For its thirteenth edition, we invited the authors of the present book: 
Andreas Dorschel, David Davies, Gunnar Hindrichs, John Rink, and Lydia 
Goehr. During the Academy, Lydia Goehr discussed the notion of “discompo-
sition” as a philosophical and musical concept, reading Stanley Cavell’s 1965 
essay “Music Discomposed” through the lens of Adorno. David Davies first 
addressed “musical practice” and “metaphysical principles,” focusing on what 
participants in artistic practice do rather than on what they say or think they are 
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doing, proposing a prescriptive (rather than descriptive) ontology; his second 
lecture dealt with the distinction between musical works and performances, 
using the notions of “multiple instantiations,” “repeatability,” and “variability.” 
John Rink explored diverse issues concerning the relation between musical 
structures and musical performances, in addition to addressing the possibil-
ities arising from innovative digital editorial practices, specifically focusing 
on case studies from his extensive work on Chopin; in his second lecture, he 
addressed issues of aesthetic evaluation, sharing with the audience his experi-
ences as a jury member of the International Chopin Competition in Warsaw in 
2015. Gunnar Hindrichs suggested a new kind of ontology, presenting a blue-
print of musical works explained through six concepts: material, sound, time, 
space, meaning, and thought; his second lecture advanced a theory of musical 
listening based upon the notion of hearing “something as something,” chal-
lenging the function of values in the aesthetic experience of music. Andreas 
Dorschel explored the idea of “music as play,” and reflected on the question 
in which way musical expression can and should be historicised. Finally, I 
presented my ongoing work on a “new image of work,” a domain-specific onto-
logical perspective, grounded on material documents, taking into account the 
intensive processuality involved in the generation of such documents (sketches, 
drafts, scores, editions, recordings, etc.), and sustained by an understanding of 
“musical works” as multiplicities. These appear as highly complex, historically 
constructed, actual and virtual assemblages of things (topics I develop in detail 
below, in my own chapter).
In addition to these lectures, there were three music performances, and sev-
eral installations across the building (see Appendix). These were not intended 
as decorative moments within a substantially theoretical debate, but as an inte-
gral part of the discourse, contributing concrete sonic and visual materials to 
the topic. Tackling the notion of performance not as a place of representation, but 
of problematisation, these musical interventions explored unknown and unpre-
dictable encounters between music, texts, and imagery. Prepared by the ME21 
Collective—concretely by myself, Lucia D’Errico, and Juan Parra Cancino—
these performances were further explorations of experimental performance 
practices in Western notated art music, problematising major works not only 
by Robert Schumann, Ludwig van Beethoven, John Cage, Bruno Maderna, 
and Luigi Nono but also by Athanasius Kircher, Nicola Vicentino, Sigismondo 
d’India, and even Friedrich Nietzsche. 
The publication process
Between the Orpheus Academy (4–6 April 2016) and the present publication, 
further critical reflections happened, in the form of a productive dialogue and 
exchange of draft chapters among all involved authors. Each faculty member 
submitted an early version of his or her lecture well in advance, that is, before 
the Academy took place. During the Academy, all presentations were vividly 
discussed by the other faculty members and by the audience, leading to add-
itional lines of thought not originally planned. After the Academy, first drafts 
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of the chapters—already reflecting developments resulting from those discus-
sions—were circulated among all the authors in order to collect comments and 
responses and stimulate critique.7 Next, each paper was read and annotated by 
at least two other faculty members,8 and, finally, a revised version was sent again 
to the editor, who in dialogue with the author agreed the final version of the 
text.9 This form of intensive collaboration is especially well suited to a group 
of thinkers with powerful voices who do not fear positive, productive critique 
to make their cases even stronger; it is also a means of integrating previously 
unthought components into their arguments.
This methodology led to a high level of understanding of the others’ posi-
tions, enabling the inclusion of some fruitful comments and footnotes that 
became part of the final versions of the essays.
David Davies offers a broad overview on the varied landscape of music 
ontologies currently available. Starting with the central challenge of determin-
ing the best ontological account for a practice in which the “work-concept” 
does have “regulative force,” Davies presents a series of different ontologies 
and their relation to what he labels “the classical paradigm,” arguing for a 
non-Platonist interpretation of this paradigm. Proactively contributing to 
MusicExperiment21’s discourse, David Davies studied the official “statements” 
of our project (musicexperiment21.eu) and included our “position” in his wide 
map of ontologies, situating our practices within a nominalist/materialist 
perspective,10 and suggesting some kind of resemblance between our perform-
ances and those developed by American theatre theoretician and philosopher 
James R. Hamilton (see Hamilton 2007, 23–40). 
Gunnar Hindrichs, openly assuming (in his own words) “a dogmatic mode 
of presentation” that does not aim at discussing either contrary or connatural 
positions, presents a case for a new kind of music ontology. First, he disquali-
fies common ontologies, which consist of providing sterile definitions of the 
kind of entities musical works are assumed to be; next, he claims that ontology 
 7 Most of the comments were made via email, in a rather informal mode of communication that also 
included comments within the written files. These comments have been integrated into the main text, 
and the author of the comment only appears (as a footnote) in those cases where a clearly different 
voice made or suggested some sort of clarification that positively influenced the essay.
 8 The only exception is Gunnar Hindrichs, who due to several other commitments could not take part in 
this exchange of thoughts and comments.
 9 A special case is Lydia Goehr’s essay, which is followed by three formal “responses” that were written 
independently of the Orpheus Academy 2016. Earlier versions of Goehr’s paper had been presented at 
the University of Toronto (2015), and at the Philosophy Department at the New School for Social Re-
search, New York (see Chapter Six, footnote 2). On that occasion, Goehr received two written responses 
to her presentation, which, given their interest, and in line with our idea of a collective discourse, are 
published here for the first time. My own comment to her essay can be seen as a third response, making 
also the bridge to the concrete artistic presentations that took place during the Orpheus Academy 2016, 
which are briefly described in the concluding Appendix.
 10 I wish to deeply thank David for his generous analysis of our statements, and for including us in his 
elaborated map of ontologies. I think he is correct from the point of view of currently available music 
ontologies, though I will argue that MusicExperiment21 operates outside such ontologies, suggesting a 
new image of work that is, at the same time, “more ideal” than Platonism’s views (including an “excess” 
of virtual singularities), and more empirical than nominalistic accounts (being grounded on actual, 
individual singularities). I will briefly explain these notions further on, and in greater detail in my 




understood as “first philosophy” is actually not needed; and, finally, he offers 
an aesthetic ontology, one that does not ignore the demands of aesthetics. In a 
post-Kantian style of thought, Hindrichs makes a plea for the full autonomy of 
musical works, and for the act of listening as disclosing the meaning of musical 
works.
John Rink focuses on the performer, suggestively offering a reflection on the 
work of the performer in relation to the musical work. The work (noun) gives 
way for “to work” (verb). By claiming that performers’ engagement with the 
“musical work” as conventionally understood entails a different sort of “work” 
in the sense of both process and outcome, Rink argues that what performers do 
influences music’s very content, how it takes shape, and how those who hear it 
perceive and understand it. He first describes the act of performing; next, he 
revisits key literature on musical narrativity, and puts it to use in addressing the 
performer–work relationship; finally, a case study based on his own experience 
as a pianist further illustrates that relationship in action.
In the place of a conventional essay, Andreas Dorschel wrote a four-part dia-
logue, a play situated in Cambridge, at St John’s College, on an early spring 
day in 1947. Four people are seated around a grand piano, which they occa-
sionally play: philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, composer Elisabeth Lutyens, 
pianist Myra Hess, and singer Rae Woodland. In an apparently pleasurable and 
joyful conversation, central reflections about different definitions and varied 
understandings of the role of “play” (in music, but also in other forms of human 
expression) are presented. During the conversation, various pieces are played 
at the piano, including works by Bach, Beethoven, Chopin, Schumann, and 
Debussy.
Lydia Goehr interprets Stanley Cavell’s 1965 essay “Music Discomposed,” 
filtered “through the lens of Adorno,” with excursions into early nineteenth- 
century definitions of “discomposition” as offered, for example, by Emerson. 
Goehr notes that “Cavell included his essay in a volume published the year 
before Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory,” allowing her to claim that both writers were 
consciously responding to the post-war challenges to philosophy and the arts. 
Goehr examines Cavell’s remarks on the alleged “fraudulence” in contempor-
ary music, but turns quickly to work out what he could have meant by the elu-
sive term “discomposed.” Her argument turns on shifting attention away from 
a music that was (in one way or another) composed, un-composed, or dis-com-
posed, to the modernist experience wherein a subject, and by extension a 
writer, feels discomposed in the face of a music where the meaning seems not 
sincerely to be meant (according to Cavell). The relevance of Cavell’s essay to 
this volume on music ontology is evident in the play between the discompos-
ition of subjecthood and workhood around 1800, which follows from Goehr’s 
earlier study of the culmination of the emergence of the work-concept in her 
The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works ([1992] 2007).
On the one hand, these essays brilliantly illuminate specific aspects of exist-
ing music ontologies and practices. They range from transcendental consid-
erations (Gunnar Hindrichs) to immanent modes of music production (John 
Rink’s concrete performance), from a neutral mapping of the available ontol-
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ogies (David Davies), to a proposal of an “aesthetic ontology” (Hindrichs), 
from serene considerations on the playfulness of music (Andreas Dorschel) 
to the sharp claim for criticality and the overcoming of existing models (Lydia 
Goehr). On the other hand, though, they all remain within the thought horizon 
of the classical paradigm, a notion explored, for example, by David Davies in his 
book Philosophy of the Performing Arts (2011), where he looks for the best possible 
ontological account that could accommodate Goehr’s notion of the regulative 
force of the work-concept.11 Gunnar Hindrichs “aesthetic ontology” develops 
the notion of listening as the locus for disclosing musical works, thus giving to 
the act of “listening” an ontological role and impact, but crucially not challeng-
ing “the other side,” the one of “the work,” which remains fully autonomous 
and transcendent both to its performance and to its listening. David Davies 
constructs his own path within the ontological landscape of our day, situating 
his perspective in a non-Platonist interpretation of models based upon the 
work-concept. Both John Rink and Andreas Dorschel insist on the centrality of 
the performative action, favouring an epistemological rather than ontological 
approach to music-making. Lydia Goehr forcefully reminds us of the impor-
tance of being critical and of the necessity of breaking down dominant modes 
of thinking; both in her essay and in the discussions during the Academy, she 
claimed that Stanley Cavell and Arthur C. Danto in the 1960s were making phil-
osophy respond to the “psychopathology” of that period, one where musicians 
and aestheticians had no hold on their concepts. According to her, that was 
also what she herself tried to do in the late 1980s, while writing The Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works, a period when practice was demolishing concepts and 
conventions, forcing people to revisit their mental categories.
Today, almost entering the third decade of the twenty-first century, musical 
practices are demolishing the ontological establishment even more, but the 
most recent analytic philosophy tries to make things and musical “works” 
more transparent, grasping or explaining them better, mapping their position 
in an overall transcendentally defined territory. Some of the contemporary 
defenders of music ontologies, such as Andrew Kania (2012) or Julian Dodd 
(2007), for example, reaffirm the authority of the work, “improving” proposi-
tional judgements, but not challenging concepts or practices. Music ontology 
seems to be caught within dominant conservative views on music, and even 
conser vative views on the world beyond music. Because of this state of affairs, 
most music practitioners, be they performers or composers, are extremely 
sceptical of music ontologies, which appear to them as profoundly sterile and 
unrelated to their practices. However, practical musicians should be aware that 
currently existing ontologies have a tremendous influence on what they play and 
how they are supposed to play it. The argument that ontological judgements 
have no aesthetic consequences (as claimed for example by James O. Young 
[2014–15, 1]) is unashamedly ideological because it aims to reinforce musical 
practices subsumed under the “strong-work concept,” tamed by authoritative 
 11 One should note that, whereas Goehr aimed at a social ontology, rooted in history and historicity, 
Davies is trying to better define an abstract ontology, in the tradition of transcendent music ontologies. 
 Introduction
17
texts and sources, whose production is the property of a caste of privileged 
musicologists and music philosophers. The way one defines what counts as a 
work establishes profound constraints on what is considered as “acceptable” 
and “unacceptable,” as “possible” and “impossible,” what is allowed and what 
is forbidden, thus providing the musical market with precise instruments of 
survey and control. Therefore, ontological judgements, which are a priori 
judgements, do have empirical consequences—at least in the empirical world 
of music performance. 
The role of artistic research
As Lydia Goehr wrote in 2001 (601), most philosophical engagement with 
music has been done by three different kinds of thinkers: (1) by philosophers 
developing metaphysical systems “in which each subject and type of phenom-
enon, including music, is assigned its proper place” (ibid.), which is Gunnar 
Hindrichs’s argument in this volume; (2) by “philosophers treating music 
as one of the arts within their different philosophical systems of aesthetics” 
(ibid.), which is David Davies’s take; and (3) by “musicians—composers, per-
formers, theorists and critics—drawing on and thus contributing to explain 
the foundations, rationale and more esoteric aspects of their theories, practices 
and products” (ibid.), which is the case in John Rink’s and Andreas Dorschel’s 
contributions. At the same time, several contemporary performance practices, 
of which those developed by MusicExperiment21 are one example among 
others, suggest renewed ontological accounts—accounts that come from a 
fourth group, namely that of performers of notated Western art music who are 
working within a creative and research-based mode of performance. These 
are “artistic researchers,” and they are proactively contributing to a redefin-
ition of our mental categories, namely in respect of ontological definitions of 
those entities usually called “musical works.” I am not saying that our practice 
“needs” an ontological rooting, nor am I saying that performers long for music 
ontologies; I am simply saying that the concrete, creative practice of music is 
generating philosophical insights that “pure” philosophy or applied musicol-
ogy are not delivering. In this sense, it seems to me that the necessary renewal 
of the ontological discourse will not come from music philosophers, nor from 
musicologists, but precisely from this new kind of performer, trained and ori-
ented towards artistic research. Through our critical apparatus and creative 
mode of making music, new images of thought and new images of the musical 
work are emerging.
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During the International Orpheus Academy for Music and Theory 2016, I pre-
sented a first attempt towards a completely renewed perspective on musical 
entities, one that could move beyond existing music ontologies, relating more 
to current performance practices and to the vast amount of available music 
sources and documents. Since the Academy, and partly as a result of it,1 my ideas 
developed into a music ontological thought strongly inspired by the differen-
tial ontology of Gilles Deleuze. A detailed account of my “new image of work” 
will be a major part of my forthcoming monograph Logic of Experimentation (De 
Assis 2018), but I wish to present its fundamental traits in this chapter, not least 
because they explain the title of this book, and of the Orpheus Academy 2016. 
I will proceed in three steps: First (section 1), I will point out some of the prob-
lems with currently available music ontologies, as they have been discussed 
in recent years (mostly) by analytic philosophers. Next (section 2), I will pre-
sent some basic components of a Deleuzian ontology as it has been extracted 
from his writings by post-Deleuzian philosophers (prominently by Manuel 
DeLanda, and first and foremost based upon Deleuze’s seminal book Difference 
and Repetition). Finally (section 3), I will present a novel way of thinking about 
musical entities, suggesting a “new image of work,” and, consequently, an 
alternative music ontology. I would like to emphasise that I do not claim to 
offer a complete, finished, and transparent ontological account. It is more of 
an attempt (a Versuch) that will be followed by other essays addressing specific 
topics in greater detail.
1. Music ontologies: some problems
To start with, one has to register (as the Orpheus Academy 2016 also proved) 
that currently existing music ontologies are in an impasse, not to say in a 
deep crisis. In a recent collective volume on the appeal to abstract objects in 
art ontology generally, edited by Christy Mag Uidhir (2012), Guy Rohrbaugh 
(2012) enthusiastically opens his chapter (the first in the collection) by stat-
ing that “we surely live in a golden age for the ontology of art” (29). However, 
throughout the chapter, he presents us with a series of burning issues that seem 
to condemn music ontology to irrelevance, even concluding that “an ontology 
 1 I wish to express my gratitude to Lydia Goehr, David Davies, and Lucia D’Errico for their extensive and 




ultimately driven by a description of what it is we already do, as it must if it is 
to be an ontology of art at all, looks like it will be unable to turn around and 
informatively explain or justify any of those doings we described. . . . One might 
say that there is no such endeavor as the ontology of art” (37). Along the way, 
Rohrbaugh addresses several problems around pragmatist and deflationist 
views, comparing various positions, authors, and recent debates, not hesitat-
ing to openly discuss critical problems that might endanger the field of music 
ontology itself. First, he observes that ontologists are motivated to preserve the 
appearances of dominant practices (32), which remain by and large unques-
tioned. Second, he identifies a serious problem in the fact that music ontolo - 
gists are squeezed between traditional metaphysics and traditional musical 
practices (33), not taking into account alternative or innovative approaches. 
Third, expressing a dilemma he shares with Jerrold Levinson, Rohrbaugh con-
fesses that “We describe objects that fit our practices to a tee and then pro-
ceed to claim that there are such objects. Unfortunately, they are not there. 
Any number of critics, myself included, have pointed out that the idea of an 
indicated type does not really make much sense” (33). Fourth, he acknowledges 
that music ontology often ends up with two discourses: one is obvious, and thus 
unnecessary; the other is of a hermetic character, and thus highly elitist: “At 
the object-level, our practices may be recognized as going on just as they do, 
while our deflationary attitude at the meta-level need only be known to the 
philosophical elite for whom it matters. . . . But instead of ending up with a pic-
ture on which our practices give rise to the very objects of their own concern, 
we instead end up with, quite literally, nothing” (34–35).2 Thus, what had been 
announced as living in a “golden age” seems to be more pertinently described 
as a discipline fading away in a sombre corner of the humanities.
A summary of all existing ontological positions would go beyond the scope 
of this chapter,3 but a very important observation—one that cannot be over-
looked—is that the vast majority of music ontologists are philosophers attached 
to so-called analytic philosophy, focusing and presenting their arguments first 
and foremost in logical propositions, to which they claim most forms of human 
knowledge is reducible.4 In the last decade a significant number of philoso-
 2 Guy Rohrbaugh’s ontological arguments have been of personal interest to me, especially his notions of 
“continuants” and “historical individuals” (that he vaguely retrieves from biology and from processes 
of speciation), which makes his position—among all other currently available accounts—the one that 
comes closest to my own practice and perspective (even if still with substantial differences). Further-
more, I also share with him his declared scepticism about music ontologies, a scepticism related to the 
widespread use of a philosophical terminology that has lost the connection to the modes of existence of 
musical works and practices of our day.
 3 For a precise and concise description of Platonism, nominalism, fictionalism, perdurantism, endurant-
ism, and eliminativism, see the chapter by David Davies in this volume (pp. 45–64). Another excellent 
overview of ongoing positions and discussions, including viewpoints from several authors, is the volume 
Art and Abstract Objects, edited by Christy Mag Uidhir (2012), particularly Andrew Kania’s essay “Plato-
nism vs. Nominalism in Contemporary Musical Ontology” (2012). A further recent edited volume on 
music ontology is Alessandro Arbo and Marcello Ruta’s Ontologie Musicale: Perspectives et débats (2014).
 4 As David Davies mentioned to me (pers. comm.), analytic philosophers acknowledge the existence 
of some practical forms of knowledge (“knowledge [of ] how [to do things]”), “and many [analytic 
philosophers] would recognize that some knowledge is irreducibly embodied.” For a detailed account 
of the complex field of analytic philosophy in relation to music, see David Davies’s forthcoming essay 




phers, such as Ross P. Cameron, Ben Caplan, Carl Matheson, David Davies, 
Julian Dodd, Andrew Kania, Chris Tillman, and Guy Rohrbaugh (among oth-
ers), have contributed major essays on art and musical ontology, renewing 
an analytic discourse initiated in the 1960s and continued up until the 1980s 
by music thinkers such as Nelson Goodman, Richard Wollheim, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Jerrold Levinson, Stanley Cavell, Peter Kivy, and Stephen Davies 
(among others). The problem with this analytic tradition is that, despite their 
differences, the very structure of its arguments, so fundamentally concerned 
with the conditions of identity, is incompatible with the objects it pretends to 
define and explain (see Butt 2002, 62). Analytic philosophers define the iden-
tity of things by the necessary conditions that enable such things to belong to a 
general category, that is to say, they must have an “essence.”5 It was this kind of 
analytical landscape that Lydia Goehr, back in 1992, managed to call into ques-
tion. Her critical perspective addresses not so much whether music al “works” 
exist as the particular moment in history when a specific way of conceiving 
musical works became “the” regulative force for musical practices. Goehr 
first and foremost disclosed the regulative function of the work-concept, 
showing its profound historicity. As a consequence, and in a second (though 
critical) moment, the work-concept itself appears as dependent on a historical 
point of view. As John Butt (2002, 62–63) expressed it, “In Goehr’s account, no 
analytic theory adequately accounts for the historical boundary of the music 
that it concerns.[6] . . . According to Goehr [the work-concept] is an ‘open 
concept,’ allowing for the subtraction or addition of defining characteristics 
provided that its continuity is assured and that it is consistently recognisable 
over its period of operation.” Goehr was simply trying to get hold of the innu-
merable musical practices that were obviously incompatible with analytic con-
structions deprived of any sense of historical situatedness and ideally placed 
in a world without time and imperfections. As Goehr ([1992] 2007, 86) put it, 
“The lurking danger remains that the [analytic] theories will probably become 
forever divorced from the phenomena and practices they purportedly seek to 
explain. . . . The problem with the search for identity conditions resides in the 
incompatibility between the theoretical demands of identity conditions and 
the phenomena to be accounted for.” Moreover, the theoretical abstraction of 
analytic philosophies is not only divorced from musical practice, it is also com-
pletely removed from philological studies, from research on sketches, music 
editorial practices, changes in execution and interpretation paradigms—in a 
nutshell, from the complexities of history, and from the concrete, processual, 
 5 In this respect, David Davies (pers. comm.) reminded me that that both Goodman’s and Wollheim’s 
writings “explicitly reject the project of defining art, any of the arts, and limit themselves to the more 
modest task of providing necessary conditions” for the existence of an artwork. 
 6 Here too, David Davies makes a call for a more nuanced formulation, taking into account recent devel-
opments in analytic philosophy. As Davies wrote (pers. comm.): “I think this is the important criticism 
of much of the analytic work on music (e.g., Kivy), although it is not true of all the writers you cite [in 
this chapter]. Levinson, for example, restricts his account of ‘what a musical work is’ to musical works of 
a certain period, and recent work by analytic philosophers has been much more sensitive to differences 
between musical practices. But it is also true that when Lydia Goehr wrote her book [late 1980s], analyt-




and immanent fabrication of all those documents that enable us to think about 
“musical works” in the first place.
A second problem with contemporary ontologies concerns the problem of 
representation. Despite their profound differences and quarrels, the three main 
existing umbrella theories—Platonism, nominalism, fictionalism—share a 
common trait: they are all sustained by a representational model of thought 
and by representational musical practices. There is always the performance or 
the apprehension of something “as” something, or the performance “of ” some-
thing. Whatever one perceives in any specific here-and-now (a performance, a 
recording, a description), it is a “representation” of something else.7 Platonists 
insist on the primacy of an original idea and of perfectly encapsulated sound 
structures (Wollheim’s types) that can be represented through performances 
(Wollheim’s tokens, which can be qualified or fully-qualified). Nominalists focus 
on the material entities internal to musical practice, rejecting abstracta but 
keeping the central assumption of performance as based upon the repeatabil-
ity and variablity of an immanently generated but clearly well-articulated work, 
which crucially pre-exists the performance and to which the performance is 
compared, thus reintroducing a transcendental entity into the picture. For 
fictionalists there are no works altogether, but through their construction of 
works “as if they existed” they commit—in practical terms—to the same model 
of performance as presenting (or representing) a pre-given musical entity (even 
if phantasmatic). They all agree that there “are” musical works (the exception 
being the eliminativists), and they all look for “what kind of things they are.” 
However, despite their considerable differences, these three main currents 
of music ontology further share a common set of fundamental questions that 
relate to the conditions of identity of musical works: What exactly is a musical 
work? Are musical works abstract ideas or concrete things? How can a musical 
work be identified as this musical work? How can an instantiation of a work be 
considered as adequate, legitimate, or, to use the language of ontologists, “fully 
qualified”? In addition to the conditions of identity, these questions also relate to 
the criteria of judgement of any given appearance of a musical work, thus doubly 
pertaining to a representational mode of thinking, a mode that is actually of 
Aristotelian imprint rather than Platonic. 
In this double sense, the vast majority of current music ontologies could 
be seen as actually relying on the Aristotelian world of representation. But 
this world is umbilically related to Plato’s theory of ideas. The very notion of 
representation implies something prior to it that has the capacity for “being 
represented.” As Gilles Deleuze argued in a long section of Difference and 
Repetition (1994, 262–304), the Aristotelian world of representation is enabled, 
first and foremost by Plato’s theory of ideas, and crucially by its intrinsic moral 
motivation. 
 7 Broadly agreeing with me (“this is true of mainstream analytic ontology of music”), David Davies stress-
es that there are some exceptions, among which he counts Kania’s paper “All Play and No Work” (2011) 
(which rejects the assumption among many analytic writers that most jazz performances also fall under 




Plato inaugurates and initiates because he evolves within a theory of Ideas 
which will allow the deployment of representation. In his case, however, a moral 
motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms 
has no motivation apart from the moral. . . . Later, the world of representation will 
more or less forget its moral origin and presuppositions. These will nevertheless 
continue to act in the distinction between the originary and the derived, the original 
and the sequel, the ground and the grounded, which animates the hierarchies of a 
representative theology by extending the complementarity between model and copy. 
Representation[, thus,] is a site of transcendental illusion. (Deleuze 1994, 265, my 
emphasis). 
While discussing and critically challenging Plato’s notions of copy and simu-
lacrum, Deleuze observes—in the conclusion to Difference and Repetition—that 
from a Platonist perspective the copy can always be systematically distin-
guished from the simulacrum by subordinating its own difference to a fourfold 
principle: of the Same, the Similar, the Analogous, and the Opposed (ibid.). 
According to Deleuze, these strict verifiable correspondences do not per se 
imply a system based upon representation: “with Plato these instances are not 
yet distributed as they will be in the deployed world of representation (from 
Aristotle onwards)” (ibid.). It is in the transition from the Platonic world to the 
world of representation that “a slippage occurs” (ibid.). As Miguel de Beistegui 
(analysing and paraphrasing Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism) makes clear: 
It is only superficially that the Platonic method involves dividing something 
according to its natural articulations, that is, according to genus and species. In 
other words, the operation of specification, from genus to species and all the way to 
what Aristotle calls “differences,” with which Plato’s work is sometimes associated, 
is only a preliminary step towards a more significant goal. Or, to put it differently, 
the Aristotelian operation of division and specification is itself an effect of, and 
a response to, the image of thought that Plato had identified for philosophy. 
(Beistegui 2012, 59–60) 
 Thus, it was actually after Plato that “the sameness of the Platonic Idea . . . 
gives way to the identity of the concept, oriented towards the form of identity in 
the object, and grounded in a self-identical thinking subject” (ibid., 61). A “thinking 
subject” that “brings to the concept its subjective concomitants: memory, rec-
ognition and self-consciousness” (Deleuze 1994, 266). In this new representa-
tional model, both objects and subjects are taken as being perfectly defined, 
transparent, and uncorrupted. This is what allows analytical investigations (of 
the objects, but also of their coded, i.e., linguistic articulations), on the one 
side, and for phenomenological considerations (of and by the subjects), on the 
other. The main operation for knowing the world becomes recognition, and dif-
ference in thought disappears because, as Beistegui (2012, 61) observes, “the 
image of thought as recognition . . . requires the concordance and collabora-
tion of all faculties (perception, memory, reason, imagination, judgment, etc.) 
in the presentation of the same object, or the object in the form of self-identity. 
Far from breaking with the doxa, and becoming paradoxical, the dominant image 




difficult to shake off in that its hidden, underlying presupposition is moral 
through and through.” 
In this light, and strictly in this particular sense, one can appropriate for 
musical ontology the Deleuzian qualifications regarding the problem of rep-
resentation in Plato and Aristotle. Surprisingly, the major existing musical 
ontologies (even those not officially labelled “Platonic”) can be traced back to 
Plato’s theory of Ideas. The fundamental questions of the diverse music ontolo-
gies assume the existence of identifiable and stabilised musical works (be it 
abstracta or concreta), of uncorrupted subjects capable of immaculately appre-
hending them, and of a transparent link between a work’s written codification 
and its sonic manifestation in performance. They do not take into account the 
energetic, intensive conditions and processes of their coming into being, nor 
the intricacies of their transmission throughout time and history. They rely on a 
grounding model based upon the notions of original, copy, and simulacra, even 
if they disagree in the concrete definitions of these notions. And they agree 
on an ontological partition of the world into genera, species, and individuals, fully 
adhering to an Aristotelian conception of categories and hierarchies. The dan-
ger of falling into scholastic “great chains of being” is lurking at the door.8 The 
difficulty is to overcome rigidly entrenched beliefs, which keep many positions 
jailed in the sterile prisons of analytical logic and language games. As philoso-
pher Manuel DeLanda (2012, 223) has put it, “For many analytical philosophers 
abandoning the categories of the general and the particular is a difficult step 
because many of them were trained to believe that all of mathematics had been 
reduced to logic.[9] . . . It is not surprising, therefore, that realist analytical phil-
osophers tend to speak like Aristotle, defining the identity of things by the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to belong to a general category. In other 
words, defining identity by the possession of an essence.”
This Aristotelian influence is manifest in some music ontological accounts, 
which explicitly refer to Aristotelian categories to ground their arguments. 
Curiously, this is particularly observable among the so-called Platonists. Julian 
Dodd, for example, when discussing norm-types, directly uses arguments from 
the field of biological species and individuals—his example being the domes-
tic dog (Canis familiaris), about which he observes that even a dog missing an 
ear or a leg is still a token of the species (type) “dog”: “There can certainly be 
improperly formed tokens of The Domestic Dog (Canis familiaris): albino dogs 
and dogs missing an ear or a leg are nevertheless tokens of the type. And it is a 
truism that, just as long as an inscription is sufficiently close to being correctly 
formed, it counts as an inscription of a certain word, albeit one of which its 
author should not feel particularly proud” (Dodd 2007, 33). Jerrold Levinson, 
who defends a softer version of Platonism, accepting that composers are the 
“creators” of their own compositions (something that pure Platonists do not 
accept), in turn recurs to the hedgehog as his example: “The creatures we call 
 8 In this respect, Gunnar Hindrichs writes that “Every ontology manifests a conceptual scheme that 
articulates the great chain of being” (see Hindrichs, in this book, pp. 67, my emphasis).
 9 Against DeLanda, David Davies (pers. comm.) claims that he is describing something closer to logicism, 




‘hedgehogs’ possess a certain structure and stand in certain causal relations 
to some particular creatures that came into existence at a given past date. . . . 
Musical works . . . are indicated structures too, and thus types that do not already 
exist but must instead be initiated. The same is true of poems, plays, and nov-
els—each of these is an entity more individual and temporally bound than the 
pure verbal structure embodied in it” (Levinson 1990, 81–82, my emphasis). 
 Music ontologists, thus, talk about species, claiming them as means to fur-
ther support their own art theories. As Rohrbaugh (2012, 36) wrote, “Orthodox 
views hold that species membership is a part-whole relation and that species 
are scattered individuals, perhaps four-dimensional sums.” Critically, the prob-
lem with these views is that they don’t allow, and they actually repress, any 
thought that could lead to the consideration of concrete and historical indi-
viduals as fundamental constitutive parts of musical works.10 On the contrary, 
“works” (especially with a capital W) become fixed, petrified, and highly reified 
generalities. Unfortunately, as Rohrbaugh (ibid., 37) puts it, “when one asks, 
‘What sort of thing is a symphony?’ what one really gets in response is just an 
expression of the speaker’s own aesthetic views about what is and is not impor-
tant about symphonies, in short, ideology.” Attempts to emphasise, or simply 
to propose the centrality of historical individuals, of elements that appear in 
a precise moment in time, that undergo changes throughout historical time, 
that disappear or that reappear in another century, are boldly excluded and 
rejected. This was the case with Guy Rohrbaugh’s concept of the “continu-
ants,” which found resistances so strong that he himself (in a kind of externally 
induced self-critique) was forced to admit several shortcomings of his own (in 
my view interesting) formulations.11 
Thus, if one is aiming at a renewal of ontological discourses, if one wishes to 
propose and sustain a new image of work, one has to look farther away from the 
field of available music ontologies. One has to search for something capable of 
replacing Aristotelian metaphysics, for some sort of “image of thought” that 
doesn’t operate under the rules of the three Aristotelian categories of entities: 
genus, species, and individual. Moreover, such an image of thought must also over-
turn Platonism, in the strict sense of readdressing the fundamental distinction 
between icons and phantasms, between images and simulacra. In a nutshell, it 
must exclude both categorical hierarchies and idealist transcendence.
 10 In my view, this is the point where Rohrbaugh could have found a way out of the analytic tradition, 
making a critique of what he just so precisely described. Unfortunately, he continues alluding to the 
Aristotelian way of thinking about species as “scattered individuals” whose constitutive parts are 
individual creatures (his constituants, which have been strongly criticised by music Platonists). Within 
the ontological account that I propose further down, Rohrbaugh’s continuants can find a new mode of 
existence, independent of transcendent systems and from hierarchical categorisations. 
 11 P. D. Magnus (2012, 108) even writes that Julian Dodd pronounced an “accusation” against Rohrbaugh’s 




2. Beyond transcendence: grasping a Deleuzian 
ontology 
The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, 
to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning. (Deleuze 1998, 137) 
If one is looking for some kind of ally in the search for a novel, nonhierarchical, 
and fully immanent ontology, Gilles Deleuze seems to be one of the best placed 
philosophers to help us. As is well known, the overturning of Platonism (in the 
wake of Nietzsche’s famous claim) and the overcoming of “representation” 
were two of Gilles Deleuze’s life-long projects, and they are at the very core of 
his primary thesis for his Doctorat d’État, his famous book from 1968, Différence 
et répétition (see Deleuze 1994). Deleuze himself did not “officially” write texts 
specifically devoted to ontological issues, but, as Constantin V. Boundas (2005b, 
191) has written, “For Deleuze, philosophy is ontology,” and one could even 
claim that his books (also those co-authored with Félix Guattari) make signifi-
cant contributions, not to “one” ontology but to several, multiple ontologies. 
Crucially, Deleuze’s philosophy is one of difference, a difference that remains 
unsubordinated to “identity” and to “being,” rejecting hierarchical categories, 
and insisting on the profound reality (and realism) of his concepts of the virtual, 
the intensive, and the actual, which manifest themselves in various assemblages 
of energies, forces, and tendencies, making the world in which humans and 
non-humans live. 
Among other philosophies of difference (such as Derrida’s), one must stress 
the point that while rejecting laws and axioms, Deleuze “offers us principles 
and methods . . . whereas Derrida offers us an ethos and style of writing about 
difference explicitly resistant to the emergence of principles or methods” 
(Williams 2013, 27). For someone operating in the creative field of artistic 
research, which is by definition a “constructivist” field of activity (as it gener-
ates objects or events of artistic nature), a permanent resistance to principles 
and methods would be counterproductive, if not simply sterile. That’s why phil - 
osophers like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, or Félix Guattari are so relevant 
to artistic research: they offer a possibility for thought and practice outside laws 
and axiomatic principles, but they also enable the positive fabrication of materi- 
alities issuing from intensive processes. “Deleuze’s ontology,” as Constantin V. 
Boundas (2005b, 191) makes clear, “is a rigorous attempt to think of process and 
metamorphosis—becoming—not as a transition or transformation from one 
substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather as 
an attempt to think of the real as a process” (my emphasis). If the real is thought 
of as a process, its processuality simultaneously is fed by and generates a con-
tinuous flux of forces and intensities, which reveal themselves only in the very 
moment of their transductive actualisation. These forces and intensities do 
generate forms and matter, but it would be a mistake to think of them exclu-
sively in terms of things and their qualities. Extension and extended magnitudes 
are only the result of the intensive genesis of the extended. “Becoming” is not 




manent actualisation, of endlessly “becoming-something-different.” Instead of 
a linear process from one actual state to another, becoming is better conceived 
as an intensive movement from an actual state of affairs, through a dynamic 
field of virtual tendencies, to the actualisation of this field of forces in a new 
state of affairs.12
In what follows, I will briefly introduce five key notions that enable us to 
grasp the ontology of Gilles Deleuze, including the couple actual–virtual, 
intensity, individual and universal singularities, topological unfoldings, and 
multiplicities.13
Actual/virtual
The terminological doublet virtual–actual is central to the ontology of Gilles 
Deleuze, being present in his books and essays since his first published texts 
on Henri Bergson in 1956. Actual and virtual describe the fundamental domains 
of Deleuze’s differential ontology. According to Anne Sauvagnargues (2003, 
22, my translation), “the actual designates the present and material state of 
things, while the virtual refers to everything that is not currently/presently 
here (including incorporeal, past, or ideal events).” It is the exchange and 
communication between the actual and the virtual that enable a dynamics of 
becoming as different/ciation and creation. Primary differences of energy and 
energetic potentials generate “differentiation” (virtual structure) and “dif-
ferenciation” (the genesis of actuality). Such dynamics always happen in the 
form of an event—an event being the individuation of differentiation, and the 
actualisation of differenciation. One cannot overstress that for Deleuze, both 
the virtual and the actual are real. As Deleuze (1994, 208–9) himself has put it: 
“The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real. 
. . . Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object—as 
though the object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as 
though into an objective dimension. . . . The reality of the virtual consists of 
the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which 
correspond to them.”
Importantly, Deleuze’s virtual is by no means to be understood in terms of 
“virtual reality,” but, on the contrary, as something absolutely real, that is even 
“actually” perceived as tension or inconsistencies in/of the actual, as a dia-
grammatic reservoir of effectively potential actualisations (some of which will 
affect the world, some of which not), but that exist in a topological space of 
possibilities.14 Moreover, the distinction between the virtual and the actual is 
 12 For a thorough discussion of the relations between the couple virtual–real and the notion of becoming, 
see Boundas (2007, 489–91).
 13 Other concepts, such as the couple molar–molecular, the dark precursor, the quasi-cause, transduction, or the 
event are not addressed here for the sake of space, though they are also central to Deleuze’s ontological 
construction.
 14 It is in this sense that Deleuze, directly inspired by Bergson, could talk of a past that has never been 
present (the virtual as immemorial past), and of a future that will never be present (the virtual as a never- 
attainable messianic future). This link between the couple virtual–real and past–future temporalities 
prevents any reification of the past (as in Plato’s recollection), or of the future (as in some teleological 




not unilateral, nor is it ontologically black-boxed. This distinction is proces-
sual and differential, making the “a priori and the a posteriori . . . a product of 
individuating processes rather than their condition” (Toscano 2009, 389). The 
“virtual–real” might lead (under precise, yet unforeseeable transductive condi-
tions) to an “actual–real,” which, in turn (as soon as it emerges-in-the-world) 
fabricates a new “virtual–real.” Without resembling the actual, the virtual none-
theless has the capacity to bring about actualisation, and yet the virtual never 
coincides or can be identified with its actualisation. The virtual is the whole set 
of forces, energies, potentials, and intensities that exist, that are real, yet that 
are not actualised in the here-and-now of the present. The actual are all the 
forces, energies, potentials, and intensities that are currently happening in the 
here-and-now of our presence. There is no actual without virtual, and no virtual 
that cannot be actualised. 
Intensity 
Both the virtual and the actual appear, then, as the result of concrete energetic 
processes, involving the passage, the relay, or the transformation of one type of 
energy into another, crucially establishing a connection between two or more 
series with different energetic potentials. The virtual does not exist a priori to 
the intensive processes that generate it; it does not pre-deterministically define 
the processes of its actualisation (which would imply a kind of neo-Platonism). 
At the same time, the actual is not an “image” (a “copy”) of a pre-existing model, 
but it emerges progressively as the result of concrete intensive processes of 
onto- and morphogenesis. Before the definition of any ontological category, 
there are several constantly ongoing ontological processes, which are summa-
rised—in Deleuze’s terminology—under the notion of the intensive. Intensive 
processes generate singularities in the two sides of the real: individual singu-
larities in the actual–real, and universal singularities in the virtual–real. Thus, 
Deleuze’s notion of intensity, the pre-individual relationship between two or 
more fields with different potentials, gains centrality within his ontological 
scheme. Intensities are not ontological entities or categories (as the virtual and 
the actual can be considered to be), they are real events “whose mode of exist-
ence is to actualise themselves in states of affairs” (Boundas 2005a, 131). 
A thorough discussion of the complex relations between the virtual, the actual, 
and the intensive would lie outside the scope of this chapter, especially as there 
have been several attempts to clarify this topic, each leading to significantly 
different understandings.15 Be that as it might be, what seems clear from all 
these different understandings of Deleuze’s ontology, is that “intensity holds 
 15 In fact, there is no consensus about the precise placement of these three notions within Deleuze’s on-
tological system. Dale Clisby’s recent essay “Intensity in Context: Thermodynamics and Transcendental 
Philosophy” (2017, especially 250–55) offers a short, yet precise, overview of the three main currently 
available positions: (1) those who align the intensive with the virtual, which is the (critical) position of 
Peter Hallward (2006) and Alain Badiou (2000); (2) those who think the intensive as a third ontological 
domain, as has been convincingly proposed by Manuel DeLanda (2002) and John Protevi (2013), who 
excavated the precise scientific influences in the writings of Deleuze; and (3) those who consider the in-
tensive as being part of the actual, or as “the being of the actual” as Jon Roffe (2012, as quoted in Clisby 




the true key for Deleuze’s metaphysical system,” as Clisby (2017, 251) pointedly 
summarises. Critically, Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of forces and of actu-
alisations, not an ontology of actualised phenomena. As its object, it takes not 
the completed form (be it ideal or nominal) but formation itself. In the words 
of James Williams (2013, 42), “Deleuze’s view is that no object is fully accounted 
for through its actual properties since the changes that it has undergone and 
will undergo, and the differences implied in those changes, must be consid-
ered to be part of the object.” In this sense, as long as we insist on the existence 
of well-defined things, Deleuze’s position will not be grasped, and his case to 
overturn Plato and Aristotle will not prevail. With Williams (ibid., 69), one can 
say that “to be is not to be a well-defined thing with recognisable limits [but] 
on the contrary, it is to be a pure movement or variation in relation to well- 
defined things.” The process of actualisation does not occur in a vacuum: 
“at every moment there exists a field of intensity implicated in the explicated 
objects of experience” (Clisby 2017, 254).
Within a dynamic system, any process of individuation starts from inten-
sity, leading to the emergence of singularities, whether actual singularities 
or virtual ones. In the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994, 
247) clearly states that individuation precedes and gives rise to actualisation: 
“Individuation does not presuppose any differenciation; it gives rise to it.” 
Thus, “every differenciation presupposes a prior intense field of individuation” 
(ibid.). Critically, this “prior intense field of individuation” is a problematic field. 
There is no transparent nor straightforward correspondence between the prior 
field of individuation, the field of individuation itself, and the individuated sin-
gularity it affords. In all phases and at all moments of the individuating pro-
cess there are multiple and incommensurable forces playing a complex game 
of intensive tendencies and unfoldings. Any intensive process is a metastable 
flux of energetic discharges, potentials, and tendencies. And whereas this dif-
ferentiation establishes a problematisation, the concrete actualisations of that 
virtual field express differenciations as the constitution of solutions (by local 
integrations), leading to the formation of actual things. Such things are formed 
by different sets of specific individual singularities that are actualised in the 
here-and-now, in the present. The process of differenciation happens through 
transduction, changing one type of energy into another, critically leading to the 
formation of new and unexpected individuations, which contain emergent 
properties that were not predetermined in advance. These actualisations result 
in individual singularities, which can be things, objects, or documents, all with 
two parts: an extensive part (quantitatively measurable and divisible) and an 
intensive part (qualitatively active and non-divisible). The actual things in the 
world are thus not only the result of an intensive genesis, as they remain proces-
sual, even within their physical constraints. They are never (or only very rarely) 
petrified in a final state of zero energy. Intensive processes never stop and never 





From the working together of the notions of virtual-actual, intensity, and trans-
duction (or modulation as Anne Sauvagnargues prefers to call it16), one starts 
grasping the virtual diagrams and the actual things that populate Deleuze’s mater - 
ialist world—a world that radically departs from, and that is totally different 
from, the Aristotelian system of categories.17 With the couple virtual–actual 
and with intensity, we have the ontological “domains” of Deleuze’s system. I 
will now turn to those entities that Deleuze acknowledges as existing in the 
world.18 For Deleuze, the actual world is populated only by individual singulari-
ties that often appear as populations of individual singularities, which exist in 
different spatio-temporal scales and in different modes of interaction among 
individual components. The actual world is the world of actual things, and all 
these things have the same ontological status—thus, no hierarchies, but a 
flat ontology to start with. As DeLanda (2010, 83) makes clear: “In [Deleuze’s] 
approach all actual entities are considered to be individual singularities, that is, 
all belong to the lowest level of Aristotle’s ontological hierarchy, while the roles 
of the two upper levels are performed by universal singularities.” 
Every individual singularity emerges as the outcome of a historical process, it 
is the concrete result of intensive processes that occur in the world. Every sin-
gularity is produced or fabricated in a specific point in time and space. So, for 
example, atoms of hydrogen are fabricated inside stars; there is no “hydrogen 
in general,” but a concrete population of materially existing hydrogen atoms 
(DeLanda 2010, 85). Likewise, there is no canis familiaris in general, but rather a 
population of single dogs, each of which is an individual singularity, unique and 
unrepeatable (as a simple DNA test can prove). As every individual singularity 
is unique, special, and remarkable, what deserves attention are not the “spe-
cies” but the moment of “speciation,” that particular moment when something 
changes state or phase, when a mutation occurs, when a cosmic phenomenon 
happens. Bigger populations of singular individuals define “larger individuals,” 
and what matters are those moments when a new species appears, and when 
it disappears. Species are historical entities that depend on the concrete evo-
lution, transformation, and mutations of all the individual singularities that 
define them—one individual at a time, one by one. The focus on such onto- 
genetical processes, on intensive individuations, enables Deleuze to populate 
reality exclusively with immanent entities, eliminating any transcendent ones, 
such as the essences of Aristotle’s two upper categories, genus and species. For 
 16 See Sauvagnargues (2016, especially chapter 4, “The Concept of Modulation in Deleuze, and the Impor-
tance of Simondon to the Deleuzian Aesthetic,” 61–84).
 17 Deleuze’s extremely dense critique of Aristotle—which essentially focuses on his concept of “differ-
ence,” and which aims at showing that Aristotle’s definition of difference is problematic and misses 
a deeper understanding of the term—is to be found in paragraphs three to five of the second section 
of the first chapter (“Difference in Itself ”) of Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994, 38–44). On this 
difficult passage, see also Williams (2013, 64–68), Somers-Hall (2013, 23–30), and Hughes (2009, 40–42). 
 18 As this is a notoriously difficult task, I support my inquiry with reference to authors who have already 
dealt with this topic in great depth. In addition to Constantin V. Boundas, I am deeply indebted to  
Manuel DeLanda’s several accounts of a Deleuzian ontology, to Anne Sauvagnargues on its implica-
tions for art, and to Arkady Plotnitsky for his invaluable clarifications in relation to mathematics (see 







Aristotle the world is already divided by general and specific categories that are 
eternal, unchangeable, and not subject to corruption and decay. For Deleuze, 
on the other hand, the world of discrete things emerges constantly, as solutions 
to problems that are defined by conditions that do not determine a result, nor 
impose consistency. Finally, as DeLanda writes, “as these ontological problems 
undergo a process of actualization they become progressively differentiated 
into a multiplicity of actual solutions. This differentiation proceeds in a fully 
historical way, and may only reveal a portion of the possibility space at a time” 
(2012, 236, my emphasis). Thus, the Aristotelian categories of the general and 
the particular (in musical Platonism: the types and the tokens) can be replaced 
in a Deleuzian ontology by two radically immanent entities: the universal singu-
lar and the individual singular.
Topological unfoldings
Influenced by theories coming from mathematics and embryology, Deleuze 
thinks of the actualisations that lead to the individuation of singularities as 
happening through a sequence of “topological unfoldings.” In very simple 
mathematical terms, a topological entity is one that can be folded into another 
form without losing its identity. As philosopher and mathematician Arkady 
Plotnitsky (2006, 191) defined it, “Geometry has to do with measurements, 
while topology disregards measurement, and deals only with the structure of 
space qua space and with the essential shapes and figures.” Differently than 
in Euclidian geometry, in topological geometry a circle, for example, can be 
stretched into an ellipse or into a quasi-square without losing its topological 
identity. A sphere can be compressed into a cylinder, a cone, or a pear-like 
shape, its topological identity remaining untouched. In an essay on mathe-
matician Bernhard Riemann (who, together with his teacher Gauss, was one 
of the inventors of topology), Plotnitsky (2009, 201) is very precise about this 
identity: “Insofar as one deforms a given figure continuously (that is, insofar 
as one does not separate points previously connected and, conversely, does 
not connect points previously separated) the resulting figure is considered the 
same.” However, spheres are topologically different from tori, and they can-
not be converted into each other without disjoining their connected points. 
If one extends these mathematical notions to biology, genetics, and embryol-
ogy, one can think of the unfolding of an embryo as a matter of topological 
transformations, or of a vertebrate animal as the result of topological changes 
and developments. French naturalist Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire thought (at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, i.e., before Darwin) that species could be 
conceived without genera, as transformation (transmutation was his word) from 
one into the other. This leads to the perspective that the world can be con-
ceived first and foremost as a continuum of intensity that becomes segmented 
into species only as certain tendencies are manifested and certain capacities 
exercised (see DeLanda 2010, 91). These remarks are extremely relevant as we 
attempt to eliminate transcendent entities from the world. Every single animal 
or embryo is the result of concrete, immanent, intensive processes, and is abso-




to think of an animal as a topological animal (ibid., 96), which can be folded and 
stretched into the multitude of different animal species that exist on Earth. Of 
course, this is only physically possible at the level of the embryos, which are 
flexible enough to endure these transformations. Moreover, every topological 
or “virtual” animal must have the capacity of being divergently actualised (leading 
to concrete divergent individual singularities), and each actualisation must be 
inheritable with a slight degree of unpredictability. We come close to describing 
DNA structures, and it is indeed “the structure of the space of possible body 
plans that replaces the genus ‘Animal’” (ibid., 97). The relevant causal agents 
(chromosomes, genes, genes marking axes of longitude and latitude, cellular 
populations, etc.) do not operate and act as “formal causes,” but as “efficient 
causes.” As DeLanda highlights, “Aristotelian species like ‘Horse’ and ‘Human’ 
should be replaced by historically constituted species that have the same onto-
logical status as the organisms that compose them, that is, that are individual 
singularities; and the genus ‘Animal’ should be replaced by a space of possibilities in 
which the different body plans are universal singularities, capable of being diver-
gently actualized into a large number of sub-phyla and classes” (DeLanda 2010, 
102, my emphasis). 
On a higher scale, biological populations of individuals (what we use to call 
“species” in common language) are “as singular, as unique, and as historically 
contingent as individual organisms: species are born when their gene pool is 
closed to external flows of genetic materials through reproductive isolation, and 
they die through extinction” (ibid., 93–94). As today is widely accepted, no spe-
cies is sempiternal, they are all historically contingent and ephemeral. Even 
stars are ephemeral: they exist for a limited amount of time, even if this is 
beyond our human capacity of imagining. Everything is ephemeral, everything 
is contingent, everything is part of a continuous relay of intensive energies from 
one actualisation to the next, without being predetermined and without being 
predictable. The diversity of entities that populate the world are bounded in 
extension, but they are generated by invisible and temporal processes set in 
motion by immanent differences of intensity—not by any transcendental “sub-
stance” or “essence,” which are no more than unreal reified generalities. 
Multiplicities
In addition to the singularities and topological intensive transductive pro-
cesses, the concept of “multiplicity” is absolutely crucial for a Deleuzian ontol-
ogy. It is one of the most recurrent concepts in the works of Deleuze—alone or 
in collaboration with Félix Guattari—and it finds its roots not in philosophy 
or linguistics, but in mathematics, particularly in the subfields of differential 
geometry, group theory, and dynamical systems theory.19 Deleuze mentioned 
it early on, in his 1966 book Bergsonism, where the subtitle of the second chap-
ter is precisely “Théorie des multiplicités”20 (Deleuze 1991, 37–49). Although 
 19 This has been exhaustively disclosed and explained by DeLanda (2002, 2010). A very different perspec-
tive, critical of DeLanda’s assumptions and interpretation, has been offered by Mary Beth Mader (2017).




originally derived from Bernhard Riemann’s differential mathematics, Deleuze 
first uses it in relation to time (duration) and space, particularly focusing on the 
notion that time is the condition for change or becoming. As Eugene B. Young 
(2013, 210) observed, this has profound consequences: “If [time] is taken as the 
foundation for conceiving space, then space (or objects and subjects within it) 
is not subjected to transcendent criteria but must be conceived in terms of dif-
ference and intensity.” 
For Deleuze, an important part of the role played by the concept of multi-
plicity is to further enable a replacement of the Aristotelian concept of essence. 
The essence of a thing is what explains its identity, and consequently how many 
different objects resemble each other by the fact that they share such an essence. 
However, in a Deleuzian ontology, “a species . . . is not defined by its essential 
traits but rather by the morphogenetic process that gave rise to it” (DeLanda 2002, 
9–10). As we have seen before, species are historically and contingently consti-
tuted entities, not the representatives of timeless categories. While an essen-
tialist worldview sees species as static, a morphogenetic account, such as the 
one offered by Deleuze, is inherently dynamic. As Boundas (2007, 489–90) has 
put it: “Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of forces attempting to correct the 
mistake we make whenever we think exclusively in terms of things and their 
qualities: in privileging extension and extended magnitudes, we overlook the 
intensive genesis of the extended.” 
Critically, Deleuze’s notion of space, surfaces, and points on a surface is 
directly indebted to the mathematical constructions of Gauss and Riemann, 
particularly to their surfaces, which are spaces in themselves and thus do 
not need to have an additional (n+1) dimension perceived. These are purely 
immanent surfaces; they are not placed within a transcendent space. In such 
surfaces, which build a dynamical system, each point in the surface becomes a 
possible state for the system—be it in an actual or virtual mode of existence in the 
present moment. The complete space is a collection of all possible states that 
the system can have. Crucially, Riemann also discovered that some points more 
probably “occur” than others—these are called topological singularities. As there 
are too many possible points in a system (all its universal singularities), we can-
not map them all. Instead, we can map the topological singularities (also called 
“attractors”). This is what allows for a replacement of hierarchical categories and 
of the necessary and sufficient conditions for those categories: a topological space 
of possibilities, where individual singularities are actualised entities, and uni-
versal singularities are virtual points.21 It is the virtual network of connectors 
between those topological singularities that makes the structure (the diagram) 
of a dynamic system. As Deleuze famously stated, “the reality of the virtual is 
structure” (Deleuze 1994, 209, my emphasis). 
 21 I insist on the crucial aspect that these universal singularities are by no means to be confused with Pla-
tonic ideas. They are real and effective parts of a dynamic system, and they can be actualised instantly 
at any given time of the system’s lifespan. They are not the result of predeterminations, nor are they 




To avoid any possible misunderstanding over Deleuze’s use of this term, 
one has to stress right away that structure is understood by Deleuze in its math-
ematical and anthropological sense, not in the conventional musicological 
sense of the “fixed system of relations” or “infra-structure” of a given piece. 
As Christopher Hasty (2010, 10n23) has put it, “Deleuze’s understanding of 
structure is quite different from that of musicology or linguistics, in which 
structure is regarded as a fixed form, a substance underlying the accidents of 
performance. Structure for Deleuze points to the differentiated multiplicity of 
Idea.”22 James Williams (2013, 160) expressed a similar remark, clarifying that 
“structure as multiplicity is in movement and does not give priority to fixed 
structures.” Multiplicities specify the structure of spaces of possibilities, which, 
in turn, offer an explanation for the regularities and inconsistencies in the 
morphogenetic processes, and in the concrete, material actualisations of the 
individual singularities. “The reality of the virtual consists of the differential 
elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to 
them. The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements 
and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and 
withdrawing from them a reality which they have” (Deleuze 1994, 209). 
In the last sentence of this quotation we find crucial arguments against the 
two dominant schools of music ontology. Nominalists should not insist in 
defending at all costs the actuality of all singularities that are part of a musical 
work (“we must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure 
an actuality which they do not have” [ibid., my emphasis]), and Platonists should 
not axiomatically deny the material and real existence of singularities that are 
part of a musical work (“we must avoid . . . withdrawing from them a reality which 
they have” [ibid., my emphasis]). As multiplicities, what we usually call “musical 
works” are diagrams of the virtual, that is, they are real but not actual, and they 
are capable of divergent actualisations in several different media, times, and 
modes of appearance. 
To conclude this section, one can summarise Deleuze’s ontological proposal 
as defining a world view made of three separate, but intrinsically interrelated 
domains. One is the domain of actual individual singularities, of materially exist-
ing and observable products of natural and human invention, which can be 
defined by their extensive properties, by their length, area, volume, weight, 
number of components, and so on. Next there is a domain of intensive processes 
(transduction), defined by differences of potential, flows of energy, phase 
shifts, and critical thresholds, which change quantity into quality, and quality 
into quantity. They link the individual singularities to the universal singularities 
that remain virtual, some of which are more likely to be actualised than others 
(topological singularities). Finally, there is the domain of virtual structure, the topo-
logical space of possibilities, which diagrammatically maps the universal singular-
 22 Deleuze’s use of the term “Idea” would also require some further explanations, which unfortunately I 
cannot undertake here. In short, I simply stress the fact that Deleuze’s “Idea” is mobile and changeable, 
thus very different from the reified Ideas of traditional idealisms and from the Kantian concepts of the 
understanding, which Deleuze discusses in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition, in relation to Salomon 




ities, and that accounts in a purely immanent way for the regularities (but also 
for the inconsistencies) in the processes and in the individuations. The virtual 
diagram cannot exist without the actual and virtual singularities that build it. 
Nothing would happen in the world without the continuous relay of intensities 
from the virtual to the actual, and vice versa. 
This leads to an ontology that is processual, immanentist, and based upon 
difference (different/ciation), a difference that is conceived not negatively, as 
lack of resemblance, but productively, as that which drives dynamic processes. 
Epistemologically, it defines a problematic epistemology (or an epistemology of 
problems and problematisations), one that gets rid of the general laws of axio-
matic epistemologies without denying the objectivity of physical knowledge, 
which is now investigated by immanent distributions of the singular. The notion 
of truth is also devalued, as the dynamic processes are not predetermined, nor 
are they predictable. Ethically, the world emerges as profoundly transformed: a 
closed, finished and authoritative world pervaded by transcendental ideas and 
categories gives place to an open world of immanent events and singularities, 
“full of divergent processes yielding novel and unexpected entities, the kind 
of world that would not sit still long enough for us to take a snapshot of it and 
present it as the final truth” (DeLanda 2002, 6).
3. Virtual works, actual things: towards a new image 
of musical work
Deleuze’s philosophy has the potential to revolutionise other disciplines. (Williams 
2013, 234)
At this point, the choice of our title for the Orpheus Academy 2016 is clear. 
What traditionally, or at least for the last two hundred years, have been called 
“musical works” are specific “zones,” or partial elements of something that can 
be more aptly described and thought about in terms of musical “multiplici-
ties,” which are fabricated by intensive processes that generate virtual structures 
and actual things. Music Platonists focus only on the structures, the reality of 
which they deny and which they conceive as purely abstract, fixed, immobile, 
and eternal. For their part, nominalists rely only on extensive individual singu-
larities, historically contingent, but also fixed and totally defined, to which they 
deny a virtual (intensive) component. For a Deleuzian-inspired music ontol-
ogy, musical multiplicities must be grounded in the actual, even as some of the 
forces that the actual summons might remain virtual. Both—abstract struc-
tures and petrified strata—have to be overcome. Structures are mobile and 
fluid, while strata are constantly being dismantled and reshaped. As Michael 
Gallope stated, in his attempt to define “a Deleuzian musical work,” 
Deleuze offers a glimpse of something different: music for him is certainly based in a 
materiality of sound, but is not reducible to any social or perceptual situation. It has 




vehicle for the actual work’s content. Incredibly, he tries to think a musical work that 
is once more ideal and more empirical than the common perspectives. A Deleuzian 
musical work would be more ideal than a Platonist view since the logic of sensation 
has no “fallen” or exterior moment like performance external to itself. And it would 
be more empirical than a historicist perspective since it takes no recourse to the 
regulative norms of any historical moment. (Gallope 2008, 117–18)
Michael Gallope’s essay “Is There a Deleuzian Musical Work?” (2008) is, to my 
knowledge, the only serious attempt so far to think about music ontology from 
a Deleuzian perspective. However, he places his inquiry within currently avail-
able ontologies, using Peter Kivy and Lydia Goehr as two examples of the polar-
isation of the debate between Platonism and historicising views. My take is 
different: I think it is indispensable to think outside existing music ontologies, 
to come up with a new image of work (which replaces the word “work” itself ), 
and to appropriate for music ontology the basic features of Deleuze’s ontol-
ogy—and not so much what Deleuze said or wrote about music. So, I don’t 
think there is “a Deleuzian musical work,” which is Gallope’s central concern. 
There cannot be a Deleuzian musical “Work” (with a capital W). There can only 
be a Deleuzian musical work, which is a multiplicity made of virtual topological 
singularities, actual individual singularities (containing a virtual component in 
themselves), and intensive transductive processes (generating the virtual and 
the actual).
Under this new image of “work,” every musical multiplicity has two halves: 
a virtual image and an actual image, resonating with Deleuze’s statement that 
“every object is double without it being the case that the two halves resemble 
one another, one being a virtual image and the other an actual image” (1994, 209, 
my emphasis).
If we consider these two images in relation to musical works, one can think 
of the virtual image as the one relating to the structure, to the diagram of a 
musical work, with all its topological singularities. It remains ideal without 
being abstract (because those singularities are real; that is, they “exist”), and is 
dependent on the quantity and quality of the concrete mapping of its univer-
sal singularities made by every single person. Thus, there are as many virtual 
images of a musical work as persons “thinking” of it. Every single person has 
his or her own and unique “diagram” of any given musical work. This diagram is 
always individual, and can only be “thought” if one starts from the topological 
singularities that enable us to think about it in the first place. It is by no means 
something prior to our mapping of the singularities; it is not an abstract or 
transcendental entity. On the contrary, it is the most extreme immanently gen-
erated construction, being dependent on an innumerable amount of concrete 
singularities working together in a specific assemblage of forces, intensities, 
and tendencies (remember that every singularity is the result of intensive 
energetic processes of individuation, thus, not “sempiternal” Platonic fic-
tions). In order to emerge, this “structural” image requires a “transcendental 
empiricism,” an enormous (“transcendental”) amount of events, of individual 
and topological singularities, of intensive processes, of forces and tendencies 




Thus, virtual images of a musical work are potentially infinite—there are no 
“absolute” or universally intelligible musical works. Every musical “work” is a 
space in itself, which has to be navigated internally by every single actant—it 
is not placed within an overarching (n+1) transcendental space containing it. 
Thus, a musical work is as many “works” as the people thinking of it. The virtual 
image, thus defines a problematic field, determining the virtual content of a 
musical work as a problem, as an ideal (though not abstract) constellation of 
differential topological singularities.
Whereas this differentiation (with a “t”) establishes a problematisation, the 
concrete actualisations of that virtual field express differenciations (with a “c”) 
as the constitution of solutions, leading to the formation of actual images. 
Such images are formed by different sets of specific individual singularities 
that are actualised in the here-and-now, in the present (and in the presence) 
of a receiver, be it a reader of a score, a listener of a recording or concert, or an 
active performer of the music (or a non-human for non-human forms of expres-
sion). The process of differenciation happens through transduction, changing 
one type of energy into another, critically leading to the formation of new and 
unexpected individuations, which contain emergent properties that were not 
predetermined in advance.
As we have seen, current music ontologies primarily insist on the conditions 
of identity and recognition of a given musical work. Their common basic ques-
tions are of the type: what is a musical work? Are musical works abstract ideas or 
concrete things? How can a musical work be identified as this musical work? How 
can an instantiation of a work be considered as adequate, legitimate, or “fully 
qualified”? However, these questions take for granted precisely what needs to 
be explained, namely, the fact that those objects they label as “musical works” 
emerged at a given historical time, have been defined by innumerable sets of 
physical documents, have been the result of intensive processes of generation, 
and undergo constant redefinitions throughout time. Anyone with experience 
of editions of musical works (for print), or in research on sketches (in archives), 
just to give two simple examples, knows that any fixed “definition” of a work 
is highly problematic, open to criticism, and the object of change over time. 
Not only do traditions of musical practice and reception change, but the very 
definition of a musical text is constantly shifting.23 Musical works from the 
past have been different entities throughout time. Think of a symphony by 
Beethoven and its many, varied, and literally different editions over the last two 
hundred years. There have been instruments added or changed, even pitches 
have not been totally indisputable. And the more one looks into its sketches, 
more problems arise and more options seem acceptable. Musical works don’t 
possess a final, definitive, and sempiternal formal definition and unchangeable 
identity. If anything, they are mobile entities.









Traditional ontological accounts seem to ignore this, they treat musical 
works as perfectly defined entities, which are to be played by perfect perform-
ers, and which can be apprehended by perfectly intentionally oriented listen-
ers. Instead of relying on such traditional ontologies (focused on “Being”), one 
needs to focus on the onto- and morphogenesis of musical works. The starting 
questions are, then, quite different: How are musical works effectively gener-
ated, constructed, formalised? Which intensive processes lead to their individ-
uation? Which pre-individuating forces and materials create the humus where 
they will emerge? On which material basis are they transmitted throughout 
time? Which parts of them remain hidden and which ones are disclosed to a 
specific discipline, perspective, goal? What is the affective power of their exten-
sive parts? Which concrete documents allow for their performance? How are 
they concretely performed? What other things influence their passive recep-
tion by an audience? Which things build their special topological singularities? 
Which are the modes of existence of such multiplicities? How can their “dia-
grams/structures” be thought? In the place of “fundamental” or “higher order” 
ontology, one urgently needs an “ontogenesis,” an account of the modes of 
individuation and continuous historical change of musical “works.” 
From this perspective, one cannot ignore the intensive energetic processes 
that lead to the emergence, that is to say, to the factual production of sketches, 
scores, editions, recordings, analyses, and theoretical reflections on a given 
“work.” Critically, one cannot forget the innumerable material objects and 
things that enable the construction of any possible “image of work” in the first 
place. Before gaining their “identity,” their unmistakable modes of appear-
ance, their enduring character, or their “aura,” musical works are constituted as 
energetic tendencies that generate complex conglomerates of things, such as 
sketches, drafts, manuscripts, scores, editions, recordings, transcriptions, trea-
tises, manuals, instruments, depictions, contracts, commissions, letters, post-
cards, scribbles, diagrams, analytical charts, theoretical essays, articles, books, 
memories, and so on. These innumerable things are actual, they have been 
historically actualised at some precise point in time, and they persist existing, 
even if remaining modally and temporally flexible. Any single item from the 
list presented above can be differently read, interpreted, exposed, presented, 
or assembled as part of a book, an edition, a performance, a lecture, an instal-
lation, or whatever format. At this level, the individual singularities pertaining to 
a musical multiplicity function in a similar way to Guy Rohrbaugh’s “continu-
ants,” possessing three qualities that Platonic entities do not: they are modally 
flexible (they might have had different intensive properties than the ones they 
currently afford), they are temporally flexible (their intensive properties might 
differ over time), and they can come into and go out of exposure. Thus, they are 
not ideal and sempiternal, nor are they materially fixed once and for all. When 
Julian Dodd asks Rohrbaugh, “where are those historical individuals you claim 
to identify?” (quoted in Rohrbaugh 2012, 33), well, here they are! But they are 
not the full story, they are not “the work,” they are transient, partial, and not 






In very concrete terms, we have to be clear about which things we consider to be 
a legitimate part of the actual components of our musical multiplicities. In this 
sense, and as a useful tool for music practitioners creating innovative modes 
of performance, I have been proposing a terminology based upon strata and 
processes of stratification, which is vaguely inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
use of these terms in A Thousand Plateaus (1987, 39–74, 637–39).24 Appropriating 
their terminology, and remaining aware of the unavoidable anisomorphism 
between philosophy and art, one can divide all those music materials that 
physically exist in the real world into diverse types of strata. Substrata are mater-
ials that already existed in the world before the first traits of instantiation of a 
new piece were produced; among them one finds other musical pieces, instru-
ments, instrumental and compositional manuals, spoken and unspoken rules, 
codes of behaviour and practice, lists of personnel, payment sheets, and so on. 
Parastrata refer to documents produced while composing or preparing a per-
formance, produced in view of the generation of a new piece, directly leading 
to the emergence of a new musical multiplicity; they include sketches, drafts, 
first editions, letters, and writings or annotations by composers and perform-
ers. From that particular moment in time, when a piece has been first defined, 
many other future materials become thinkable and possible: new and renewed 
editions, all sorts of catalogues (of the sketches, of the variants, of the ren-
derings), technical analysis of the piece or parts of it, reflexive texts about it, 
theoretical contextualisations, recordings, and so on—these are epistrata, they 
appear from the first materials that defined the piece and evolve from them 
in ever growing circles. Next, there are metastrata, new materials generated at 
every future historical time, by practitioners aiming at presenting or, better, 
at exposing specific sets of materials from a given multiplicity in a new way; 
such strata include performances, recordings, transcriptions, expositions, or 
any other mode of critically reflecting on the available sources. Furthermore, 
there are also interstrata, particular singularities that function in more than one 
register, being sometimes part of one strata, sometimes of another one. Finally, 
materials that have apparently nothing to do with a given piece, but that might 
under certain circumstances create relations to it are called allostrata (one sim-
ple example is a concert situation where, for example, a piece by Schumann 
enters into an unexpected relation with a piece by Ligeti). Significantly, all 
these different strata are not ontologically predefined, that is, their belonging 
 
 24 Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 522n14) acknowledge their appropriation of these concepts from Italian 
paleoanthropologist Pia Laviosa Zambotti, more specifically from her book Les origines et la diffusion 
de la civilisation (1949), where she develops a whole theory on nomadic cultures and their progressive 
diffusion over the Earth’s ecumene. Especially in chapter four, she addresses the topic of strata, sub-
strata, and parastrata, illuminating the processes by which a nomadic culture interfered with, and was 
influenced by, the sedentary cultures it met. A set of substrata, which were part of the structures of a 
sedentary population or of its milieu, starts being challenged, while new configurations (parastrata) be-
gin to emerge. The concrete planetary movements and migrations of human populations described by 
Zambotti proved to be wrong by the late 1950s, but her descriptions of the kind of interactions between 




to this or that stratum is more functional than “existential.” It all depends on 
the specific use made of them by the musical actants.
We can now understand some of the strata at work in the opening perform-
ance of the Orpheus Academy 2016, Rasch14 (see Introduction). Moscheles’s 
piano étude Zorn, which Schumann notated in his sketchbook to Kreisleriana, 
acted as a substratum, a piece of music that existed in the world prior to the 
composition of Kreisleriana and that had an impact on it. The same applies to 
Beethoven’s An die ferne Geliebte, which is literally quoted in Schumann’s imme-
diately preceding work (the Fantasie, op. 17) and evoked at the end of the sec-
ond number of Kreisleriana. Roland Barthes’s essays operated first as metastrata 
(when Barthes was writing them), and now as epistrata, adding new individual 
singularities to the multiplicity called “Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana.” If one 
thinks of musical works as multiplicities, their constitutive parts become not 
only innumerable but also unpredictable, an aspect that enables infinite differ-
ential and experimental reconfigurations of their connectors and relationships. 
In fact, one of the goals of ME21’s Rasch series is to generate an intricate 
network of aesthetico-epistemic cross-references, through which the listener 
has the freedom to focus on different layers of perception: be it on the music, 
on the texts being projected or read, on the images, or on the voices. Situated 
beyond “interpretation,” “hermeneutics,” and “aesthetics,” the Rasch series is 
part of wider research on what might be labelled “experimental performance 
practices.” Such practices offer a tangible mode of exposing musical works as 
multiplicities. On the contrary, if one sticks to a traditional image of work based 
upon the One (or Idea), one has necessarily to stick also to notions of “work- 
concept,” interpretation, authenticity, fidelity to the composer’s intentions, 
and other highly prescriptive rules that originated in the nineteenth century. 
And if one sticks only to the historical situatedness of practices and codes of 
the time of the original compositions, then one is condemned to historicism, 
to the cultivation of relics and fetishes from other epochs (even if “historically 
informed practices” are a highly modern invention, as Richard Taruskin sharply 
demonstrated in several passages of his book Text and Act [1995]). What I mean 
is that every musical practice, every way of doing performance depends on, or 
is the direct result of, a specific ontological commitment. If one’s goal is the 
passive reproduction of a particular edition of a musical piece from the early 
nineteenth century, one is indeed better advised to remain within the “classical 
paradigm,” with all its associated practices of survey, discipline, and control. 
But if one is willing to expose the richness of the available materials that irradi-
ate from that piece, one has to move towards new ontological accounts, such as 
the one proposed in this chapter.
Critically, different disciplines look at the different strata differently, each 
discipline constructing its own specific “image of work.” Robert Schumann’s 
Kreisleriana is a different “entity” for a music sociologist, a music analyst, a 
clinical psychologist, or a pianist. They all take into account different actual 
things relating to that multiplicity, and they all build different virtual diagrams 
of it. And each individual person, even from the same discipline, sees differ-




image of work. The (impossible to grasp) totality of materials pertaining to a 
work can only be considered as being virtual in the Deleuzian sense I explained 
above. Any actualisation of the virtual music singularities is a snapshot of wider 
images of work, the particular snapshot that a person, a group, or a community 
perceives for a certain duration of time. Brought together in specific config-
urations (historically, geographically, and disciplinarily situated), every imagi-
nable individual stratum in its interaction with other strata enables the mater-
ial, psychological, and sociocultural construction of diverse images of work, 
which have the potential to replace those reified generalities that we usually 
call “musical works.” 
Works appear then as multiplicities, as highly complex, historically constructed 
assemblages defined by virtual structures and actual things. While traditional 
musical ontologies remain attached to hermeneutic, analytical, and interpre-
tative approaches, the new image of work enhances the emergence of creative, 
performative, and experimental events. Beyond transcendental typologies, 
beyond extreme or qualified versions of Platonism, beyond functional theor-
ies of operative concepts, and beyond aesthetic considerations coming from 
the ivory-towers of academia, this new “image of work” offers a redefinition of 
musical works as highly flexible, mobile multiplicities with potentially infinite 
constitutive parts that can be exposed in different modes, to different audi-
ences, and at different times. The shift from a work-centred perspective to a 
vision of an exploded continuum made of innumerable objects and things, 
in steady, intensive interaction with one another, creates fields of discourse, 
practice, and perception based on pure difference, leading to processes of dif-
ferential repetition. Every single performance then becomes “different”—not 
different from any original transcendental idea, but different from difference 
itself. It is only one ephemeral solution to the problematic field defined by a 
musical multiplicity. 
When looking at those exploded things, a musician or a scholar has two 
options: one is analytical, remaining at a certain distance from the materials 
of musical practice, questioning things in terms of what they are, how they 
appear, which properties they have, and what relations they entertain with 
each other; the other option is one that decidedly dives into the materialities 
of music-making, focusing on what to do with these things, how to reacti-
vate them, searching for the yet unseen virtual components that they possess, 
asking which potentialities they have, how to give them renewed sounds and 
furies, and how to express them anew. The first approach remains hopelessly 
imprisoned in the past; the second creatively and productively designs new 
futures for past musical objects and things. The first relates to conventional 
scholarly research and disciplines, the second—so I claim—to new modes of 
research, primarily to artistic research, a mode in which the artistic dimension 
is quintessentially needed and requested. In the place of a reiteration of uncrit-
ically inherited performance practices, or patronising instances of survey and 
control, this perspective offers a methodology for unconventional, critical ren-
derings that expose the variety and complexity of the music materials available 




work, it claims the pure unknown as the most productive field for artistic prac-
tices. Rather than accepting a reproductive tradition, it argues for an experi-
mental, creative, and vitalist attitude. 
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Locating the Performable 
Musical Work in Practice: 
A Non-Platonist Interpretation  




In The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, Lydia Goehr makes the following 
claim: “The idea of a work of music existing as a fixed creation independently 
of its many possible performances had no regulative force in a practice that 
demanded adaptable and functional music, and which allowed an open inter-
change of musical material. Musicians did not see works as much as they saw 
individual performances themselves to be the direct outcome of their compo-
sitional activity” (Goehr [1992] 2007, 185–86). To say that the “work-concept”—
the concept of the multiply performable work—had no “regulative force” in 
eighteenth-century musical practice is to say that it did not regulate what 
musicians did nor, presumably, how what they did was received by those attend-
ing the events where music was performed. Goehr takes this to show that in 
general Western musical performances before the late eighteenth century 
are not rightly taken to be of performable works conforming to the “work- 
concept,” and she thereby appeals to artistic practice in arguing for ontological 
conclusions.
I have argued elsewhere (Davies 2017) that musical ontology is indeed reflec-
tively accountable to musical practice. Practice must ground our ontological 
inquiries into the nature of artworks of various kinds because the ontologist’s 
primary task is to make sense of the practices into which such artworks enter, 
and terms like “musical work” as employed by the ontologist play an essentially 
explanatory role in this endeavour. More generally, the philosopher’s task, in 
addressing a human practice, is to provide a framework that both facilitates 
the achievement of the aims of that practice and furthers its comprehension by 
both practitioners and receivers.1 
 1 It is because the task facing the musical ontologist is reflective, and not merely descriptive, that the 
“explanatory” role I ascribe to the notion of “musical work” accords with this more general character-
isation of the philosopher’s task in addressing a human practice. The musical ontologist’s task is to 




My aim in this paper is not, however, to engage straightforwardly in musical 
ontology informed by this methodological directive. Rather than ask which 
ontological account would best reflectively represent our actual musical prac-
tices, I want to ask the following question: supposing that we were confronted 
by a musical practice in which the “work-concept” did have “regulative force” in 
the foregoing sense, what would be the best ontological story about that prac-
tice? Since saying that the “work-concept” has regulative force in a practice 
means talking about the practitioners’ enacted understanding of that practice, 
we leave open, in accordance with our methodological directive, the possibility 
that this understanding is ontologically flawed: We may decide against includ-
ing in our ontology anything having the properties enshrined in the “work-con-
cept.” But, as we shall also see, to grant that the “work-concept” has not only 
regulative force but ontological validity for a given musical practice does not 
settle matters, for the ontological validity of the “work-concept” itself admits 
of very different understandings.
In the rest of this paper, I shall for convenience speak not primarily of Goehr’s 
“work-concept” but of what I have myself termed the “classical paradigm,” a 
widely endorsed model for thinking about the performing arts more generally 
(Davies 2011, chapter 2). As we shall see, Goehr’s “work-concept” is precisely 
what is central to the classical paradigm. As a preface to this inquiry, I want to 
provide a brief outline both of the classical paradigm and of salient features of 
the more general art-theoretical context in which it can be located. 
The classical paradigm is a model for thinking about the performing arts, 
where the latter are taken to be an artistic domain in which most performa-
tive practice involves “multiple artworks”—artworks that admit of multiple 
instances.2 According to the classical paradigm, a performance in the perform-
ing arts is generally of something else—what we can call a performable work—
and plays a necessary part in the appreciation of the latter. Performable works 
prescribe certain things to performers, and are appreciated for the qualities 
realisable in performances that satisfy these prescriptions. Theorists differ as 
to the kinds of things that are prescribed and the nature of the things that do 
the prescribing. Performers, according to the classical paradigm, are in a sense 
collaborators with composers, for they are expected to exercise their creative 
freedom in interpreting what is prescribed. Only where this kind of interpre-
tation is called for in generating work-instances of a multiple artwork do we 
think of it as a performable work.
Let me now back up and say a little about some of the notions I have just 
introduced. Multiple artworks, I have said, are works admitting of multiple 
 
features of our musical practice that should be preserved in a codification of that practice that respects 
its presumed aims. Thus the adequacy of an “explanatory” conception of the musical work requires that 
it both facilitates the achievement of the aims of musical practice and furthers its comprehension. I am 
grateful to Andreas Dorschel for pointing out the need to clarify this point.
 2 As we shall see below, “multiply performable” works in the performing arts are merely one species 
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instances.3 The word “instance” is very much a term of philosophical art—try 
going into a bookstore and asking for an instance of War and Peace—but philoso-
phers, usually without noting this fact, have used the term in two distinguisha-
ble ways. On the one hand, the term is used epistemically to talk about entities 
that play a particular role in the appreciation of an artwork. An instance of a 
work in the epistemic sense—call this an e-instance—is an entity that makes 
manifest to the receiver some or all of the experienceable properties bearing 
upon the work’s appreciation. Instances, so conceived, are defined by the par-
ticular role that they play in appreciation, what we may term “the experiential 
role.” But entities can be more or less well fitted to play this role. A print of a 
film used in a screening may be damaged, or a performance of a musical work 
may depart unintentionally from what is specified in the score, and some cop-
ies of a novel may contain typographical errors. This suggests that we should 
talk not merely of entities “qualified” to play the experiential role for a work, 
but of entities “fully qualified” in virtue of not being so flawed. Something is 
fully qualified to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork 
X at a time t just in case at t it possesses all those experienceable properties that 
are necessary, according to the practices of the art form in question, to fully play 
this role.4 Where something fully qualifies in this sense at time t, we may term 
it a strict instance of X at t. Arguably, all artworks can have multiple strict e-in-
stances—the only practical obstacles here are technological.
 3 For a much fuller presentation and defence of the following account of multiple artworks and of the 
different senses in which they can be said to have instances, see Davies (2010). The terminology used in 
the present context is slightly different from that used in the 2010 article—for the current terminology 
see Davies (2015).
 4 Paulo de Assis has pointed out that this definition of being “fully qualified” to play the experiential 
role should be doubly relativised to a time. The first relativisation, in the formulation I give, concerns 
the properties that an instance possesses at the time it is experienced. Since these properties can change, 
at least in the case of instances that are material objects rather than events (for example, works of 
sculpture), a given object may be “fully qualified” at one time but, after suffering material change, not 
“fully qualified” at another time. But we also need to allow for changes in the practices of the art form 
in question. An object or event having given properties p may be “fully qualified” to play the experien-
tial role according to the practices in art form F at time T, but not be fully qualified to play that role 
according to the practices in F at time T*. To take an example suggested by Paulo (pers. comm.), “a Bach 
performance by Pablo Casals, by Sigiswald Kuijken, or by Mischa Maisky, all of which were considered 
‘fully qualified’ when they appeared, [were] not necessarily [so considered] afterwards (I think Casals, 
for example, would not count as fully qualified in the performance landscape of the 1990s, nor Kuijken 
in the 1890s).” To bring this out, the definition of being “fully qualified” needs to be modified to read as 
follows: Something is fully qualified to play the experiential role in the appreciation of a given artwork X 
at time t just in case it possesses at t all those experienceable properties that are necessary, according to 
the practices of the art form in question at a given historical time “T,” to fully play this role. Once we make 
explicit this second dimension of temporal relativisation, we must ask whether the practices in place 
in F at a particular time T—for example, the time of the work’s composition—have a privileged status 
in determining, atemporally, those entities that count as “fully qualified” (or, as I term this, “strict”) 
instances of the work, or whether a work’s “strict” instances are only specifiable relative to, and may 
change according to, the performance practices of the artistic community evaluating or appreciating 
the work. Since I do not address these epistemological issues in the present paper, I shall let the simpler 
formulation stand in the body of the paper. I thank Paulo for his perceptive observation, however, which 




In a second sense, however, the term “instance” is used to identify certain 
entities that stand in some kind of direct historical relationship to an act of 
“initiating” on the part of one or more agents. An instance in this sense is 
something that has some or all of the properties necessary to play the expe-
riential role in the appreciation of a work, by virtue of standing in this histor-
ical relation. For example, an original painting owes its perceptible properties 
directly to the agency of the artist who painted it, whereas a perfect reproduc-
tion of that painting, while equally suited to play the experiential role, does so 
in virtue of perceptible properties only indirectly related to what the artist did. 
An instance in this sense can be termed a provenential instance, or p-instance. 
If the distinction between “multiple” and “singular” works, understood as a 
matter of how many instances a work can have, is to mark a significant distinc-
tion, then a multiple artwork must be understood as one that can have more 
than one p-instance that is a strict e-instance—that is, more than one strict e-in-
stance directly historically related to the act of initiating the work.
Philosophers have distinguished three ways in which multiple artworks can 
be initiated. First, as in the case of literary works, an artist may bring into exist-
ence a p-instance of the work, which serves as an exemplar. Strict e-instances 
of the work are then generated through emulating the exemplar, corrected if 
necessary to remedy slips of the author’s pen, in those respects required by rele- 
 vant artistic conventions in place. Second, as in the case of standard analogue 
photography and cast sculpture, an artist may produce an artefact that, when 
employed in prescribed ways, generates p-instances of the work. This may be 
termed a “production-artefact” (Wolterstorff 1980). As in the case of exemplars, 
further conventions or understandings in place in the relevant art form deter-
mine how this artefact must be used if a p-instance is to be a strict e-instance 
of the work. Third, as in the case of classical musical works as standardly con-
ceived, an artist may provide instructions that, if properly followed by those 
aware of the relevant conventions and practices, result in p-instances that are 
strict e-instances of the work. In such cases, compliance with the instructions 
also calls for performative interpretation, and the resulting instances of the 
work (strict or flawed) are performances of it.
Nothing interesting ontologically speaking follows from the fact that a work 
is e-multiple—this is no more interesting ontologically than the fact that there 
can be multiple pictures of an individual through which that individual can 
be recognised. But p-multiplicity has been taken to have very specific onto-
logical implications. All p-multiple artworks give rise to the ontological prob-
lem that we may term the problem of repeatability: what kind of thing must a 
multiple work be if it is to admit of multiple p-instances? Philosophers in the 
broadly analytic tradition who have reflected upon this problem have gener-
ally assumed that multiple artworks must be abstract entities of some sort, and 
more particularly—following Richard Wollheim’s Art and its Objects—types. 
Wollheim (1980) claimed that, while singular artworks such as paintings and 
works of carved sculpture are physical objects, all multiple artworks are “types” 
having their instances as “tokens.” Repeatability is then just the familiar rela-
tionship between a type and its tokens. 
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For one subscribing to such a view of performable musical works, the sali-
ent ontological questions about musical artworks relate not to their abstract 
nature—as, in some sense, prescriptions for performances—but to the kinds 
of properties entering into those prescriptions, and thus to the manner in 
which performable works are individuated. Different answers to this question 
include pure sonicism, timbral sonicism, and instrumentalism. The distinc-
tive claim of the sonicist is that “whether a sound-event counts as a properly 
formed token of [a performable work] W is determined purely by its acoustic 
qualitative appearance” (Dodd 2007, 201)—that is to say, purely by the way the 
performance sounds. Pure sonicists hold that the kinds of features prescribed for 
correct performance of a musical work are restricted to structural or “organisa-
tional” properties—pitch, rhythm, harmony, and melody (see, e.g., Kivy 1983). 
Timbral sonicists, on the other hand, maintain that the timbre of the notes pro-
duced, which will vary according to the instruments used in generating those 
notes, is an essential part of what the composer prescribes for well-formed per-
formances of the work (see, e.g., Dodd 2007). While the timbral sonicist makes 
the timbral qualities of a sound sequence partly constitutive of the perform-
able work, she or he doesn’t require that, in well-formed performances, this 
sound sequence is actually produced on the instruments with which we naturally 
associate those timbral qualities. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, insist that 
a correct performance of a performable work not only must have the prescribed 
timbral qualities, but also must be performed on the prescribed instruments 
(see, e.g., Levinson 1980). Another central question is whether performable 
works are essentially contextualised entities. The contrasting views here are 
that works are pure sound structures or sound sequences (see, e.g., Kivy [1983] 
and Dodd [2007]), and that they are sound structures or sound sequences as 
indicated in a particular musico-historical context (see Levinson 1980).
2
If, as I have argued (Davies 2017), we hold ontology of art reflectively account-
able to artistic practice, what are the salient features of practice that must be 
accommodated by an ontology of musical works if the latter are taken to be 
performable works conforming to the classical paradigm? Repeatability seems 
to be essential, since this is just another way of saying that we have a work that 
admits of multiple p-instances and that therefore in some manner exists inde-
pendently of its particular performances. Repeatability is built into the “work- 
concept” understood in terms of the classical paradigm and our question is 
how we should think ontologically about those cases, if any, where this work- 
concept is regulative. 
In the analytic literature, we find a number of other things proposed as 
essential to our musical practice and thus, given our methodological directive, 
as features for which an ontology of music must account. But there is consid-
erable disagreement about some of these properties, and they need to be bal-
anced against one another in our attempts to make ontology of music rationally 





has been taken to carry ontological weight (see Dodd 2007). But the supposed 
audibility of musical works seems to be explicable on any ontological account 
as long as something appropriately related to the work is audible (see Davies 
2009). Another often-cited property of works satisfying the classical paradigm 
is creatability (see Levinson 1980), but there are debates over whether perform-
able musical works must be created by their composers or whether creativity 
in discovery is enough (Dodd 2007). Again it isn’t clear that there is a non- 
question-begging datum that an adequate ontology must explain. The same 
applies to the claimed modal and temporal flexibility of the musical work 
(Rohrbaugh 2003 makes such a claim; for criticism, see Davies 2012a, 271–73).
 However, there is one other feature that seems essential to musical 
works in any musical practice that conforms to the classical paradigm, although 
it has attracted much less attention than those properties just cited. This is 
what I term the “variability” of at least some multiple artworks, including musi-
cal works. The “problem of variability” for an ontological theory of such works 
is to explain the range of acceptable variation in artistically relevant properties 
amongst the strict p-instances of such multiple works. Where, as in the case of 
literary works, initiation is by means of an exemplar, there is no room for vari- 
ation in artistically relevant qualities among a work’s strict instances. This is 
because strict instances are required to emulate the exemplar in all artistically 
relevant respects—thus allowing no room for variation in such respects. But 
the problem of variability seems to be particularly acute for “type” theories of 
multiple artworks that are generated by means of a production-artefact, such 
as photographs, films, and works of cast sculpture (see Davies 2012b). It also 
presents a problem for theories of musical works taken to fall under the classi-
cal paradigm. We seem to have in our practice a perhaps imprecise distinction 
between performances and non-performances of a musical work, and between 
correct and incorrect performances, and, in musical practices describable in 
terms of the classical paradigm, we seem committed to variations in the artis- 
tically relevant properties of both performances and correct performances.
3
Of the various proposed ontological accounts of works in musical contexts 
where the “work-concept” has regulative force, which ones can at least accom-
modate the two features—repeatability and variability—that seem intrinsic to 
the very idea of a performable work?5 There are broadly speaking three kinds of 
answer to the question, What kind of thing would a musical work that fits the 
classical paradigm be, ontologically speaking?
(1)  According to musical “Platonism” in its various forms, the musical 
work is an abstract entity of some kind that stands outside our musical 
practice and informs and guides that practice in certain ways.
 5 Note here that this is not incompatible with the claim, in Davies (2017), that it is the whole of our 
practice to which the ontology of art is accountable. Our question here is not which ontological theory 
we should accept upon reflection, but which ontological theories have the resources to accommodate a 
practice that conforms to the classical paradigm.
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(2)  According to musical “nominalism” or musical “materialism,” the 
musical work is internal to our practice and in some way definable in 
terms of relationships between material entities that enter into, and 
material states of affairs that obtain in, that practice.
(3)  According to “fictionalist” accounts, talk of “musical works” is a useful 
fiction for describing what goes on in our musical practice, but there 
are actually no musical works. A more austere alternative here is “elim-
inativism,” which holds not only that there are no musical works but 
also that we should stop talking as if there were.
If accounting for variability is a requirement for an ontology of performable 
musical works, Platonism faces a serious difficulty, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Davies 2012a). While I believe my argument generalises to all Platonist views, 
let me consider here the version of Platonism defended by Julian Dodd (2007). 
Dodd maintains that a classical musical work is a norm-type that admits of 
both correct and incorrect instances. The type is associated with a property 
that specifies the features that are required in a strict instance of the work. 
For Dodd, all these features are sonic features, including timbral features, and 
he defends “timbral sonicism” as an account of how works, viewed as abstract 
norm-types, are individuated. Our question then is how the permissible range 
of variations in correct performances of works, if so construed, is determined. 
I have argued (Davies 2012a) that, given certain explicit prescriptions by a com-
poser embodied in a score for a musical work, we can derive a set of determi-
nate requirements for correct performance of that work, and thus principled 
limits on the variability of such performances, only if we take account of certain 
norms operative in the intended performing and receptive communities for 
that work. These norms relate both to (1) the interpretation of what is explicitly 
notated in the work’s score concerning the work’s pure sonic qualities and (in 
the case of the timbral sonicist) to (2) the timbral qualities rightly ascribable to 
the work in virtue of the prescription of specific instrumentation for realising 
those pure sonic qualities.
The question for the Platonist is whether the properties taken to be norma-
tive within the work by the timbral sonicist—the sonic properties required in 
its strict instances—can be characterised independently of the ways in which 
performances are or would be classified as strict or flawed p-instances within 
the relevant historically situated performative and receptive communities. But 
why can’t we represent the specific norms that are operative in a performative 
or receptive community, and thus the features required in strict instances of 
a work given its score, independently of the ways in which members of that 
community actually apply those norms? Why, in other words, should we think 
that the very content of those norms depends upon the actual practices of those 
who apply them? In arguing for this conclusion, I have drawn (in Davies 2012a) 
on Robert Brandom’s (1994) neo-Wittgensteinian claim that explicit specifi-
cations of rules operative in a practice can never do anything more than make 
partially explicit the norms that reside implicitly in that practice. Applying 





scores, but also in the practical interactions between composers, performers, 
and receivers in a particular musical context that the norms determining cor-
rect performance of a musical work are located. These interactions give deter-
minate content to the idea of “shared understandings” as to how scores and 
other explicit specifications are to be rightly translated into practice. Crucially, 
the import of these norms cannot be characterised independently of those 
interactions through which content is given to the idea that particular perfor-
mances are strict or flawed performances of a work, or fail to be performances 
of that work at all. It is only by reference to the class of strict p-instances deter-
mined through such interactions that we can give content to the idea of a set 
of features that are normative within the work, and thereby account for the 
range of variability in a work’s right performances, in the way that the classical 
paradigm requires.
Suppose it is indeed true that it is only in terms of norms realised in the 
activities of a particular performative and receptive community that we can 
identity the permissible range of variation in strict instances of a musical work. 
Nonetheless, the timbral sonicist might argue, these activities still serve to 
identify, through the class of p-instances that they validate as correct, a set of 
timbral sonic properties that are necessary and sufficient, given the prescrip-
tions of the composer, for a sound-sequence to count as a strict instance of a 
work. The norm-type to be identified with the musical work, then, prescribes 
just these features for correct performance. The features themselves make no 
reference to either the instrumentation used or the context in which the work 
was initiated. It is the norm-type so conceived that is discovered by the com-
poser, and that exists eternally, even if we can identify it only by reference to the 
practices of a given artistic community, the Platonist might insist.
It is undeniable that we can abstract a prescribed set of timbral sonic features 
from the set of performances of a musical work validated through the perform-
ative interpretations of a composer’s prescriptions by members of an intended 
performative community and the receptive practice of an intended community 
of receivers. But, to the extent that this prescribed set of features is accessible 
only “after the fact,” it cannot plausibly be said to either be conceived by the com-
poser or serve as a guide to the practice of performers—the latter because it is 
constituted through that practice. It is unclear therefore how such a prescribed 
set of timbral sonic features—those individuative of a given norm-kind—can 
play any kind of explanatory role in our understanding of the initiation and 
reception of musical works.
4
Suppose that, for these or other reasons, we reject the Platonist option in 
an ontological account of musical practice describable in terms of the clas-
sical paradigm, and agree that the only entities to which we can appeal in 
such an account are entities that are nominalistically acceptable—concrete 
particulars or constructions out of such particulars. As those members of 
MusicExperiment21 proposing the “multiplicities” conception of the musical 
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work have pointed out, these entities—the multiple materialities entering into 
our musical practice broadly conceived—are both considerable and diverse. In 
presenting the case for thinking of musical works in terms of multiplicities, 
they identify these elements in the following passage:
From a materialist ontological perspective, works only exist as elaborated products 
of a network of relations and interactions between documents. In the place of 
works . . . one can look at the innumerable things on top of things that allow for 
the construction of an “image of work”: sketches, drafts, manuscripts, editions, 
recordings, transcriptions, treatises, manuals, instruments, depictions, contracts, 
commissions, letters, postcards, scribbles, diagrams, analytical charts, theoretical 
essays, articles, books, memories, etc. Brought together in specific combinations 
(historically and geographically situated), these things make up those reified 
generalities that we used to call musical works. From this materialistic perspective 
works emerge as “multiplicities,” as highly complex, historically constructed 
conglomerates of things that define and take part in an ever-expanding “manifold.” 
(MusicExperiment21, 2015)
I shall spend the rest of this paper exploring the options open to one who 
endorses a materialist picture and wishes to in some way accommodate those 
aspects of our practice that naturally lend themselves to description in terms 
of the classical paradigm. An obvious question will be how different alterna-
tives can provide us with a reflectively acceptable framework for thinking about 
a practice apparently characterised by repeatability and variability. Theorists 
considering the nominalist options confronting the ontologist of multiple art-
works describable in terms of the classical paradigm have identified the follow-
ing more general alternatives (see, e.g., Tillman 2011; Kania 2012):
(1)  “Materialist” theories that commit themselves to the real existence of 
such multiple works construed as in some sense “constructions” out 
of the material elements entering into our practices. Two examples of 
such theories are musical perdurantism (Caplan and Matheson 2006) 
and musical endurantism (Rohrbaugh 2003), which take music al 
works to be either constituted by or ontologically dependent upon 
such material elements. 
(2)  Eliminativist theories (e.g., Cameron 2008), according to which 
“there are only concrete objects, such as performances and the cre-
ative actions of composers, and none of these can be identified with 
music al works; therefore there are no musical works” (Kania 2012, 
208).
(3)  “Fictionalism,” as proposed by Andrew Kania (2012), as a kind of 
“eliminativism light.” 
Kania assumes that both materialist and eliminativist accounts entail that there 
are no musical works of the kind assumed in our ordinary musical practices, 
since he takes those practices to commit us to Platonism. (This, I think, will be 
so only if we are so committed by our commitment to repeatability and variabil-
ity, but that is the very question at issue). So construed, the issue is whether it is 
better to identify musical works with concreta or to deny that there are musical 




to be that “it would do less violence to musical practice to deny the existence 
of musical works altogether than to identify them with the concreta the mater-
ialist believes them to be.” He also maintains that “the dispute between the 
materialist and the eliminativist is doubly pragmatic” (ibid.): (1) it is pragmatic 
in the sense that the materialist and eliminativist agree about what kinds of 
things exist, but not about whether to call one kind of thing a musical work; 
and (2) it is also pragmatic in the sense that something like the “methodo - 
logical directive” identified at the beginning of this paper appears to be implicit 
common ground. The question the nominalist faces when choosing between 
materialism and eliminativism is whether it would be better to give up talk of 
musical works altogether or to transform it into talk of, say, fusions of perform - 
ances. And the measure of what is better here is closeness to, or coherence 
with, existing musical practices.
Kania claims that we should prefer fictionalism over either materialism or 
eliminativism on these pragmatic grounds. The fictionalist about musical 
works claims that, while there are actually no such things, we have shared ways 
of representing such things in our musical practice. These shared representa-
tions play a valuable part in that practice, and this justifies continuing to talk as 
if there were such works even if the world contains no such things. The kinds 
of properties we have been assuming that musical works must have—Kania 
cites creatability and repeatability, in particular—play an important part in 
sustaining different elements in our musical practice. But, Kania maintains, 
it isn’t clear that anything can actually have both these features; so, in order 
to preserve the various useful parts of musical discourse centred on the work- 
concept, we should make-believe that there are such things. Kania argues that 
this practice, with its incorporation of the work-concept, is worth preserving. 
But the crucial fictionalist claim here is that “it would make no difference if 
there were no musical works, strictly speaking, as long as we all continued to 
behave as if there were” (Kania 2008, 440).
While musical fictionalism, like fictionalism more generally, is not without 
its defenders, it does raise more general metaphysical questions that I don’t 
want to get into in any detail here. To simply gesture at the issues, we might 
ask why the regulative role of the work-concept in our practice doesn’t itself 
justify being a realist about performable musical works. Kania seems to think 
that, if our concern is to preserve both creatability and repeatability as aspects 
of our practice, we cannot be realists about musical works because nothing 
could have both of these properties. But, as suggested above, I don’t think cre-
atability is crucial to the work-concept, so this can’t be a conclusive reason for 
fictionalism about musical works. But any fictionalist move not supported in 
this way seems to assume practice-transcendent standards as to what “really” 
exists, and this is itself a contested meta-ontological position, especially if we 
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Eliminativism about musical works is not open to this kind of objection 
since the eliminativist makes no claim about the practical indispensability of 
talk about musical works. Rather, the eliminitavist can maintain that in fact 
those features of our musical practice worth preserving in no way require an 
overarching “work-concept.” This view might be read into the idea, in the pas-
sage from MusicExperiment21 cited above, that talk of multiplicities and rela-
tionships between different material elements should replace talk of “those 
reified generalities that we used to call musical works.” A related, but perhaps 
distinct, practical suggestion can be found in the same description of the 
MusicExperiment21 research programme, where it is proposed that we think 
of (performing) art as “a radical immanent process of intensive actualization of 
virtual, extensive potentialities” (MusicExperiment21 2015). To cite an earlier 
description of the programme:
The main goal of MusicExperiment21 is to propose and generate new modes of 
performance and exposition of research. Integrating material that goes beyond the 
score (such as sketches, texts, concepts, images, videos) into performances, this 
project offers a broader contextualisation of the works within a transdisciplinary 
horizon. . . . Combining theoretical investigations with the concrete practice of 
music, this project presents a case for change in the field of musical performance, 
proposing alternatives to traditional understandings of “interpretation.” Whereas 
traditional models are based on static conceptions of the score, this project 
proposes a dynamic conception, in which innumerable layers of notational practices 
and editions of musical works throughout time generate an intricate multi-layered 
set of inscriptions. If the source text is seen as dynamic, rather than fixed, and if the 
performative moment is—in its essential nature—also dynamic and ever-changing, 
it follows that every performance is more of an “event” than a reiteration of the 
given “form” of a piece. In place of a heuristic approach, there is an exploration of 
potentialities contained within a given score. The performer wanders creatively 
through such a landscape, using and training the imagination with the goal of 
breaking free from the past and constructing new assemblages. (MusicExperiment21 
2013, 101)
This proposal suggests not that there is no material basis for the work-concept 
—it allows that we can indeed see the work as conceived by the classical 
paradigm as one possible construct out of the material multiplicities making 
up our historically evolving musical practice—but rather that we should now 
pursue other potentialities that those multiplicities would allow for musical 
performance. The issue between the first and second cited passages concern-
ing MusicExperiment21 is that the latter passage seems to allow, whereas the 
former passage seems to deny, that at least some materialistically grounded 
musical practices are correctly described in terms of the classical paradigm 
even if other (new and innovative) practices would not be rightly so described.
These two ways of thinking on the part of nominalistically and materialistically 
inclined ontologists of music may be usefully mapped onto some recent work 





James Hamilton (2007, 31) affirms6 that “the texts used in theatrical perform-
ances [are] just so many ingredients, sources of works and other ideas for theat-
rical performances, alongside other ingredients that are available from a variety 
of other sources. Works of dramatic literature, in particular, are not regarded as 
especially or intrinsically fitting ingredients for performances. As ingredients 
they are but one kind among many possible sources of words for a theatrical 
performance.” But Hamilton is not merely affirming a possibility for theatri-
cal performance. He maintains, in line with MusicExperiment21 (2015), that “a 
[theatrical] performance is . . . never a performance of some other work nor is it 
ever a performance of a text or of anything initiated in a text; so no faithfulness 
standard—of any kind—is required for determining what work a performance 
is of. . . . Theatrical performances are artworks in their own right” (Hamilton 
2007, 32). His descriptions of theatrical practice stress the elements of deliber-
ation, extemporisation, experimentation, and discovery that enter into the pre-
paratory process, the choices open to the director and performers, and the fact 
that the text is always used by the performers to realise the general performative 
goals of the company—it is always a means to an independent performance, 
rather than something that, in itself, imposes any constraints on performance. 
As Hamilton (2007, 203) characterises this general feature of theatrical pro-
ductions, “a company arrive at the first rehearsal and are given a script. There is 
no logically predetermined way for them to use the script. There is not even a 
requirement, of logic or of art, that they actually do use it. This is a situation in 
which a number of things can be decided.” This supports the further claim that 
where we have the appearance of a theatrical performance falling under the 
classical paradigm, the performers are merely exercising one among a number 
of possible options as to how to use the script as an ingredient in a production. 
The classical paradigm, Hamilton maintains, has no applicability to theatre 
understood as a performing art.
Hamilton’s rejection of the classical paradigm in theatre relies on the idea 
of theatrical productions as processes of “ensemble revision,” and one prob-
lem with this claim, historically, is that it fits uneasily with periods of theat-
rical practice where ensemble revision has played a minimal role, if any—see 
for example Tiffany Stern’s work on the nature of Shakespearean and seven-
teenth-century British theatre (Stern 2000; for a discussion of the significance 
 6 It might be thought that Hamilton’s use of the term “text” in this passage runs counter to Nicholas 
Cook’s influential contention (2001) that, in thinking about musical performance, we should “shift 
from seeing performance as the reproduction of texts to seeing it as a cultural practice prompted by 
scripts.” To think of the score as a text, for Cook, is to think of it as embodying the composer’s original 
vision, something to which performance is accountable; whereas to think of the score as a script is 
to think of it as “choreographing a series of real-time, social interactions between players.” Cook’s 
distinction has influenced much contemporary work in musical performance studies, but Hamilton’s 
use of the term “text” here in no way conflicts with Cook’s account, nor indeed with Hamilton’s own 
talk, in a passage quoted below, of the place of a “script” in the ensemble revision of theatrical works. 
Cook’s distinction between texts and scripts is a distinction between two ways of thinking about scores. 
In the case of theatre, on the other hand, the thing in need of reconceptualisation is itself a text—a 
play script—rather than a score. Hamilton’s claim is that we should view this text as a script in Cook’s 
sense—it is one among many things that can enter as ingredients into the social interactions that result 
in a performance. I am grateful to Andreas Dorschel for alerting me to the need to clarify this point.
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of Stern’s work for Hamilton’s claims about theatre, see Davies 2011, 164–71). 
But even where we do have productions that involve “ensemble revision,” it 
isn’t clear why this establishes that the ingredients model accounts for all such 
productions better than the classical paradigm. Take a company attempting 
to present a “faithful” rendition of Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler, for example. While 
performances of this production indeed reflect decisions and modifications 
made in rehearsal, those decisions and modifications seem to be governed by 
the company’s overarching aim of being true to Ibsen’s play in the sense of con-
forming as far as possible to Ibsen’s prescriptions in the play script. Hamilton 
claims that, even if the company belongs to a tradition that always uses a text in 
this way, their treating it as the script of a performable work is still an unforced 
choice on their part, as the ingredients model requires. He supports this claim 
by appealing to an ideal companion company belonging to the same tradition 
who would see alternative ways of engaging with the text. So, where companies 
seek to faithfully realise an independent work, we have “performances that 
adopt constraints that are not binding in the tradition, but are taken as though 
they were” (Hamilton 2007, 210). 
But this is rather mystifying. For suppose that we have a tradition where both 
performers and audience assume that the right, or the only, way to engage with 
the text of a dramatic work is to seek to mount a production that is faithful 
to the text of that work. In what sense does the observation that “objectively” 
there are other options open to both performers and audience show that per-
formances intended by the performers and understood by the audience to be 
of a work are not really of the work at all? By analogy, it is objectively possible 
for musicians performing in a string quartet to treat the score as merely one 
“ingredient” in a group improvisation. But this surely does not demonstrate 
that their actual performance, which is intended by the performers and under-
stood by the audience to conform to the classical paradigm, is not really of a 
musical work at all. This suggests that the right lesson to draw from Hamilton’s 
account is not that we should deny the applicability of the classical paradigm to 
theatrical performance, but that we should insist on its contingency and stress 
the range of possibilities that a text presents to a performing company and the 
exciting prospects for those who take advantage of this range of possibilities. 
This then fits with a broader literature that points to the limitations of the 
classical paradigm as a model for performances in the performing arts, given 
the diversity of legitimate aims of performance, and the possibilities available 
for performers who are not bound by the classical paradigm or, if bound, are 
bound in a much looser way than has traditionally been assumed. To mention 
only a couple of issues here:
(1)  Those late twentieth-century theatrical productions that provide a 
primary motivation for Hamilton’s “ingredients” model of theatre are 
only an extreme example of a more general problem that we face in 
identifying what is required for a performance to be a performance of 
a particular play. Theatrical practice allows considerable freedom in 
modifying the elements in the play script for a theatrical work while 






ist” interpretation of King Lear, for example. If the classical paradigm is 
to be applied to at least some theatrical works, we need a sense of what 
the work requires that distances itself from any attempt to accord the 
play script the role ascribed to the score in musical works held to fall 
under the classical paradigm. 
(2)  Extending the classical paradigm to dance is even more problematic, 
for a number of reasons. If repeatability is a necessary requirement 
for the paradigm, dance theorists have questioned whether there is 
a stable dance work that can be reperformed, except in cases where 
different performances can be grouped as “of the same work” in vir-
tue of the supervisory role of the choreographer. Martha Graham is 
famously said to have remarked of her dance works, “when I go, they 
go”! The problem of “dance reconstruction” arises in part because we 
usually lack any authoritative “notation” for a dance work issuing from 
its creator and capable of serving as a guide to performers. The nota-
tions that we have are usually “after the fact,” constructed by trained 
notators who observe a performance of the dance. But there is no 
single notational system used for dance, and in trying to work from 
a particular performance to a notational representation of a work 
rather than, as in music, from a notational representation of a work 
to a particular performance, we face the problem of disentangling, in 
the overall embodied activity of the dancers, those movements that 
are constitutive of the work from those that are elements in a particu-
lar interpretation of it. We face a similar problem when the evidence 
upon which we try to base a dance reconstruction is a filmed account 
of an earlier performance.
(3)  Finally, a number of authors have called into question the applicability 
of the classical paradigm to other musical genres such as rock and jazz. 
While some have tried to bring rock music under a modified version 
of the paradigm—for example, Stephen Davies (2001) who maintains 
that rock works are works for studio performance whereas classical 
works are works for live performance—Theodore Gracyk (1996) and 
Andrew Kania (2006) have each separately argued that the rock work 
is not a work for performance at all, but something owing its essential 
properties to the shaping and manipulation of various sonic elements 
in a studio, the result being what Kania terms a “track.” Such works are 
appreciated not through performance but through “playback” on an 
appropriate device. In the case of jazz, while some have maintained 
that jazz performances of “standards” fit the classical paradigm, oth-
ers have held that they use the standards as “ingredients” in a perform- 
ance, and are best described as being “after” rather than “of ” those 
standards (see, e.g., S. Davies 2001; Kania 2011).
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I started this paper by asking how we should think ontologically about a 
musical practice in which the “work-concept” does play a regulative role. It was 
suggested that two features that any such practice must have are repeatability 
and variability, and that it is difficult for a Platonist to accommodate the latter 
feature. If, in line with the reflections in the previous section, we think that 
there are at least some actual or possible forms of musical practice rightly char-
acterised in terms of the classical paradigm, then we can return to our original 
question, now voiced in a nominalist/materialist key. Assuming that there are 
various ways in which a practice can be structured around the multiplicity of ele-
ments that enter into it, what is distinctive about the manner of structuration 
associated with the work-concept? In the final part of this paper, I want to con-
sider two possible answers to this question.
A. Rohrbaugh on musical works as “continuants”
Guy Rohrbaugh has proposed that multiple artworks in general, and trad-
itional musical works in particular, are “continuants,” historical individuals that 
depend for their existence on those concrete entities that are their “embodi-
ments.” Some of these embodiments are occurrences that are distinguished from 
other embodiments in that they “display the qualities of the work of art and are 
relevant to appreciation and criticism” (Rohrbaugh 2003, 198). Rohrbaugh’s 
characterisation of “occurrences” in terms of the role they play in apprecia-
tion suggests that they are a work’s e-instances, or perhaps a work’s strict e- 
instances, but the role that they are intended to play as embodiments that enter 
into the dependence-base of works understood to be historical individuals sug-
gests that they must stand in an appropriate historical relation to a work’s ini-
tiation, in which case they must also be p-instances. This is one example of the 
general failure to distinguish the two senses of “instance” in the literature, but, 
as we shall see, the distinction is important for the tenability of Rohrbaugh’s 
ontological proposal. 
There are in fact two versions of the “continuant” view. On one account 
(e.g., Caplan and Matheson 2006), continuants are perduring entities made up 
of their temporal parts, which, in the case of musical works, will include their 
performances. Embodiment here is constitution. On Rohrbaugh’s alternative 
account, continuants are enduring entities, “‘higher level’ objects” (2003, 199) 
that depend on but are not constituted by those physical or spatial things that 
are their embodiments.
Continuants so construed, according to Rohrbaugh (2003), possess three 
qualities that artworks also possess and that Platonic entities do not: 
(1)  continuants are modally flexible—the same continuant might have 
existed with different intrinsic properties from the ones it actually 
possesses; 
(2)  continuants are temporally flexible—their intrinsic properties might 
differ over time; and




A particular house might be an example of a continuant. This very house, it 
might be claimed, could have had a slightly different design, may undergo vari-
ous alterations in its intrinsic properties during its lifetime, and comes into 
and goes out of existence—the first when it comes to have, and the second 
when it ceases to have, an embodiment. In this sense, houses are multiplicities, 
but their existence depends only upon some of the elements entering into the 
story of their nature as continuants. For example, a house usually stands in a 
relation of causal dependence on an architect’s plan, but the plan is not one of 
its existence-constituting embodiments.
Rohrbaugh claims that the musical work is a continuant having the afore-
mentioned kinds of properties, and that such a work can exist without perfor-
mances as long as it has other embodiments. There are, however, a number of 
problems with Rohrbaugh’s account, given the way in which we have defined 
our task. First, to take internal difficulties, even were it to be agreed that con-
tinuants are modally and temporally flexible, this doesn’t obviously sit well 
with the work-concept as usually understood. Are performable works modally 
flexible, so that something having different requirements for its strict instances 
could have been the same work? And are they temporally flexible, admitting 
of change through time? Rohrbaugh draws an analogy with paintings that, 
so he claims, are endurants with these properties. But others have argued to 
the contrary that while the physical objects that “house” paintings are indeed 
continuants, paintings themselves are not but are modally and temporally 
inflexible. This is one reason why, for some philosophers, works of sculpture 
are constituted by but not identical with the physical masses that serve as their 
vehicles: the statue and the lump of clay have different persistence and exist-
ence conditions.
More germane in the present context, Rohrbaugh’s account doesn’t seem 
to provide an answer to our two central challenges for an ontological account 
of musical works that comply with the classical paradigm, the challenges of 
accounting for the repeatability and variability of such works. It might seem 
that the continuant account can explain repeatability in terms of a musical 
work’s capacity to have multiple occurrences among its embodiments. But we 
have defined the problem of repeatability in terms of a work’s capacity for mul-
tiple p-instances that are strict e-instances. We therefore require an account of 
how the latter are to be picked out, which requires, in turn, a solution to the 
problem of variability. But it isn’t clear that Rohrbaugh’s account has any way 
of addressing the latter problem. In dealing with the musical work in terms of 
embodiments and occurrences, it fails to address how status as an occurrence 
and as a strict occurrence is established through our musical practices, as argued 
in the discussion of Platonist theories. If Rohrbaugh were to argue that, given 
that continuants are historical individuals, a musical work’s occurrences must 
be p-instances, then he might avail himself of an independent account of how a 
work’s p-instances, and indeed those of a work’s p-instances that are strict e-in-
stances, are determined. But since it would then be the independent account 
that would solve the problem of variability, this is simply to reiterate the point 
above, that Rohrbaugh’s account does not itself speak to this problem.
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The significant objection to Rohrbaugh’s “continuants” view then is not 
Dodd’s objection (2007, chapter 6) that such a view is ontologically opaque, 
since there is no reason why ontology of art cannot revise both our practice and 
our prior ontological categories (see Davies 2017). The objection is that such a 
view doesn’t seem to give us what we are looking for—an ontological account 
that captures the concept of the performable work as it occurs in the classical 
paradigm.
B. Musical works as Wollheimian types
As noted earlier, the idea of multiple artworks, and of musical works conform-
ing to the classical paradigm, as abstract entities was in central cases a devel-
opment of Wollheim’s idea (1968) that all multiple artworks are types. It was 
in response to Wollheim that Nicholas Wolterstorff (1975, 1980) developed his 
conception of such works as norm-kinds, a view largely taken over by Julian 
Dodd (2007). Both Wolterstorff and Dodd assume that works, as norm-kinds, 
are abstract entities, and Dodd argues forcefully that, as such, they cannot be 
created by artists but only discovered. What is striking in the present context 
is Wollheim’s claim that what distinguishes types from other kinds of generic 
entities—universals and classes for example—is that they are postulated 
“where we can correlate a class of particulars with a piece of human invention; 
these particulars may then be regarded as tokens of a certain type” (1980, 78). 
This suggests that “Wollheimian types,” as we may call them, differ fundamen-
tally from the types/kinds posited by Platonist theorists such as Dodd. 
What, then, are Wollheimian types?7 Wollheim (1980, 34–35) introduces the 
idea of multiple artworks as types in addressing what he terms the “logical” 
question, “Are works of art physical objects?” This asks about the logical category 
to which works of art belong, and thus the criteria of identity and individua-
tion applicable to them. To answer the logical question positively is to say that 
works are particulars, rather than being non-particulars such as universals, or 
classes. Wollheim contrasts the logical question with what he terms the “meta-
physical” question, “Are works of art physical objects?” Here we assume that 
artworks are particulars, and ask what kinds of particulars they are. Wollheim 
defends the idea of multiple artworks as types as one possible negative answer to 
the logical question. A negative answer to this question maintains that multiple 
artworks are not objects or particulars of any kind, and thus not abstract objects 
or particulars of any kind. Indeed, it is notable that, in his discussion of mul-
tiple artworks as types, Wollheim nowhere mentions abstracta. This isn’t to say 
that types might not be abstract entities, but it is to say that this is not relevant 
to answering the logical question as Wollheim conceives it. Rather, as noted 
earlier, he classifies types alongside classes and universals as generic entities, 
entities that, intuitively, can have other entities falling under them.
It might seem, however, that Wollheim’s claim that musical works are types, 
so construed, simply postpones the salient ontological question about such 
works. If, to take an example, the Enigma Variations is a Wollheimian type and 




is thus something we postulate in virtue of the way in which we group particu-
lar performances by reference to a piece of human invention by Elgar, what 
kind of thing is it, ontologically speaking, that we postulate? It is here that 
we see the temptation to reify types through the kind of analysis furnished by 
Dodd. Wollheimian types, it might seem, must be entities that somehow stand 
apart from their tokens, and that explain why those tokens are rightly grouped 
together. But we have already seen the difficulties with this view in our discus-
sion of the failings of Platonism as an answer to the problem of variability.
How, then, if not in Platonist terms, might we illuminate the nature of what 
is postulated when, in identifying a work, we postulate a Wollheimian type? The 
answer, I suggest, is that we illuminate what is postulated by attending to the 
precise combination of an act of human invention and an enabling practice 
that, I have argued, does explain and legitimate both the groupings of certain 
things as p-instances of a work and the identification of the range of features 
necessary or possible in those p-instances that are strict e-instances. To postu-
late a work qua Wollheimian type is to postulate a piece of human invention 
“initiating” the work, where this act of initiation is embedded in a historically 
and culturally specific set of performative and appreciative practices that issue 
in the very groupings of tokens that we seek to understand. 
To appreciate works as Wollheimian types is just to appreciate what was done 
in two senses: (1) it is to appreciate what manifest properties can be possessed 
by right tokens—strict e-instances—having the relevant causal history, and (2) 
it is to appreciate what was done in establishing the preconditions (for exam-
ple, the generation of a production-artefact or the composition of a score) for 
that casual history to take place. On such a view, our understanding of works as 
Wollheimian types is not illuminated by appeal to Platonistic abstracta. Rather, 
the things that play the particular kind of logical role described by Wollheim 
might be viewed as what I have elsewhere (Davies 2004) termed “perform-
ances,” contextualised actions. On the “performance theory” of art, a work 
like Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane is a collective generative action, in the social 
context furnished by a set of artistic practices, that brings into existence a pro-
duction artefact whose function is to enable multiple screenings of the work. 
A correct screening is one that has those distinctive manifest features required 
by norms embodied in the relevant artistic practice in virtue of standing in a 
causal relation to the work, qua contextualised generative process, mediated by 
the production artefact. And the Enigma Variations is a generative action, in the 
historical and social context furnished by a set of artistic practices, that brings 
into existence a score whose function is to enable multiple performances of 
the work. A performance of the work is an event that stands in the kind of his-
torical-intentional relation to this generative action sanctioned in the relevant 
artistic practice, and the status of a performance as a strict instance of the work 
is similarly dependent upon norms embedded in actual artistic practice. 
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It is Wollheimian types so construed—historically and socially realised 
practices whereby particulars are grouped relative to a piece of human inven-
tion—that are the materialistically respectable realisations of the performable 
works characterised by the classical paradigm. Whether the “work-concept” is 
regulative in a musical practice depends, therefore, upon whether the artistic 
practices necessary to sustain repeatability and variability exist in a given his-
torico-social milieu so that individuals, as participants in that milieu, can per-
form the acts of human invention necessary to initiate such works.8
 8 I would like to thank all my fellow participants at the Orpheus Academy for a very stimulating and 
intellectually rewarding exchange. Above all, I would like to thank Paulo for his tireless work in bringing 
us together in the first place, and in editing the resulting volume.
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1. In the following I will offer an argument for musical works as autonomous 
sound complexes. Such autonomous sound complexes are understood to con-
stitute the being of music. I will also offer a corresponding account of musical 
listening. It presents musical listening as the disclosure of musical works. From 
these two connected models, I will finally infer an idea of music history that 
defends the central role of the avant-garde.
2. Let me note in advance some points of contention. Among these might be: 
the privileging of musical works over musical practices; the elevation of a spe-
cific cultural-historical type of music to its constitutive exemplar; the neglect 
of social, cultural, or historical conditions in favour of musical autonomy; the 
disregarding of liturgical, communal, or political functions of music; and the 
ignorance towards phenomena that overcome formal closeness, such as instal-
lations, chance compositions, conceptual art, aesthetic situations, and the like. 
I hope that they, and other points of contention, will fall to the wayside over 
the course of the argument. My aim is neither to commit music to the work- 
concept that ruled the European tradition between, say, 1700 and 1950, nor to 
sterilise music by extinguishing its seemingly extra-musical aspects. Rather, I 
propose a concept of the musical work that is assumed to grasp the full being 
of music, which then helps us adequately understand those phenomena that 
seem to dissolve the work paradigm. I do hold, however, that such a concept of 
the musical work is central to the understanding of musical being in general.
3. The mode of presentation will be dogmatic. That is, I will discuss neither 
contrary nor connatural positions, but devote my argument to constructive 
work; exceptions prove the rule. I also will not give multiple examples, but stay 
mainly within the conceptual tracks of the argument. The latter is a deficit, for 
the meaning of any philosophy of music consists of its explicative function on 
concrete musical entities and experiences. However, I hope that this deficit is 
balanced by the fact that some crucial concepts stem from compositional and 
musicological reflection. In these concepts, musical experience has been pre-






case, the dogmatic outlook does not imply that I disrespect obverse theories or 
that I have not learned from them, nor does it imply that I fancy the following 
ideas were all invented by myself. It is simply a matter of concision. The restric-
tion to constructive and conceptual work allows the argument to be expressed 
in the most straightforward manner.1
II. Aesthetic ontology
4. If musical works are supposed to constitute the being of music, their account 
is an exercise in musical ontology. The common approach of contemporary 
philosophy to musical ontology consists of providing definitions of the kind of 
entities that works of music are assumed to be. These definitions are designed 
to distinguish musical works from other entities and to lay down their identity 
criteria and conditions of individuation. Most notably, Lydia Goehr (1992) has 
shown that this conception of musical ontology has failed. I will not repeat her 
arguments here, which prove the malfunction of such definitions in my eyes, 
but will take their destructive result as the origin of my own reasoning. There 
is also a second vein of disappointment with the common approach in musical 
ontology. Even if the approach were successful, its aesthetic significance would 
have been nil. Preoccupied with nitpicking about standards of definition, onto-
logical definitions of musical works sound like gobbledygook to the aesthetic 
understanding. Understanding music is something different from watching for 
criteria that an entity must satisfy to count as a musical work. Thus, the internal 
flop and the external prevarication of the search for definitions disqualify the 
ontology of music as it is pursued in the common style.
5. The majority of people who share this disillusion concludes that musical 
ontology has been shipwrecked in general. If it is to be continued at all, ontol-
ogy may survive in the form of an “as if ” ontology. This is to say that, by using the 
concept of musical works, one does not commit oneself to their existence but 
articulates a regulative idea for certain musical practices: one acts “as if ” works 
of music existed. Veritable ontological claims, in contrast, have to be aban-
doned. But this conclusion regarding the general collapse of musical ontology 
is overhasty. The failure of the common approach evidently does not imply that 
there cannot be an ontology that does not run after definitions and that does 
not ignore the demands of aesthetics. This possibility is crucial because the 
question of musical being remains somehow to be answered, for, after all, our 
musical experience is the experience of something that is. The task, then, is 
 1 The argument draws on material that was presented on different occasions. Section II includes un-
published thoughts delivered at Brown and Harvard Universities. Section III compresses, and slightly 
reformulates, the much more detailed account of basic concepts as offered by my book Die Autonomie des 
Klangs (2014). The two sections were presented at the Orpheus Institute, as was the main body of section 
IV. Section IV also makes use of an argument discussed at the inaugural meeting of the Basler Forum für 
Musikästhetik in 2015, and of some parts of the keynote address that I delivered to the annual meeting 
of the Gesellschaft für Musiktheorie in Berlin the same year. The address was published as Hindrichs 
(2016a) and the Basel paper was published as Hindrichs (2016b). I am indebted to the audiences of all 
these presentations. I am also indebted to Elaine Fitz Gibbon for polishing my English.
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this: to construct the ontology of musical works in terms alternative to those 
of the common approach, and to compose it in an aesthetic key. Let us call this 
novel option “aesthetic ontology.”
6. The argument for an aesthetic ontology goes thus. Its first premise asserts 
that ontology is not fundamental. This premise stands in contradiction to the 
venerable idea of ontology as first philosophy. Stretching from Aristotle to 
contemporary accounts, this idea argues that ontology comes first because it 
investigates being as such, in contrast to all approaches that investigate specific 
kinds of being and thus build on a general account of what there is. However, 
ontology cannot maintain the first place in the order of philosophical inquiry. 
Every ontology manifests a conceptual scheme that articulates the great chain 
of being. Without such a scheme, or a framework of basic ontological concepts 
(categories), being remains an inarticulate sphere of which nothing could be 
said. This conceptual scheme, in turn, requires an analysis. And its analysis 
cannot be an ontological analysis, since any ontology presupposes a conceptual 
scheme. Thus, ontology is not the fundamental inquiry, but depends on a prior 
investigation into its conceptual scheme. Ontology is dethroned.
7. That the conceptual scheme articulates the great chain of being means that 
it articulates the elementary ways of how the things are. The concepts of the 
scheme, or categories, operate on these elementary ways of being. Now, a gen-
eral formula for “how the things are” is to say that “the things are thus and 
thus.” Accordingly, the basic ontological concepts operate on the things being 
thus and thus. However, that the things are thus and thus is not only the univer-
sal structure of being, but also the universal structure of judgements. It is their 
generic logical form. It follows that the great chain of being substantiates the 
generic logical form of judgements. In other words, the content of judgements, 
“that things are thus and thus,” and the facts of reality, “that things are thus and 
thus,” have the same form. This puts us in a position of assuming that the basic 
ontological concepts can be founded in the reflection on the logical form of 
judgements. Judgement theory may provide us with proper access to the con-
ceptual scheme of ontology.
8. The premise that ontology is not fundamental thus drives us to take notice 
of the proper order of judgement. And here I believe the Kantian view to be 
right: that there are three distinct types of judgement, which are irreducible 
to one another. These types are theoretical judgements, practical judgements, 
and aesthetic judgements. For reasons evident enough, let us focus immedi-
ately on the third type. Aesthetic judgements differ from theoretical judge-
ments and practical judgements in peculiar ways. On the one hand, unlike 
theoretical judgements, aesthetic judgements are not made true by facts, for 
judgemental content made true by a fact consists of the description of the fact, 
and the description of a fact and its aesthetic apprehension are two distinct 
things. On the other hand, unlike practical judgements, aesthetic judgements 






appraisal of something is impartial to the question of its reality and concerns 
facta and ficta likewise. It follows that aesthetic judgements are judgements that 
are not made true by the facts of the world and are disinterested in their real-
isation. Accordingly, they cannot be reduced to theoretical or practical judge-
ments. Although the three types may stand in specific relations to one another, 
the aesthetic judgement is a judgement in its own right. 
9. In the horizon of this Kantian idea, an important conclusion for the proper 
ontological approach has to be drawn. If judgement theory gives access to the 
framework of basic ontological concepts, and if a cardinal tenet of judgement 
theory consists of the differentiation of judgement into theoretical, practical, 
and aesthetic judgements, then ontology too has to be differentiated. This is 
to say that there are different, irreducible kinds of ontology: one under the 
prescription of theoretical judgement, one under the prescription of prac-
tical judgement, and one under the prescription of aesthetic judgement. 
Correspondingly, we have reason to speak of a specifically aesthetic being, 
whose articulation depends on the third type of judgement and which is ruled 
by neither one of the two other ontologies. Such ontology is tuned in a genu-
inely aesthetic key.
10. The most salient characteristic of aesthetic ontology is the autonomy of its 
entities. This becomes clear when one considers the opposite of autonomy. 
The opposite of autonomy, heteronomy, applies where entities are not ruled by 
themselves, but are submitted to laws imposed on them. Here, the entity and 
the law are two sides that have to be brought together, and the entities become 
cases of the law. As such cases, they have to be identifiable, and re-identifiable, 
as particular instances of a law that is, in principle, general. Accordingly, the 
judgement type on which the framework of heteronomy depends must be a 
judgement type that identifies its objects. But identification is not an issue of 
the aesthetic judgement. Questions like, Does the reference fail?, How is one 
guaranteed to get the object right?, What discriminating knowledge must the 
judging subject have?, and so on, are nonsensical from the aesthetic point of 
view, for aesthetic judgements are not made true by facts. If the truth-makers 
of aesthetic judgements were facts, they would indeed have to identify their 
objects, for the correct or incorrect discrimination of their objects would con-
tribute to their truth. Since this is not the case, the issue of identification is not 
significant. It follows that the entities of aesthetic ontology are not to be con-
sidered as identifiable, and re-identifiable, objects. And from this, it follows 
further that they cannot be cases of imposed laws. Thus, aesthetic entities are 
not subject to any kind of heteronomy. The structures of aesthetic being are 
structures of autonomy.
11. An interesting analogy to first-person thought should be noticed here. 
There is a well-known distinction by Wittgenstein between the object use and 
the subject use of the “I” (Wittgenstein 1970). While the first use requires the 
recognition of a particular person in the world, the second use is free of such 
 
69
Towards a General Theory of Musical Works and Musical Listening
 
 
recognition. Examples of the different uses are, on the one hand, me seeing 
someone in the mirror and identifying him as myself by thinking “I am stand-
ing there and there,” and, on the other hand, me thinking “I feel pain,” regard-
ing which the question of whether it is really me who feels pain is nonsensical. 
These examples suggest that, using the “I” objectively, I spot myself in a range 
of objects, whereas no identification is pursued when I use it subjectively. In an 
analogous manner, we can distinguish between the object use and the aesthetic 
use of the singular term in a judgement. Its object use identifies a particular 
object with which the judgement is concerned; its aesthetic use, however, does 
not recognise an object in contrast to other things, for identification is not at 
issue in the case of judgements that are not made true by facts. Here the singu-
lar term refers to something that is simply present. To acknowledge this feature 
marks the most important difference to the other versions of musical ontology 
onstage. All of them are meant to offer matrices of identification, be they ver-
sions of Platonism, nominalism, or other isms; however, a truly aesthetic ontol-
ogy does not need such a matrix.
III. Musical works
12. We are now able to design the ontology of music in its adequate form. 
Musical ontology shall be considered as a subgenre of aesthetic ontology. That 
is, it has to be carried out under the prescription of the aesthetic judgement, 
and not under the prescriptions of the theoretical or the practical judgement. 
Accordingly, musical being must be understood neither in terms of natural 
being nor in terms of social being. It is a kind of aesthetic being, which means 
that its entities are autonomous entities.
13. These autonomous entities are designated by the notion of the musical 
work. There is no musical being that is not a work; that is, there is no musical 
being that is not constituted as an autonomous entity. To be significant, this 
general notion needs to be articulated in a series of explicata. Such explicata are 
the basic ontological concepts that build the framework in which the aesthetic 
being of music can be understood. It follows that the basic concepts of musical 
ontology must be constructed under the auspices of autonomy. 
14. The first concept is the concept of musical sound. Whatever else music may 
be, it is something audible. Sound is therefore its most elementary characteris-
tic. However, not every sound is musical sound. According to the requirements 
of aesthetic ontology, the difference between musical and non-musical sound 
is to be explained in terms of autonomy and heteronomy. Thus, we can say that 
musical sound is sound giving itself its own laws, while non-musical sound is 
sound being subject to foreign laws, for example, to the laws of physics or the 
laws of social praxis. In this sense, the most elementary characteristic of the 






15. The autonomy of sound has to be read in the strict sense. The fact that sound 
gives itself its own laws means, first, that the rule system of musical sound is not 
imposed upon by anything external to it and, second, that this rule system has 
to be validated by the musical entity itself. To say the latter is to say that there 
is no musical apriority. Musical apriority would consist in pre-established rule 
systems that would determine whether sounds might count as musical sounds. 
Many epochs of music history suggest the existence of such musical apriority, 
and one is seduced by this into assuming that musical sound stands under its 
condition. However, twentieth-century currents as distinct as musique con-
crète, electronic music, musique formelle, and chance music have all proven that 
the decision of whether sounds may count as musical sounds is a basic problem 
for composition. The second condition of the autonomy of sound is a conclu-
sion from this: the musicality of sound is not decided by some musical apri-
ority, but by the self-legislation of sound. Self-legislation means that the laws 
of sound hold in virtue of the sound complex alone. They are instituted by the 
inner consistency of the sound constituted by them. Rule systems that appear to 
be preset, such as tonality, counterpoint, and the like, are in fact to be recon-
structed by each musical work in terms of their own rule systems.
16. There are different types of musical sound. Such types cannot be deduced, 
but have to be induced by musicological, compositional, or practical reflec-
tions. Their most important requirement is that they are common enough to 
precede all specific functions that musical sounds fulfil. Sound types articulate 
generic possibilities of musical sound. As such articulations, they remain on 
the merely structural level. In contrast, the individuality of a musical sound is 
articulated by the concept of timbre. Timbre must not be misunderstood as 
one sound parameter alongside others. Rather, timbre is the “general physiog-
nomy” (Chion 2011, 237) of an individual sound of music. However, since we 
often do speak of the same musical sound appearing in different timbres, for 
example, in the case of a figure played at different pitches or performed by dif-
ferent instruments, one has to restate the assessment of timbre with the pro-
viso that musical sound possesses a core towards which its physiognomy grav-
itates. This core can be the same in different individual sounds and belongs, 
accordingly, to an intermediate level between the generality of types and the 
individuality of timbre. Different physiognomies constitute different individu-
alities of sound without excluding a common kernel that allows their equation.
17. Individual sounds, sound kernels, and sound types are identifiable and 
re-identifiable. This is grounded in the concept of rules. Because a rule requires 
the discrimination of particulars as its cases, it implies the identifiability, and 
re-identifiability, of items. Accordingly, sound rules identify sounds as their 
instances. This seems to contradict the statement that the question of identifi-
cation is nonsensical concerning musical being. But although the question of 
identification indeed does not apply to the musical work itself, it does apply to 
the sounds whose complex the work is. And this means that individual sounds, 
sound kernels, and sound types are not the object of aesthetic judgement as 
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long as they are taken for themselves. The aesthetic judgement refers only to 
the complex, or the totality, of sounds, while all identifiable sounds remain 
under its radar. The complex of autonomous sound differentiates into them.
18. After all, musical sound can be understood as an autonomous complex 
of identifiable, and re-identifiable, audible phenomena of certain types with 
physiognomies gravitating towards shared kernels.
19. Having introduced musical sound as standing under self-given rules, the 
adjacent basic concepts have to be explicata of the different kinds of these rules. 
The first of these kinds consists of rules that govern the temporal relations of 
sounds. Accordingly, the second basic concept is the concept of musical time.
20. Traditionally, the temporal character of music was seen as evidence against 
the conception of musical works. Music, it was said, could not form a work 
because its fugaciousness contradicted the endurance that works of art must 
have. Leonardo thus subordinated music to painting, which remains in being, 
whereas music dies immediately after its creation (Leonardo 1651, 1.25). The 
argument relies on the assumption that the temporal structure of music sub-
jects music to time, and therefore to its fugaciousness. However, if the con-
cept of musical time articulates autonomous sound, music cannot be subject to 
time, but gives the time rules by itself to itself. It does not stand in time, but has 
time within it. Autonomous sound is sound possessing time.
21. If musical time is not the time to which music is subject, but the time that 
music has, musical time is, in the first instance, not a time span. Time spans 
are units of the temporal order. But musical time is not an element of the 
temporal order, but its own autonomous order. Thus, it is not a time span. 
Correspondingly, musical time cannot be compared to other units of time. 
Since a unit that can be compared to other units is called an extensive magni-
tude, musical time is not an extensive magnitude. Now, the opposite of exten-
sive magnitudes are intensive magnitudes. They are characterised by the con-
tinuity of degrees. It follows that musical time is such an intensive magnitude. 
It is the continuity of degrees, or a flowing magnitude, that then differentiates 
into distinct units. Accordingly, the rules of musical time are the rules of dif-
ferentiation of this flowing continuity: they are rules of differentiation of the 
intensive magnitude into extensive magnitudes. Therefore, it is of foremost 
importance to bind the temporal units of music to the continuity of musical 
time. The comparable units of metre, for example, have to be understood nei-
ther as divisions nor as additions of time, but as products of the evolution of 
time, as Moritz Hauptmann (1853, 238) put it and Christopher Hasty (1997) 
worked out. Products of the evolution of time are differentiations of its conti-
nuity. Its extensive magnitudes result from its intensive magnitude.
22. Autonomous complexes of sound, or musical works, are self-differentiat-







intensive magnitude of musical time and the extensive magnitude of the time 
span in which a musical work is performed or heard. How can these incommen-
surable magnitudes correspond? Their correspondence can be formulated in 
terms of claims and compliance. The intensive magnitude of musical time calls 
for an adequate extensive magnitude of extra-musical time, and the extra- 
musical time span satisfies this claim if the performance is felicitous. Note that 
this allows for a variety of compliances, for musical time does not define the 
measurement of the extra-musical time for which it calls, as its intensive mag-
nitude cannot represent an extensive magnitude. Compliance remains a mat-
ter of judgement. And note further that this feature explains the repeatability 
of musical time in extra-musical time. The musical time of a work is repeated 
again and again in extra-musical time, for the claim that it presents remains the 
same while its compliances change.
23. After all, musical time can be understood as an intensive magnitude that 
differentiates into intra-musical extensive magnitudes and that calls for the 
compliance of extra-musical time spans.
24. Time rules cannot be the only kind of rules. The concept of musical sound 
has established musical sounds as identifiable, and re-identifiable, items. 
Time rules, however, do not institute the framework that is needed in order to 
identify, and re-identify, musical sounds. Let us assume that, contrary to fact, 
time rules were the only rules of autonomous sound. If we wanted to state the 
numerical difference of qualitatively identical sounds under this condition, the 
only way to do so would be to distinguish by the instants of time at which they 
sound. Accordingly, sounds at different instants would need to be different 
sounds. But then, sounds would not be re-identifiable at different instants of 
time. It follows that identifiable, and re-identifiable, sounds require a frame-
work that entails more than just the rules of time.
25. The identification, and re-identification, of sounds that are numerically 
different, but qualitatively the same, presupposes a spatial order. Qualitatively 
identical sounds can be distinguished according to the places at which they 
sound, and they can be re-identified when they sound at other places (see 
Strawson 1959, 71–85). But since the autonomy of musical sound suspends 
it from extra-musical laws, the required spatial order cannot be found in 
extra-musical space, that is, in physical space. A genuine space of music is 
needed. This, then, is the third basic concept: the concept of musical space.
26. Musical space is often either confused with the space in which music 
appears or taken as a metaphor. But like musical time, musical space is not the 
space in which music is, but the space that music has in itself; and it is more 
than a metaphor because it is the constitutive condition for identifiable sounds 
whose complex the musical work is. Nonetheless, musical space is a rather mar-
ginal concept in musical aesthetics. The old distinction between temporal 
and spatial arts seems to have suppressed the spatial characteristics of music. 
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Fortunately, historical investigations into medieval theories of music as well as 
compositional reflections, especially those of serialism, have brought the con-
cept of musical space to light. They show that our speaking of high and low 
pitch, of lines and parallels, of inversions and intervals, and so on, are more 
than mere façons de parler. They are expressions of the constitutive role of the 
rules of musical space. 
27. Musical space has three dimensions: breadth, height, and depth. The first 
dimension determines the horizontal order of musical sound. It is the simul-
taneous representation of temporal succession, “sounds being side by side,” 
and its factors correspond to the respective factors of musical time. The sec-
ond dimension, height, determines the vertical order, “sounds being one upon 
another.” It is operated by the distinction between high and low and differen-
tiated by intervals, scales, their repeatability in other positions, and the like. 
The diastematic and chordal structure of music is constituted in its height, as 
well as the pitch determination of clusters and sound clouds. The third dimen-
sion, depth, introduces “sounds being behind one another.” Its fundamental 
operator is the construction of nearness and remoteness in different respects, 
extending from factors of background and foreground over the topology of 
tonal regions, to musical gestures like wie aus weiter Ferne.
28. In addition to the three dimensions, at least two other spatial functions rule 
autonomous sound. These functions are the diagonal and the density of musical 
space. The diagonal correlates horizontal and vertical functions. It is important 
especially for counterpoint, which constructs musical structures that embody 
internal relations between vertical and horizontal positions. Density, in turn, 
determines musical sound concerning whether it is open-worked or compact. 
Questions of complexity or minimalism are variations of density. All these spa-
tial functions generate the order of distance between sounds. Globally, they 
govern the constriction or the extent of musical structures; locally, they operate 
on their internal patterns.
29. As musical time, musical space must not be understood as an extensive 
magnitude, but as an intensive magnitude. Otherwise, a musical work would 
be subordinated to the extra-musical spatial order in which it would be compa-
rable to other spatial items. Accordingly, musical space should be understood 
as an intensive magnitude that differentiates into extensive spatial magnitudes 
through the functions of its three dimensions and their two corollary factors.
30. The concepts of musical time and musical space articulate the structural 
order of musical sound. However, in addition to their structural order, the 
spatio-temporal sounds of music must also be convincing. Their power to 
convince is because musical sounds are not arbitrary, but consequent. That 
is, they have to have some kind of logical force. The spatio-temporal sounds’ 




31. Musical logic must not be cast in terms of analytical necessity, but has to be 
understood in respect to the uses of argument. The musical order of sounds 
works like an argument that is meant to convince someone of a certain con-
sequence in a particular context: it is a topical argument of a certain scope. 
The spatio-temporal sounds’ power to convince depends on this scope. To 
assert that a sequence of sounds is an argument of a certain scope is to assert 
that a sound sequence in, say, a Chopin nocturne is convincing under differ-
ent presuppositions than it would be in a motet by Josquin. To be sure, sound 
sequences also contain elements independent of scope. Rules of counterpoint, 
for example, contribute to the persuasiveness of a fugue by Bach as well as of a 
symphony by Bruckner, although their musical logic is otherwise quite differ-
ent. Nonetheless, even the elements independent of scope acquire their spe-
cific function within an argument of a certain scope. Thus, musical arguments 
are topical, or dialectical, arguments and not analytical ones.
32. That musical sound sequences are arguments meant to convince someone 
introduces a further condition. Convincing someone makes sense only if the 
consequence of which one shall be convinced is not already obvious. There 
must be some opposition to it. With regard to music, this means that doubt 
about and resistance against sound sequences are the precondition of musical 
arguments. If music runs like clockwork, it has no power to convince. It must 
“unsettle the aesthetic apparatus” in order to become convincing (Lachenmann 
1996, my translation). On the basis of such a disturbance, the topical arguments 
of music can do their work. They convince those who are resistant to sound 
sequences of their consequence. Accordingly, the functional order of music 
institutes persuasiveness on the basis of disturbance.
33. The upheaval of the aesthetic apparatus is not restricted to the currents 
of twentieth-century music that explicitly have formulated it. It holds for all 
autonomous sound complexes, that is, for all musical entities in the realm of 
aesthetic being. Ordinary oppositions like rhapsodic versus logic, drastic ver-
sus gnostic, music at hand versus music in presentation, and so on, miss the 
point insofar as they rest on a mistaken view of musical logic. To repeat: musical 
logic is constructed in the form of topical arguments that convince someone 
of certain sound sequences under certain premises. This holds both for ad libi-
tum and obliggato styles of music. And since topical arguments presuppose 
the resistance of an opponent, musical arguments presuppose the resistance 
of the listener to their sounds. This can be seen even in the case of the most 
easy-going forms of music. Tonal music, for example, rests on the exposure of 
its tonality in the form of the cadence. The cadence, in turn, consists of two falls 
of the fifth (I–IV, V–I). The first fall suggests that the tonic is the dominant of 
the subdominant, although it is posited as the tonic; the second fall dissolves 
this contradiction and reconfirms the right of the tonic. The cadence is thus 
grounded in a harmonic malfunction: the elements of the first chord repre-
sent a different tonal function (the dominant) than the function that they are 
supposed to represent (the tonic). It follows that the argument in favour of a 
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certain tonality, which the cadence presents, presupposes the resistance and 
disturbance of the aesthetic apparatus, whose understanding of the first tonal 
function is shaken. Where such elementary upheaval is missing, the musical 
argument of the cadence becomes nonsensical. Thus, being successful, musical 
arguments sublate the resistance of the aesthetic apparatus into a fuller under-
standing of the music.
34. The logical force of music manifests the spatial-temporal structures of 
musical sound as argumentative functions. Now, the formula “something as 
something” expresses the meaning of the object in question. Thus, the articu-
lation of the argumentative order of music is done by the concept of musical 
meaning. It is the fourth basic concept in the aesthetic ontology of music. 
However, musical meaning cannot be restricted to the argumentative function 
of sounds. Musical sounds are argumentative functions insofar as they operate 
in regard to other sounds. But there seem to be aspects of musical meaning 
that are not restricted to relations of sound alone. Sounds might expose ideals, 
enact ways of life, or anticipate what has not yet come to be. Such aspects, all 
of which are instances of sound as something, put sound in relation to non-
sound. Notwithstanding, they must still be understood in terms of autonomy, 
being the products of the self-legislation of music. Thus, the concept of music- 
al meaning has to be modelled in such a way that simultaneously respects the 
autonomy of sound and points to the world of non-sound.
35. The best model I can find is that of the fourfold meaning of Scripture. In this 
model, what is written in a Scriptural text can be interpreted in four ways: the 
literal sense, or “what is said”; the allegorical sense, or “what you shall believe”; 
the tropological sense, or “how you shall live”; and the anagogical sense, or 
“what you can hope for.” Applying this model to music, the different layers of 
musical meaning can be distinguished in the following ways: the literal sense of 
musical sounds is the meaning of sound solely in regard to sound, “what is said 
in terms of sound alone,” and we have seen that this meaning consists of the 
argumentative function that a sound possesses in a sequence of sounds. On the 
basis of this literal sense of music, the three other senses point to something 
other than sound alone. The allegorical sense is what musical sounds make 
you believe from the particular premises that they imply. To give an example: 
under certain implicit premises of eighteenth-century German Protestant 
music, a sound structure is to be understood as passus duriusculus and thus as 
the enactment of pain. The tropological sense, in turn, is what musical sounds 
mean when their auditors apply them to themselves and the comprehension 
of their own lives. To again give an example: the meaning of rhythm could be 
understood as the exposition of the movement of the animate world. Finally, 
the anagogic sense is the utopian meaning of musical sounds: they present an 
order of freedom not realised in the existing world. Each of these higher senses 
is constituted as autonomously as the elementary literal sense. They are con-
strued under implicit premises for beliefs, with conditions for the application 




of musical sounds and understandable in terms of it. Thus, their contents are 
functions of musical sound, in opposition to musical sound as a function of 
such contents.
36. With the concept of musical meaning, the articulation of musical being 
seems to be completed. The spatio-temporal structure of autonomous sound 
and its fourfold meaning are spelled out. But the last step is still missing. As 
seen, the logical force of musical sound is of a certain scope, instituted by each 
of its autonomous complexes. Its power to convince depends on this scope. 
Therefore, it calls for the persuasiveness of the scope itself. The persuasiveness 
of the scope, in turn, cannot be decided by the arguments working within it. 
That is, musical meaning, resting on the argumentative functions of sounds, 
stands under the constraint that the scope of the autonomous sound complex 
itself proves to be valid. And this proof cannot be a matter of musical meaning, 
but has to be articulated on a superordinate level. 
37. In order to be valid, the scope of the autonomous sound complex has to be 
related to a normative instance. If it satisfies the demands of this instance, its 
validity is realised. The instance cannot be external to the musical work, for 
this would run counter to the autonomy of sound. Accordingly, the required 
relation of the autonomous sound complex must be an internal relation. This 
means that the complex has to manifest an aspect that is different from the 
aspect of which the articulations hitherto given are comprised, and to which 
the latter aspect can be related. Let us call this latter aspect the aspect of form. 
In our context, musical form shall be defined as the answer to the question 
“what is it?” asked about a musical entity. The framework of this answer has 
been explained: the form of a musical entity is a certain autonomous spatio- 
temporal structure of fourfold meaning. But the question “what is it?” is not 
the only question to be asked of a musical entity. An equally important ques-
tion asks “whereof is it?” The answer to this question is given by the music- 
al material. Musical material is everything of which a musical work is made. 
It comprises not only inventories of tones and systems of their relations, but 
also rules of performance and social conditions of music. What matters is that 
these materials have been transformed into the form of autonomous sound. 
Seemingly given determinants from nature and society are thus subordinated 
to the self-legislation of sound. Indeed, these materials are present only within 
the autonomy of sound, for they have been processed by the rule system of the 
musical work before they become an issue. Thus, the musical material is an 
internal aspect of autonomous sound complexes, although external matters 
have precipitated into it.
38. The musical material is the normative instance to which the rule systems of 
autonomous sound are related in order to be valid. This is because the musical 
material is itself not formless, but was preformed over the course of history. 
Being historically preformed, the musical material implements a specific range 
of possibilities of what can be made of them. In Adorno’s words, the musical 
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material has a certain tendency (Adorno [1949] 1975, 38–42). To it, the music- 
al form has to respond if it wants to realise the possibilities offered by the 
material. One must not misconceive this tendency. It is clear that it cannot 
be straight linearity, and it is also clear that it cannot be used as a tribunal to 
condemn, or to praise, abstract methods of composition. Rather, it has to be 
understood as a historically instituted, and historically changing, field of com-
positional possibilities to which the rule systems of autonomous musical sound 
have to react. As such a field of possibilities that excludes other possibilities, 
the musical material has normative power.
39. The internal relation of aesthetic validation has now become manifest. It 
consists of the consistency of material and form of an autonomous sound com-
plex. Therefore, the final concept of musical ontology has to be a concept that 
articulates the internal consistency-relation of works. In recourse to some con-
siderations of Schoenberg (1975), I call this final concept the “musical idea.” 
The musical idea is the method used to generate cohesion through the homeo-
stasis of material and form. It institutes rule systems of spatio-temporal sound 
sequences with meaning in response to the demands of material possibilities. 
40. Because musical meaning is an element of form, while the musical idea is 
the method that relates form and material in a consistent manner, the musical 
idea is meaningless. It is the meaningless centre of musical meaning. As such, it 
transcends everything that can be interpreted in music. But it is not ingrained 
into music and its interpretations from above. Rather, it is the explicatum of the 
fact that musical form has to respond to material requirements. That is, the 
musical idea manifests a transcendence of meaning that is rooted in the mater-
iality of music. As such, it proves the aesthetic ontology of musical works to be 
materialistic and transcendent at once.
IV. Musical listening
41. The aesthetic ontology of musical works has presented works as autonomous 
complexes of sound. As mentioned previously, sounds are audible phenomena. 
Accordingly, musical works are complexes of audible phenomena. This means 
that musical works are constituted with regard to musical listening. They imply 
the possibility to be auditively disclosed. However, not every kind of listening is 
apt to disclose the being of music. It must be performed in specifically musical 
terms. Thus, the ontological account of music translates into an investigation 
into the characteristics of musical listening.
42. The characterisation of musical listening shall begin with its intentional-
ity. To say that musical listening is intentional is to say that it is the hearing of 
something as something. The formula “of something as something” entails two 
conditions: musical listening is, first, directed towards something and, second, 
perceives that towards which it is directed under a certain aspect. Wittgenstein 






the phrase “according to an interpretation” (Wittgenstein 1960, §511, 524, my 
translation). Perceiving something as something is to perceive it according to an 
interpretation. Wittgenstein further introduces the concept of guidedness into 
the context of aspect perception (1960, §368–71). The different interpretations 
according to which someone perceives something as something correspond to 
different forms of perceptive guidedness. This means that the ongoing flow 
of our perception is guided and determined by the different interpretations 
according to which we perceive something. Finally, Wittgenstein makes a third 
point. This point states that to perceive different aspects means to be disposed 
to different behaviour. When we perceive something according to a certain 
interpretation, we are disposed to behave in a certain way, while we are dis-
posed to behave in other ways when we perceive it according to other interpre-
tations (ibid., §505, 513–14, 517–18). Let us rely on Wittgenstein’s three consid-
erations and put them together. Intentional perception, then, is the perception 
of aspects according to interpretations that guide the track of perception and 
that correspond to certain types of behaviour.
43. When we apply these general considerations to the question of listening, we 
can say that to hear something as something means to hear it under an aspect. 
That is, the flow and determination of auditory perception is guided according 
to interpretations and connected to behavioural dispositions. “Hearing-as” is 
interpretative hearing. Here we have the precise point of distinction between 
musical and non-musical listening. Both kinds of listening hear different 
aspects of something, which implies that they hear audible phenomena accord-
ing to different interpretations; the difference in these interpretations marks 
the difference between musical and non-musical forms of listening. From this 
account, it follows that the interpretations according to which one listens to 
musical works have to be specifically musical interpretations. Musical listening 
is aspect-hearing guided by interpretations that constitute those aspects under 
which sounds become music. 
44. Before becoming more explicit about that which makes an interpretation 
a musical interpretation, let us refine the general idea a little bit more. The 
interpretations according to which something is heard as something cannot be 
general concepts under which audible phenomena are subsumed or classified. 
Subsumption and classification are analytical operations. But the interpreta-
tive guidance of the flow of perception is a synthetic function. It synthesises 
perceptual information into perceptual items of certain aspects, making an 
indeterminate “this” into a recognisable “this-such.” Using terminology intro-
duced by Kant, we can call the “this-such” a figurative synthesis of perceptions, 
and we can call the function that carries it out the productive imagination of 
this-suches (Critique of Pure Reason B150–52, Kant 1998 256–57).2 This synthetic 
function is productive because it generates the recognisable items of percep-
 2 Here and in the following, I draw on the interpretations provided by Wilfrid Sellars (1968, 4–8), and 
Peter F. Strawson ([1971] 1974).
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tion. And it is imaginative because it not only operates on present perceptual 
information, but refers to all perceptual content that is connected with the 
behaviour to which the performance of aspect perception disposes us. In other 
words, productive imagination synthesises perceptions according to interpre-
tations that imply an entire horizon of perceptual possibilities. Thus, the inter-
pretations according to which we hear something as something are substanti-
ated in figurative syntheses of auditory perceptions that imply a wide range of 
perceptions present and absent. They guide the flow of listening. 
45. Yet another point: the results of productive imagination, the figurative syn-
theses of “this-suches,” are closely connected with judgements. For example, 
the perceptual contents “this-sound trope” and “this-triad” can be easily stated 
in the propositional forms “this is a sound trope” and “this is a triad.” In these 
propositional forms, they become the content of judgements. From the easy 
transformability of non-propositional content into propositional form, it fol-
lows that a perception according to an interpretation is not a mere “this.” As a 
“this-such,” it is conceptually rich, closely connected to the predicative use of 
concepts and implying a framework of them. Notwithstanding, the this-such 
nexus is distinct from judgement insofar as it is in the perception itself, having 
been put there by productive imagination according to an interpretation. To 
hear something according to an interpretation, it is not necessary that one be 
able to transform one’s “this-suches” into propositional forms. Thus, the per-
ception is not reducible to the concepts and the conceptual framework that it 
implies. The figurative syntheses of productive imagination are transformable 
into propositional forms, but independent of their actual transformation. 
46. Under these premises, the distinction between musical and non-musical 
listening can be restated more precisely. The differences in their interpreta-
tions are differences of figurative syntheses by productive imagination. Musical 
listening is imaginative in its own way. And we can state the direction in which 
this way leads. The distinctive imaginative form of musical listening must con-
cern the conceptual factors that are implied in the respective interpretation 
according to which we hear. 
47. By this, one could feel prompted to say that the required conceptual dif-
ference becomes explicit in the different conceptual frameworks implied in 
productive imagination. When we hear a “this-triad,” the conceptual richness 
of this perception leads to another framework, namely that of tonal harmony or 
at least of chord systems, than does the conceptual richness of a “this-signal.” 
But it seems that the difference between musical imagination and non-musical 
imagination must be more than just the implication of different conceptual 
schemes. Musical and non-musical imaginations not only involve different sets 
of concepts, they also appear to involve concepts in different ways. 
48. One way to state this difference in conceptual involvement is to say that 






implies. This statement could be concluded from Roger Scruton’s position that 
aesthetic experience employs unasserted thought (1974, 87–98).3 Unasserted 
thought goes beyond what is believed truly or falsely. To be sure, not everything 
that we believe is asserted; but everything that we believe when we believe truly 
or falsely is asserted. Scruton’s position that aesthetic experience employs 
unasserted thought fits nicely with the pre-propositional side of productive 
imagination. But it misses the transformability of “this-suches” into propo-
sitional form. When we hear a “this-triad,” we are allowed to move on to the 
proposition “this is a triad.” And here we clearly make an assertion. Thus, the 
concept of a chord is implicitly asserted when we hear a “this-chord,” and the 
concepts that are at work in figurative syntheses are not at work as unasserted 
concepts but as tacitly asserted concepts. We thus have to look for another pos-
sibility in order to state the different ways in which concepts are involved in 
musical imagination. 
49. I suggest that this possibility can be found in the fundamental characteris-
tic of aesthetic judgements. This characteristic, and not the contrast between 
asserted and unasserted thought, marks the difference between musical and 
non-musical listening. As argued in the first section, the fundamental char-
acteristic of aesthetic judgements consists of the condition that these judge-
ments are not made true by facts. In the context of musical listening, this con-
dition becomes important because the transformation of “this-suches” into 
propositional form occurs under the prescription of aesthetic apprehension. 
Musical listening is a form of aesthetic experience. Hence, its propositional 
form must be a function of the aesthetic judgement, and the perceptual con-
tent that can be transformed into a propositional form has to be explicable in 
regard to the aesthetic judgement. Now, if musical listening tacitly asserts the 
concepts that are implied in its figurative syntheses, and if it amounts, in the 
end, to aesthetic judgements, then the assertion of those concepts is not made 
true by facts. Here the distinctive factor of musical listening becomes evident. 
Musical listening synthesises something according to an interpretation whose 
propositional form is never made true by a fact. Nonetheless, musical listening 
asserts its interpretations, that is, it claims to be true. Both conditions amount 
to the circumstance that musical listening is full of tacit claims encapsulated 
in its conceptual richness, and that it nonetheless can never be nailed down by 
facts. Musical listening is marked as imaginative freedom, being the issue of an 
ongoing critique. 
50. We are now in a position to give an elementary account of musical listening. 
To hear sounds as music means to hear them according to imaginative interpre-
tations that produce conceptually rich “this-as-suches,” standing in a horizon 
of perceptual possibilities and being the subject of a never-ending debate in 
freedom and strife.
 3 Scruton continues his claim in his The Aesthetics of Music (1997, 88–90). 
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51. Since musical listening intends to disclose musical being, the concepts that 
are involved in its productive imagination are the very concepts that articulate 
the being of music. Correspondingly, the scheme of ontological concepts is 
also the tacit conceptual scheme of musical listening, articulating the concep-
tual richness involved in our hearing of sounds as music. The basic concepts 
are not only explicata of musical being, they are also explicata of the figurative 
syntheses of musical imagination.
52. With their help, we can distinguish different layers of figurative synthe-
ses. The first layer refers to musical time and musical space. Musical time and 
musical space are interpretative frameworks in which audible phenomena can 
be heard. According to them, these phenomena are heard as products of the 
evolution of musical time and as sounds at a certain place in musical space. 
They are synthesised as “this-torrent,” “this-crotchet,” “this-foreground,” or 
“this-high-pitch,” and the conceptual richness that is involved in these figura-
tive syntheses according to an interpretation is evident. Musical analysis, in its 
broadest sense, devotes its work to bringing this richness into propositional 
form. However, by such transformation, it provides new means for new inter-
pretations according to which one can hear sounds as music, so that a recip-
rocal influence between productive imagination and analytical explication is 
applicable. Explicit conceptual work precipitates into musical listening in the 
form of an implicit cultural memory. Such cultural memory contributes to the 
tacit assertion of concepts that are involved when we hear sounds according to 
an imaginative interpretation.
53. This also concerns the second layer of figurative syntheses, the layer of 
musical meaning. Here, we have the iteration of the formula “something as 
something.” In the first layer, audible phenomena are heard as spatio-tempo-
ral structures. In the second layer, these spatio-temporal structures are heard 
as convincing spatio-temporal structures, and this means that they are heard 
as argumentative functions of a musical logic. The interpretation according 
to which an audible phenomenon becomes a sound within musical time and 
musical space is now the issue of a further interpretation, which is concerned 
with its meaning.
54. One might object that this iteration of interpretations is gratuitous. All 
kinds of music at hand, for example, seem to be the issue of interpretations 
of sounds that do not care about argumentative functions of a musical logic. 
That very well may be. But if sounds are supposed to be heard in an aesthetic 
key, the question of their aesthetic validity arises. And these sounds have to be 
heard as convincing sounds. In other words, they have to be heard as sequences 
that endorse certain consequences. This is their argumentative function. If you 
restrict the conceptual richness that is involved in the interpretation of sounds 
as music to the frameworks of musical time and musical space, you deprive 
these interpretations of their aesthetic significance. That is, you disconnect 






pretations are connected either to theoretical or to practical judgement. You 
hear them as natural or social phenomena. Of course, it is up to the will, or 
better, up to the education of the ear whether one hears sounds as natural, as 
social, or as aesthetic phenomena. But if your listening intends to disclose the 
aesthetic phenomenon, then the iterated interpretation must happen. Musical 
listening, whose figurative syntheses refer to the aesthetic judgement, hears 
spatio-temporal sound structures as argumentative functions. 
55. On the level of interpretations of musical meaning, the peculiarity that 
musical arguments presuppose the resistance of someone who has to be 
convinced by them becomes crucial. The subject who is to be convinced by 
these arguments is the listener. Accordingly, hearing sounds as argumentative 
functions of a musical logic implies the resistance of the listener and its subla-
tion. As Lachenmann put it, the listener’s aesthetic apparatus has to be shat-
tered. We can specify this idea in our terms of musical listening. The aesthetic 
apparatus is the functional set-up of hearing sounds as music according to an 
interpretation that guides the flow of perception. If this apparatus has to be 
shattered, the guidedness of musical perception has to be shattered. That is, 
the determination of the perceptual flow must be distracted. The argumenta-
tive function of sounds is supposed to carry this out and to procure a kind of 
consent that neither forgets the shattering nor has the final say. Thus, in the 
first instance, there must be some failure, or distraction, of the guidedness of 
listening in order to hear sounds as argumentative functions of musical logic. 
But, at the same time, the logical functions of sound are nothing other than 
products of this guidedness. Hence, the productive imagination undergoes an 
internal upheaval. On the one hand, it follows the flow of perceptions guided 
by a conceptually laden interpretation. On the other hand, this interpretation 
is thwarted by the very products of the musical imagination. Its anticipations 
are annulled, and the syntheses are circumfered.
56. But hearing sounds according to an interpretation does not stop at the 
level of their functional sense. We hear spatio-temporal sound structures of a 
certain musical logic as birds, as grief, as the movement of life, as something 
that no ear has heard before, and so on. The figurative syntheses produced by 
such interpretations entail a conceptual richness of a different texture than the 
richness involved in the figurations of argumentative functions. In their case, 
the guidedness of the perceptual flow acquires forms that make the listener 
hear some extra-musical content in sounds. Taking advantage of a distinction 
drawn by Richard Wollheim (1980, 140–50) in a different context with different 
intentions and different implications, we can say that, according to these inter-
pretations, you hear sounds as something that prompts you to hear something 
in them.
57. In respect to these figurative syntheses, the formula “something as some-
thing” is iterated again. From hearing sounds as spatio-temporal structures, 
and from hearing spatio-temporal sound structures as argumentative func-
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tions, we move on to hearing argumentative functions as making you hear 
something extra-musical in them. The conceptual richness opens the ear for 
the three higher senses of music.
58. Corresponding to the three higher senses, the guidedness of the perceptual 
flow that is accomplished on this layer of figurative syntheses manifests three 
different modes. In its first mode, the guidedness stands under implicit prem-
ises that make you hear some extra-musical content in them. The sounds pro-
duced by it embody affections or enact nature or expose ideals: being guided 
under the premises of, say, the doctrine of figures, you hear the chromatically 
descending fourth as passus duriusculus, and, accordingly, hear pain in it. In its 
second mode, the guidedness works in regard to what music means to us and 
our lives. Here, the sounds are heard as inviting us to apply their features to 
ourselves and thus to hear extra-musical content in them: being guided by the 
application of, say, the sonata form to your bourgeois life, you hear the history 
of a subject or its Bildung, moving through contradictory experiences and reflec-
tions to a solution, in the piece of music. And in its third mode, the guidedness 
operates in view of something that is lacking. The sounds are heard as substan-
tiating a state that is nowhere else realised and thus to be heard in them: being 
guided by the anticipation of, say, true freedom, you hear such freedom in the 
constellation of musical sounds.
59. On the level of the three higher senses, the conceptual richness of produc-
tive imagination seems to violate the autonomy of sound. Sounds are heard as 
something according to an interpretation that employs extra-musical content. 
Thus, they appear to be subject to heteronomous conditions. But this would 
be true only if the extra-musical contents were not integrated into the scope of 
the aesthetic judgement. Since the figurative syntheses of musical listening are 
implicitly asserted propositions that stand under the prescription of the aes-
thetic judgement, the conceptual richness of these syntheses also involves this 
prescription. That is, the extra-musical contents are deprived of interests and 
from being made true by facts when they precipitate in the figurative syntheses 
of musical sound, for these are the two marks of the aesthetic judgement. By 
this, extra-musical contents, which as such are laden with interests and identi-
fications of facts, become functions of autonomous sounds. Thus, the fact that 
something extra-musical is heard in the music does not impose extra-musical 
rules onto the laws of music. On the contrary, the extra-musical meanings of 
sounds are the results of the rule system of music that incorporates the rules of 
extra-musical content under the prescription of the aesthetic judgement.
60. The integration into the scope of the aesthetic judgement applies also to a 
further issue. The interpretations according to which we hear audible phenom-
ena as musical sounds involve certain values. To stay with one of the examples 
above, whether you hear the chromatically descending fourth as passus duriuscu-





of the respective frames of reference. Let us say that the piece in question is 
Bach’s Invention for Three Voices in F minor. To hear it under the premises of 
the theory of figures, you have to emphasise the traditional context in which 
Bach’s music stands, and you have to estimate highly the German Protestant 
music of the eighteenth century. To hear it in the other way, you have to stress 
the path-breaking quality of Bach’s compositions, which relates them to forth-
coming ideas, and you have to place the expression of the subject over the rhet- 
orical craftsmanship that produces music for church services. Here, different 
evaluations are at work. These evaluations, which concern intra-musical ques-
tions, are entangled with extra-musical evaluations. Considering Bach’s music 
in the context of the older tradition refers to the value of a pre-modern ordo 
divinus; in contrast, considering it with regard to the forthcoming ideas refers 
to the value of the modern subject and its individual expression. Musical val-
ues and extra-musical values go hand in hand and shape the interpretations 
according to which something is heard as music.
61. The values that are implied in musical listening make clear that the inter-
pretations of audible phenomena are by no means purely descriptive. They are 
also normative. Intra- and extra-musical values are involved in the guidedness 
of the perceptual flow, and the figurative syntheses of musical listening are full 
of evaluative impact. In other words, the “this” that becomes a “this-such” is 
normatively laden because the “such” manifests the guidedness of perceptions 
according to interpretations including value relations. This should be no sur-
prise. Perceptual guidedness requires points of orientation that establish the 
direction into which the flow of perceptions runs. Such points of orientation 
cannot be randomly selected. They have to be of some value in order to be 
directive, and they have to be of higher value than other potential points of 
orientation. And this means that the points of orientation embody value rela-
tions. They determine the content of the figurative syntheses. Because musical 
listening is interpretative listening, it is descriptive and normative at once.
62. The fact that musical listening is packed with value relations seems to 
introduce the predicament that Nicolai Hartmann aptly called “the tyranny of 
values” (1926, 574–76; 1932, 2:421–26).4 The tyranny of values consists of the 
tendency of each value to posit itself as the tyrant of interpretative contexts. 
It is connected with the devaluation of other values, with the corresponding 
struggle of values, and with the submission of our understanding to a decision 
for certain values. This proves that values are positions in a system of values. 
The devaluation of values downgrades them within the system, the struggle of 
values is a struggle for position, and the submission of our understanding to 
value decisions makes it into something that must occupy a position registered 
in the system. All this is well known from the history of musical listening. The 
tyranny of values pops up again and again.
 4 Hartmann considers the tyranny of values in the context of practical reason. His solution, however, 
which suggests a “value synthesis,” is as dissatisfactory as his material value ethics in general. 
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63. But as in the case of musical meaning, the values involved in musical lis-
tening are integrated into the scope of the aesthetic judgement. That is, their 
genuine articulation—value judgements—are subordinated to another kind of 
judgement. Often, aesthetic judgements are considered to be a special case of 
value judgements. Indeed, beauty itself is frequently defined as aesthetic value. 
Nothing could be more wrong. Values are connected with interests, as are their 
articulations, value judgements. Aesthetic judgements are not. Thus, the aes-
thetic judgement is of a different kind than the value judgement. If the latter 
has to be in the scope of the former, the interests that are connected with it 
have to lose their power. And this means that the values themselves cannot be 
the tyrants of our understanding any longer. On the contrary, aesthetic judge-
ment deprives of their decisive force the values that are involved in musical lis-
tening. To be sure, hearing audible phenomena as musical sounds still involves 
value relations, but these value relations are not the determinative factors in 
the end.
64. This leads us to the highest point at which musical listening is attached. The 
formula “something as something” has been iterated several times. The layers 
of musical listening extend from hearing something as spatio-temporal sound 
structures, to hearing spatio-temporal sound structures as argumentative func-
tions, to hearing argumentative functions as something that makes you hear 
something in them. All these layers are pervaded with tacit value relations. But 
the aesthetic nature of musical listening is not yet explained: to subordinate all 
these layers under the aesthetic judgement requires hearing them as autono-
mous sound complexes.
65. At first glance, it seems that this requirement is a further iteration of the 
formula “something as something.” What else could the phrase “hearing some-
thing as an autonomous sound complex” mean? But we have to be careful here. 
As seen, the formula “something as something” can be explained in terms of 
“hearing something according to an interpretation.” And this cannot hold for 
autonomous sound complexes for the following reason: to hear something as 
an autonomous sound complex is to hear the sound as self-legislating sound. 
As we saw in the previous section, the self-legislation of sound is grounded in 
the internal relation of musical form and musical material. Correspondingly, in 
order to hear something as an autonomous sound complex, one must appre-
hend this internal relation. The internal relation of form and material, in turn, 
has proven to be the meaningless centre of musical meaning. Thus, it cannot 
be interpreted. It follows that hearing it is not an issue of interpretation. The 
phrase “hearing something as an autonomous sound complex” is corrupted. 
It does not allow for a reformulation in terms of “hearing something accord-
ing to an interpretation” and is, accordingly, mistakenly expressed. Instead of 
saying “musical listening hears something as an autonomous sound complex” 
we should merely say “musical listening hears an autonomous sound complex.” 
The musical work is simply present in musical listening. Hearing something as 




66. Because hearing autonomous sound complexes is not a matter of interpre-
tation, musical listening is, in the end, beyond interpretation and the value 
relations involved in such an act. Nonetheless it cannot dispense with interpre-
tation, for all its layers rest on it. Musical listening must thus work through the 
interpretations of audible phenomena as musical sounds, as well as through 
the tacit value relations that are involved in them, in order to approach the 
meaningless centre of music at which all this is attached and by which all this is 
transcended. Musical listening is the infinite reshaping of interpretations for 
the sake of the nonsensical core of music.
67. But the nonsensical core at which musical listening is attached has, as we 
saw, a structure. It consists of the response of the form to the tendency of the 
material. This tendency is directed to the actualisation of hitherto unactual-
ised possibilities that the material offers. The movement that is concerned with 
such actualisations is the avant-garde. Thus, the infinite reshaping of interpre-
tations for the sake of the nonsensical core of music is connected to the musical 
avant-garde. It receives from the avant-garde the works that open our ears, and 
it is committed to the avant-garde. Musical listening in the sphere of the aes-
thetic judgement is partisan.
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The Work of the Performer
John Rink
University of Cambridge
This essay considers the work of the performer in relation to the musical work.1 
More is at stake than the play on words implied here. By claiming that perform-
ers’ engagement with the “musical work” as conventionally understood entails 
a different sort of “work” in the sense of both process and outcome, I argue 
that what performers do influences music’s very content, how it takes shape, 
and how those who hear it perceive and understand it. The essay first describes 
the act of performing and what I have termed “the problem of performance” 
(Rink 2001b). The next section then revisits key literature on musical narrativity 
and puts it to use in addressing the performer/work relationship at the heart of 
the enquiry.2 Finally, a case study based on my experience in playing a piece by 
Rachmaninoff demonstrates that relationship in action.
Premises
“Music-making,” writes Jonathan Dunsby (2001, 346), “is a virtually universal 
human activity”; motivated at the most fundamental level by “private biological 
necessity,” it takes the form of “public property” at its most elevated extreme. 
For all its universality, however, musical performance is notoriously resistant to 
explication, notwithstanding an avalanche of research in recent years and grow-
ing recognition of its centrality to musical thought and musicological enquiry. 
Gaining a clear and comprehensive understanding of musical performance is 
thwarted by its evanescence and ontology, ambiguity surrounding what it sig-
nifies and how it conveys meaning, and the performer’s variable identity in 
the act of performance. In surveying these problems, I lay the groundwork for 
reconsideration of aspects of performative process from the perspectives of 
both performers and listeners. 
Performances do not exist so much as happen,3 and live performances in par-
ticular are temporal, ephemeral acts—in Nicholas Cook’s words, a “snatching 
of eternity . . . from the jaws of evanescence” (2001, §19). Furthermore, a single 
performance is rarely if ever adequate or definitive: as Janet Schmalfeldt (1985, 
28) has observed, “there are always ‘different, better’ performances . . . to be 
 1 I am grateful to Daniel Leech-Wilkinson, Andreas Dorschel, and Paulo de Assis for their insightful 
comments on a draft of this essay.
 2 See Leech-Wilkinson (2015) for further discussion of what I call the “performer/work relationship.” For 
example, referring to multiple recordings of Chopin’s Berceuse, op. 57, Leech-Wilkinson comments: 
“There is much less work being done by the score and much more by the performer than is implied by 
the way we habitually talk about scores” (345). While the composer provided “a starting point” in the 
form of the finished score, “most of the musical work is done later” (344).




achieved.” At least in the Western art tradition, performance typically involves 
a quest for an elusive ideal at odds with its “inevitably contingent” nature and 
its characteristic “element of risk” (Dunsby 2001, 348). Many performers feel 
the need to perform not just once but over and over—whether in striving for 
specific artistic goals or simply because of the self-affirming value of the act of 
performance. Performing over and over is also what practice and rehearsal are 
all about, to which the lion’s share of one’s time as a performer is devoted.
As indicated, one of the challenges to studying performance is its evanes-
cence. Recordings, the most concrete and accessible incarnation of perfor-
mance, are only a trace thereof, not the performance itself—as Dunsby (2001, 
348) has observed, “not in fact a reproduction but a mere simulacrum, an 
approximation.” Musical recordings can be likened to photographs as opposed 
to the events that give rise to them,4 the fixed image failing to capture one’s 
sense of the original experience, which naturally was shaped by a host of fac-
tors outside the frame. Cook (2001, §28) among others has argued that perfor-
mance involves not just “the music” but constitutive elements including “per-
formance values” related to context, venue, visual appearance, and so on, all of 
which influence how listeners perceive it.
As for how performers themselves perceive performance, it is virtually impos-
sible to describe the performance act from the executant’s perspective as it is 
happening—and certainly not in its synchronic entirety.5 While performing, 
one’s consciousness is often different from, indeed at odds with, any normal 
state. A suspension of time and place can occur while performing—the over-
riding feeling being one of connection and identification with the music (to the 
extent that concentration remains focused) but also one of disembodiment, 
disenfranchisement from normal awareness and the outer world. Paradoxically, 
that disembodiment is counterpointed by a heightened awareness of one’s cor-
poreal being, each physical motion directly or indirectly invoking sound while 
subsuming and being subsumed by the workings of a transcendent yet actively 
engaged mind. One way of describing this experience is to compare it to living 
out a dream, in which objects and words loom larger than in real life, in which 
feeling predominates over rational thought, and after which only a vague rec-
ollection of the experience can often be mustered. Just as dreams defy expla-
nation, so does music as performance with its sometimes illogical, attenuated, 
intangible meanings and narrative flow.6
The factors that I have identified impinge on what performances mean and 
communicate to listeners—or, from the performer’s perspective, on what 
is being communicated and how that communication might be effected. 
 4 A point also made by Godlovitch (1998), among others.
 5 For discussion of relevant issues, see, for example, Clark, Lisboa, and Williamon (2014); Lisboa, Chaffin, and  
Logan (2011); Coessens, Crispin, and Douglas (2009, especially 149–56); Doğantan-Dack (2008); Hardy 
(2006); Hallam (2001). See also Guymer (forthcoming) on tacit and explicit knowledge in performance.
 6 Compare the description of the experience of performing in Rink (2017). It would be an exaggeration  
to claim that this state of disembodiment, of “living out a dream,” characterises each and every 
performance act. Nevertheless, even if these comments are likely to pertain to solo performance more 
than other performance contexts, the descriptions of the “strong experiences” of orchestral and other 
ensemble musicians in Gabrielsson (2011) suggest that the immersion described here is by no means 
confined to soloists.
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Admittedly, to hope for “communication” may be too optimistic, given the 
uniqueness of every perceiver’s response, likewise a uniqueness of intention on 
the part of every performer.7 An inevitable distance therefore occurs between 
the performer’s intentions and the responses of one’s listeners—not to men-
tion an inevitable distance between the composer’s intentions (whatever they 
might be) and the responses of performer and listener alike. Furthermore, per-
formers rarely have the opportunity to make their intentions explicit. In the 
concert traditions of Western art music, performers are rendered mute except 
in texted repertoire: most of the time, performances must speak for themselves, 
even though verbal explication of some sort would be beneficial in conveying 
their particular message to listeners. Of course, therein lies performance’s 
richest potentiality—not for the communication of specific meaning but for 
the construction of infinite meanings. The downside, however, is that an audi-
ence’s response cannot be confidently predicted by the performer—hence the 
need for more than just “the music” if communication is to be effected.8
No less problematic is the vulnerability that performers tend to experience 
while performing: their identity is often laid on the line in an act of personal 
disclosure. Indeed, much performance goes beyond public divulgence to the 
point of public assimilation, through the audience’s subjugation of an inferred 
other. That act of conquest explains why performers customarily put on masks, 
for example by assuming an alter ego while onstage; this depersonalises (or 
“repersonalises”) them, thereby avoiding intrusion that might be uncomfort-
able at the very least. Paradoxically, performers habitually strive to take control 
of audiences in a reciprocal act of conquest. The language used in the nine-
teenth century to describe listeners’ reactions to certain keyboard virtuosos 
was charged in precisely that way.9 But here again there are alternatives, namely, 
an enhanced form of communication outside conventional performance con-
texts, of which I will say more later.
The obstacles to which I have referred make it difficult to grasp musical per-
formance in essence and totality. Yet its importance in our lives—whether out 
of “private biological necessity” or for the sake of aesthetic delectation and 
expression at the “most elevated” plane—means that we have a fundamental 
need to try to comprehend it. To that extent, the performative turn in music- 
ology over the past two decades or so has been enlightening as well as suc-
cessful in redressing inattention to musical performance on the part of pre-
ceding generations of musicologists, who had focused on “product” to such 
an extent that the discipline ceased to recognise music as a performance art 
(Cook 2001, §6). Indeed, in “traditional” musicology, music was generally 
understood in terms of textual artefacts rather than socially enacted processes 
 7 For a critique of the notion of “communication” in performance, see King and Gritten (2017).
 8 The “talk-and-play events” described below represent one way of meeting such a need. Note that in 
smaller-scale concert venues many professional musicians now give verbal introductions to the pieces 
they will be performing; these “ice-breakers” establish a rapport with listeners and help avoid the 
barriers that persist in more formal concert settings.
 9 Katharine Ellis (1997, 357) cites one review from 1837 which “makes clear how a quasi-sexual possession 
of the audience was an integral and necessary part of the performance,” in which “issues of control” 






involving sound, time, and human experience: the score tended to be seen as 
“the music,” and vice versa. In proposing new means of studying music as per-
formance, Cook encouraged a “dissolving of any stable distinction” between 
performances and works by regarding scores not as texts but as “scripts,” a term 
implying “a reorientation of the relationship between notation and perform-
ance” (§16). Such a reorientation, he argued, would allow the prevailing con-
ception of “a single work located ‘vertically’ in relation to its performances” to 
be transcended in favour of “an unlimited number of ontologically equivalent 
instantiations, all existing on the same ‘horizontal’ plane” (§17).
According to this model, engagement with “the work” therefore yields innu-
merable new conceptions and constructions thereof, rather than a singular 
version that musicians are expected to reproduce in performance. The creative 
agency of the performer is obviously critical in that respect, and this has been 
increasingly recognised in recent decades. For example, the role of gesture 
and physicality in performance has now been widely investigated, along with 
other factors defining the “total performance event.” An extensive literature 
has grown up around practice and rehearsal, and along with it an increasing 
attention to the technical, artistic, and practical concerns of performers with 
regard to both research into practice (see Frayling 1993, 5), which considers 
what Jane Davidson (2015, 93) calls “the practice-focused behaviour of oth-
ers,” and practice as research (characterised by Frayling [1993, 5] as practice 
“through” research), which investigates emergent, practitioner-led activity 
through a cycle of research planning, acting, observing, and reflecting. The 
five-year CHARM initiative10 promoted the musicological study of recordings 
by drawing on a “wide range of approaches ranging from computational ana- 
lysis to business history” in four projects that now have many counterparts; and 
CHARM’s successor, CMPCP,11 explored key research questions focusing on 
the creative practice of performance rather than the outcomes thereof.
Questions nevertheless remain about how the “relationship between nota-
tion and performance” is played out, and further attention is also needed to 
the process by which performers devise the “ontologically equivalent instanti-
ations” referred to above. These are the focal points of the next two sections, 
which address—if only provisionally—the work of performers in interacting 
with and shaping the musical work.
Programming the musical work
Musical narrative in perspective
I referred above to re-evaluation of both the “work-concept” and the presumed 
identity between score and music that dominated musicological thought for 
 10 AHRC Research Centre for the History and Analysis of Recorded Music; www.charm.rhul.ac.uk.
 11 AHRC Research Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice; www.cmpcp.ac.uk. CMPCP 
addressed three main research questions: In what ways are performers creative? How does their creative 
activity vary across different cultures, idioms, and conditions? How do musical performances take shape 
over time, through the exercise of individual and collective creativity?
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so long. For reasons that will become clear, further re-evaluation is warranted 
here, especially in respect of the literature on musical narrativity from the 1980s 
and 1990s.12 In retrospect, it seems astonishing that so little attention was paid 
to performance in that literature, given that music’s narrative properties—
however constituted—can be actualised only through performance. Moreover, 
any claims about a musical structure’s ostensibly immanent narrativity must 
account for the fact that works signify in unique ways on each performance 
occasion, and furthermore that “musical structure” is a fundamentally syn-
chronic notion valorised by analysis but at odds with the diachronic process of 
music-in-sound. I am not suggesting that the leading authors on musical nar-
rativity altogether ignored its time-dependency, but some of their conclusions 
seem remote from, and inimical to, musical reality and to what I am calling 
the work of performers. This is problematic in itself and frustrating in respect 
of the potential of the narrative concept to shed light on what performers do; 
on how they regard, engage with, and co-create the musical work; and on how 
listeners make sense of what they are hearing. To redress these lacunae, I survey 
and critique the principal literature here, teasing out definitions that eventu-
ally are reconceived and newly employed.
In an article applying Proppian theory and terminology to music (especially 
the notion of “plot archetype”), Anthony Newcomb (1987) defined a narrative 
as a continuous “series of functional events in a prescribed order” (165), and 
he asserted that “the very heart of musical meaning . . . lies in modes of con-
tinuation,” which in turn “lie at the very heart of narrativity, whether verbal or 
musical” (167). Elsewhere, Newcomb (1994) described musical narratives as “a 
comprehensible series of intentional acts” (84) potentially comprising “two 
distinct elements”: “those aspects or characteristics within the music itself that 
suggest or stimulate a narrative interpretation,” and the “criteria and strat-
egies by which the listener identifies, locates and interprets narrative aspects 
in music” (85). According to Newcomb, such aspects “are themselves purely musi-
cal” (86) and require no literal “story,” although any narrative activity on the 
listener’s part “is stimulated by a heightened sense of contingency within the series 
of events itself ” (87).
Notwithstanding this emphasis on immanent and “purely musical” proper-
ties, Newcomb cites Jerome Bruner’s (1991, 5) distinction between the “narra-
tive mode of thought” and “forms of narrative discourse,” each of which “enables 
and gives form to the other.” For Bruner, narrative is “a form not only of repre-
senting but of constituting reality” (5), operating “as an instrument of mind” in 
the construction thereof (6). Its characteristics include: 
 12 In the ensuing survey I concentrate on the anglophone literature from the period in question mainly 
because it was so influential in the context of New Musicology, as a result of which its failure to address 
issues related to performance can be seen as especially problematic. It goes without saying that a vast 
literature on musical narrativity now exists and that a systematic trawl of that literature would be re-
quired to explore all the issues adumbrated here. By way of example, see Grabócz (2009); Baroni (2007); 





2.  a “part–whole textual interdependence” whereby “parts and wholes 
in a narrative rely on each other for their viability” (8)
3.  a distinction between a narrative’s “plot” and its mode of delivery (12)
4.  a normative background and its subversion through “breach[es] of 
conventional expectation” (15)
Similar points inform Eero Tarasti’s Theory of Musical Semiotics (1994), which 
claims that “some music is narrative even though it has no explicit connec-
tion with a verbal, gestural, or pictorial language that can provide a ‘plot’” 
(23). Tarasti defines three types of narrativity. The first involves “latent trait[s]” 
that emerge only “when a musical work is interpreted, played, or performed 
in a given way,” and which cannot be analysed “merely at the ‘neutral’ level 
of musical structure” (23). In contrast, the second is “based on an immanent 
process of signification” (30) and manifests itself “at a purely structural level” 
(23). And the third should be seen as a “general category of the human mind, 
a competency that involves putting temporal events into a certain order, [i.e.] 
a syntagmatic continuum” with “beginning, development, and end,” whose 
logic reflects a given tension that is manifested in an “arch progression” (24). 
Tarasti’s book mostly concerns the second type and the semantic content of the 
“musical utterance” (énoncé musical), but he broaches the first—the act of utter-
ance (énonciation musicale)—in an analysis of Fauré’s “Après un rêve,” studying 
eight “pertinent parameters” in twenty-eight select recordings, among them 
tempo, vibrato, and breathing (205–8). This rare attention to the performance 
act is undermined, however, by Tarasti’s commitment to an ostensible “basic 
truth” concerning musical interpretation, namely, that “performance can only 
be analyzed in relation to the musical enunciate itself ” (193).14 Such a “truth” is 
problematic for reasons shown later.
Other references to performance in narrative terms can be found in roughly 
contemporaneous writings by Janet Schmalfeldt (1985), Fred Maus (1988), and 
William Rothstein (1995), who claimed that the performer’s aim is “to discover, 
or create, a musical narrative,” synthesised “from all he or she knows and feels 
about the work; listeners, in turn, will construct their own narratives, guided by 
the performer. One performer’s narrative may differ radically from another’s 
for the same work, and not all will accord equally with the composer’s inten-
tions. . . . But a narrative there must be, even if it . . . cannot be translated into 
words” (1995, 237).15
I too have written about musical narrative, defining it as “a time-dependent 
unfolding of successive musical events, palpably linked to produce a coherent 
 13 According to Bruner (1991, 6), a “narrative is an account of events occurring over time”; it is both 
“irreducibly durative” and based on a “‘mental model’ whose defining property is its unique pattern of 
events over time.”
 14 Tarasti translates énoncé musical both as “musical utterance” and as “musical enunciate,” while énonciation 
is variably translated as “uttering,” “utterance,” “musical performance,” and so on. 
 15 See also Schachter (1988, 253) on Chopin’s four Ballades and Fantasy op. 49: “Among the musical values 
of all these works is their narrative quality; but the narration is a musical one, carried out by tonal struc-
ture, texture, form, and motivic design.”
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‘statement’ embodied in sound alone” (Rink 1999, 218).16 I represented the 
background to one such “narration” as an intensity curve capturing the overall 
shape of the performance, likening it to the intonatory curve of speech (see 
Rink 1999, 235, 236; cf. Cook 1999, 2013). Elsewhere (Rink 1994, 112) I com-
mented that if a “hidden narrating voice” is to be found in music (as some of 
the authors surveyed here once insisted), it surely “belongs in large part to the 
performer, who, as ‘story-teller,’ determines the music’s essential ‘narrative’ 
content by following indications in the score as to ‘plot’ and, as in the enact-
ment of any ‘plot archetype,’ by shaping the unfolding tale on the spur of the 
moment.”
This allusion to the “storytelling” qualities of performance echoes similar 
comments by John Sloboda (1985), Stan Godlovitch (1998), Nicholas Cook 
(2001), and others. Discerning numerous commonalities between perform-
ance and story-telling, Godlovitch (1998) proposes the latter as a narrative 
“model of instantiation for the relationship between works and performances” 
(95), hence his descriptions of musical performance as an act of “variety under 
fixity” (86, 88), of “invited variety” (88), and of “instantial variety” (86, 89, 95) 
with regard to some underlying framework. Such variety—which should be 
considered axiomatic—is hard to square with a putatively immanent narrativ-
ity for the reasons I have indicated. 
Thus, two types of narrative can be said to exist in relation to musical per-
formance: one that is constructed by the performer and is poïetic in function, 
whereas the other is constructed by the listener and is esthesic in nature.17 
These are depicted in figure 4.1, which shows the performer’s narrative “pro-
gram” feeding into the performance.18 The figure also shows the perceiver’s 
“narrativised response” to the performance.19 I contend that narrativised 
response may not occur in all listening situations—hence the question mark 
in the figure—whereas the performer is bound to follow a “narrative program” 
of some sort, the comprehensivity of which will depend on intangible factors 
such as the degree of familiarity with the music in question,20 the performer’s 
aesthetic goals and prerogatives, and his or her capability as well as experience. 
The performance here—which in my view cannot be construed as operating at 
a “neutral level”—involves not only the music-as-sound but the very act itself, 
which has signifying powers just as the performer’s narrative conception com-
prises more than “the music” alone, as I will show.
 16 My view about embodiment “in sound alone” has since evolved, as I show later.
 17 Note Shaffer’s (1995, 18) complementary claim that the performer is a “privileged listener.” For further 
discussion of the semiotic tripartition see Nattiez (1990b), among others.
 18 As we will see, I mean “program” in the sense of a “series of coded instructions and definitions,” as 
“something conceived of as encoding and determining a process, esp. genetically” (OED 2018, 9b), not 
as in “programme music” (ibid., 5: “A sequence of scenes or events intended to be conveyed by a piece 
of music, or serving as the inspiration or basis for a composition”). Moreover, as will also become clear, 
the focus here is on the solo performer, although relevance to other performance contexts should by no 
means be ruled out. 
 19 I concentrate here on the listener, though there are of course many different sorts of perceiver, includ-
ing critic, analyst, and so forth.
 20 See Donington (1963) on the role of familiarity and unfamiliarity in the performance of “early music” as 
well as more generally.
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Figure 4.1. Performance and musical narrative(s).
Perceiving performance
The available space allows only brief observations on musical narrativity as 
perceived by listeners, and what it is listeners hear. A significant component 
of the latter will be what Peter Johnson (1999, 63) terms “the physical prop-
erties of musical sound itself ”; in his view, “performance is constituted by the 
listener from physical sound as signifier, constituting the fabric of the music.” 
The implications of sound are greater than one might assume: as Clarke 
(2002a, 190) claims, “The sounds of a performance have the potential to con-
vey a wealth of information to a listener, ranging from physical characteristics 
related to the [performance] space . . . and the nature of the instrument, to 
less palpable properties such as the performance ideology of the performer.”21 
Moreover, “information about the body of the performer and its relationship 
with the instrument” is also specified (ibid., 191; see also Doğantan-Dack 2008; 
Rink 2017). That is why Godlovitch (1998, 43) describes “the sound sequence 
in performance” as “not just a physical commodity but a phenomenal one.” 
But, as observed previously, the listener’s construction of meaning stems from 
a good deal more than just the sound of the music: citing Kershaw’s (1992, 22) 
pronouncement that “no item in the environment of performance can be dis-
counted as irrelevant to its impact,” Cook (2001, §28) encourages an ethno-
graphically inspired under standing of “the performance of a particular piece in 
the context of the total performance event,” as noted above. This more broadly 
constructed meaning explains the presence of “music” and “act” in the centre 
of figure 4.1, along with my resistance to claims of unmediated immanence and 
my misgivings about Tarasti’s “basic truth,” given that the factors influencing 
the meaning of performance as constructed by listeners (whether narrative 
meaning or not) may well reside outside the score and the musical enunciate 
as he understands it.
Furthermore, any theory of narrativised response must avoid further naive 
assumptions about how listeners listen and their inclination or ability to hear 
structurally ramified, comprehensive narratives within performed music. 
Referring to Levinson (1997), Clarke (2002a, 192) claims that “listeners do not 
construct elaborate and large-scale hierarchical structures, but are primar-
 21 Or rather, the performance ideology of the performer as inferred by individual listeners. In private corres- 
pondence, Daniel Leech-Wilkinson commented that listeners draw on their own ideologies to attribute 
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Figure 4.2. The score–sound continuum.
ily focused on the continuously evolving detail of a small amount of ‘current’ 
music”—a claim “consistent with work in the psychology of time perception 
which suggests that at any moment we are aware of a relatively brief ‘patch’ 
of time (around 6–10 seconds), referred to as the perceptual present.” He 
continues: “Larger structures are a function of memory, and Levinson argues 
that listeners’ memories for these structures are usually rather imprecise and 
do not support a large-scale ‘architecture’” (ibid.; see also Stern 2004; Leech-
Wilkinson 2017). Not only are these comments relevant to how and whether 
narratives may be constructed by listeners, but they offer a salutary reminder 
of the potential pertinence of psychological research to any study of musical 
performance.
Conceiving performance
A psychological perspective is by no means sufficient, however. The next step in 
this more broadly conceived enquiry into musical narrative and specifically the 
“narrative programming” that I referred to earlier is therefore to consider what 
I call the score–sound continuum, the primary relevance of which to solo perform-
ance must again be emphasised. Shown in figure 4.2, this continuum implies 
that the score only hints at “the music,” which necessarily will be imagined 
and internalised by the performer either at first sight or, more usually, over 
an extended timescale involving rehearsal and actual performance, in a dura-
tive and recursive process. The performance “program” is never entirely fixed, 
although (as we will see) it may remain largely stable over time and, in some 
respects, possibly across different performers’ conceptions.
The means by which music takes shape from the score22 involves what pianist 
Alfred Brendel (1976c, 25) terms a “translation” of the composer’s intentions 
“into one’s own understanding . . . with the help of one’s own engaged emo-
tions, one’s own senses, one’s own intellect, one’s own refined ears.” In his 
 22 The score has been variously described as a recipe, rough outline, template, blueprint, roadmap, and (as 





view, a key priority of practice is “the task of clarifying, purifying, fortifying and 
restoring musical continuity” (1976a, 124)—the accent on continuity chiming 
both with Godlovitch’s (1988, 34) reference to the “spatiotemporal continu-
ity” on which the cohesion of a performance depends, and with Newcomb’s 
“modes of continuation.”
That continuity partly explains why I refer to the performer’s program as 
being “narrative” in nature. A second reason relates to the deliberate construc-
tion by some performers of more traditionally conceived “narratives, tableaux 
and programmes for the works they play,” as noted by Rothstein (1995, 238). 
Such literal prompts are of only passing interest in one sense, but the com-
ments of two performers along these lines do offer more general insight into 
performance conception and into the musical narrative under discussion here. 
Brendel’s essay “Form and Psychology in Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas” intrigu-
ingly claims that in one movement, “the psychological process establishes the 
form . . . but the form itself is also cast in such a way that one can deduce from 
it the psychological process” ([1971] 1976, 50).23 Though never defined, the pro-
cess in question takes on more specific meaning in Brendel’s “narrativised,” 
diachronic description of the music, which presumably conveys verbally the 
basis of his performances thereof. Similarly, one of the first priorities of con-
cert pianist Murray Perahia in learning a piece is to discern a “unifying” image 
or framework “so that the whole thing is either telling some kind of story, even 
if the story is only with tones, or [so that] those tones can somehow metaphor-
ically transform themselves into some kind of story that one can make sense 
of, so that the whole piece can be seen as one, so that one isn’t only working 
on details, . . . so [that] one has the whole picture before one begins” (quoted 
in Rink 2001a, 12, reproduced with additional original text).24 Close study then 
follows, contextualised within the broad framework, as in one movement of a 
sonata by Chopin where Perahia found the essence of the music’s meaning—at 
least as conveyed in his performance—within an inner voice, which professed 
an overriding “sadness” and “disappointment of not being able to go higher” 
to its implicit goal (quoted in ibid., 12). For Perahia, “it is important to try to 
sketch what’s happening—the drama of the tones—into a kind of metaphor-
ical drama, so that it speaks to you on as many levels as possible, not just the 
musical level” (quoted in ibid., 15).
These comments reveal one aspect of what I am referring to as the perform-
er’s “narrative program”—a “drama of the tones,” which might be consciously 
played out in the performer’s mind to the point that it “becomes” the music 
and possibly even subsumes the identity of the performer (see Rink 2017). But 
coupled with this assignment of function to individual musical elements and 
their shaping in an overarching “plot” (however defined) is the structuring of 
the mental model behind the musical continuity so essential to performance 
and to any narrative conception. To understand this requires reference to 
 23 For further discussion of Brendel’s notion of “psychology,” see Rink (2017).
 24 Perahia also tries to capture “the general harmonic shape” at the beginning, as well as the basic phrase 
structure.
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the literature on cognitive representation and how performers map musical 
thought to musical action (see Palmer 1989). It must be stressed, however, that 
psychologists themselves cannot fully explain that process. Indeed, the funda-
mental point of this discussion is that performance conception—and more 
specifically any “narrative program” underlying performance—has multiple 
dimensions and must be explained accordingly.
I have cited Bruner’s view of narrative as a form of representing and consti-
tuting reality, and certain “cognitive structures” relevant to performance fol-
low from this. Defining a “cognitive structure” as a “nonspecific but organised 
representation of prior experience,” Ulric Neisser (1967, 286, 287) states in 
his classic study of cognitive psychology, “When we first perceive or imagine 
something, the process of construction is not limited to the object itself. We 
generally build (or rebuild) a spatial, temporal, and conceptual framework as 
well. . . . The preattentive processes delineate units, provide partial cues, and 
control simple responses; focal attention builds complexly structured objects 
or movements, one at a time, on the basis thus provided; [and] the background 
processes build and maintain schemata to which these objects are referred.” 
According to Neisser (ibid., 287), this multi-level “process of construction 
leaves traces behind. The schemata themselves are such constructions, elabo-
rated at every moment in the course of attentive activity. Recall is organized in 
terms of these structures because the original experiences were elaborated in 
the same terms.”
Musical performance is of course highly demanding of both mental and 
physical skills, but it depends at least in part on the basic mechanisms just 
described, even if one would need to go much further to explain it as a cre-
ative practice. Following on from Neisser, Caroline Palmer (1997, 116) writes 
that “During a performance, musical structures and units are retrieved from 
memory according to the performer’s conceptual interpretation, and are 
then prepared for production and transformed into appropriate movements.” 
Discussion of the motor aspect will follow below; first, let us consider how music- 
al memory is constituted, the so-called executive process, the hierarchical 
structure of performance programs, and the relation thereof to musical expres-
sion. Recall in performance—whether fully memorised or not—depends on 
auditory, visual, conceptual, and kinaesthetic memory (see Williamon 2002). 
Together these different types of memory enable performers to execute com-
plicated sequences at high speed and typically without directing conscious 
attention to their constituent parts. The process involves both sequential and 
parallel (or multiple) processing, respectively handling “one thing at a time” 
and many functions either “simultaneously, or at least independently” (Neisser 
1967, 297). Neisser (ibid., 299) notes the need for a “conception of the mind 
which allows for multiple activity at some levels, but also has a place for an exec-
utive process.” Neither “serves simply as a retrieval system,” given that each is 
“essentially constructive in nature, making use of stored information to build 
something new.”
All of this supports my claim that the performer’s “programming” entails 






control over the flow of events. It also helps explain why, or how, performances 
and thus “the music itself ” vary from occasion to occasion, thanks in part to 
each performance’s unique actualisation of an underlying conceptual frame-
work (which itself can be highly dynamic). That is true of any narrative act, as is 
the existence of some sort of hierarchical structure in the first place. Discussing 
solo piano performance from memory, Eric Clarke (1988, 3) writes: “Though 
something of an idealization, we can imagine a performer who, at the start of 
a performance, has a complete knowledge of the generative structure of the 
piece, from the very highest level, where the whole piece is represented as a 
unity, down to the lowest level, . . . where each . . . note is represented.”25 Clarke 
illustrates this hypothetical structure as a conventional tree diagram, only part 
of which is likely to be “active at any time” (ibid., 4). Although the essentially 
static nature of Clarke’s diagram and especially the fixed point at the top fail 
to capture the essential process of performance (even at the most remote con-
ceptual level, which in principle should encapsulate the performed music’s 
shape, its “arch of tension,” as heuristically represented in my intensity curve, 
discussed earlier), his depiction alludes to important and intriguing parallels 
between the actualisation of a performance conception and the “improvisa-
tory” composing-out described by Heinrich Schenker, whose theory repre-
sents music—in Tarasti’s words (1994, 24)—as “a totality created by a structure 
wherein all events relate to a basic model and the tension it provides,” which 
“corresponds well to the syntagmatic demand of narrativity.”26
That demand is also met through the agency of performance expression, 
notably performers’ apparent use of what Palmer (1997, 125) calls “a syntax or 
formal set of rules to generate expression,” by means of which “systematic pat-
terns of expression result from transformations of the performer’s internal rep-
resentation of musical structure.”27 For example, Clarke (2002b, 61) writes that 
“the stability (or otherwise) of . . . higher-level tempo shape can . . . be directly 
attributed to the stability of the performer’s representation of the music,” par-
ticularly with regard to phrase structure. Bruno Repp (1992) discovered signifi-
cant agreement between the timing profiles of twenty-eight performers’ ren-
ditions of a given piece, all of which, according to Clarke (2002b, 65), “were 
organised around the phrase structure,” with an “increasing diversity between 
the performers [occurring] at more superficial levels of expression.” The fact 
that “subsequent studies by Repp with even larger samples (over 100 perfor-
mances of the same music) have confirmed these conclusions” (ibid.) suggests 
the existence of generally perceived paradigms (or “archetypes”) derived from 
phrase structures that are individualised on each performance occasion.28 This 
 25 The proposition that “each note is represented” does not imply a conscious focus on each and every 
one by the performer as the music is played or sung. On the contrary, the consciousness of the perform-
er necessarily operates at a higher level, in part to reduce a cognitive load that otherwise would be too 
great to allow operational fluency.
 26 The time-dependency of a performance’s “fundamental structure” is implicit in my intensity curve and 
also in the “theory of performance” espoused by Rachmaninoff, which I discuss later.
 27 See for example the rule systems devised by Johan Sundberg and Neil Todd (cited in Clarke 2002b).
 28 For discussion, see Buck, MacRitchie, and Bailey (2013); compare however Rink (2013) and Cook (2013, 
esp. chap. 6).
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lends some credence to claims that music’s meaning derives from structure, 
even if that is by no means the full story. (For further discussion, see Rink 2013, 
2015.)
The final matter for consideration here concerns the physical aspect of per-
formance, specifically motor programming. Palmer (1989) defines this as “the 
memory representation for the organization (prior to execution) of a sequence 
of commands to the performing muscles” (332) operating at hierarchical “lev-
els of conscious and unconscious control,” respectively comprising “conscious 
intentions influenced by cognitive and emotional” factors and, at lower rep-
resentational levels, “automated procedures” (345). Jeff Pressing (1988, 131) 
observes that motor programs take shape through the combination of “specific 
single movements . . . into sequences, and ultimately into various subroutines 
that make up goal-directed action[s]. [These] are then organized and initi-
ated by an executive,” which various authors have explained in terms of motor 
schemata, frames, scripts, and action plans (see, e.g., Shaffer 1981). Expert per-
formers have access to a vast repertoire of “finely timed and tuneable” motor 
programs (Pressing 1988, 139) learnt over many years, which are “susceptible to 
tuning (adjustment) on the basis of feedback” (133) in the heat of performance.
The hierarchical nature of such programs, the existence of archetypes (even if 
personal ones), and their flexible and spontaneous realisation in performance 
all resonate with the definitions of “narrative” advanced earlier. Furthermore, 
the individual “gestures” that make up these programs—gesture in the literal 
sense of physical motion and in terms of the sonorous shapes that result—
potentially have a functional role as bearers of semantic content, as “units of 
code” within the unfolding narrative (for discussion see Robb 2015). The need 
to recognise physical movement as an integral part of any performance con-
ception and enactment is one more reason why we must look beyond the score 
to understand both musical meaning in general and musical narrativity more 
specifically. In my view, we cannot properly define music’s narrative character 
or indeed understand music in general and its effect on us unless the actions of 
the performer are fully taken into account.
Work in progress
Some years ago (Rink 2001b), I suggested that the combination of words and 
music in what I have since called “talk-and-play” events offers a highly effective 
means of surmounting the obstacles to communication that I identified earlier 
in this essay. In my experience, greater insight tends to be generated through 
that combination than by means of either performance or verbal commentary 
alone. Although more traditional modes of presentation will continue to have 
their place, the pursuit of alternative formats like those I am describing could 
significantly enhance the prevailing understanding of musical performance, 
however recondite the latter remains.29 Unfortunately, because the medium of 
 29 Hence the programme of “talk-and-play” events initiated in 2009 by the AHRC Research Centre for 
Musical Performance as Creative Practice.
  






performance is unavailable in the context of this essay, we must rely on words 
alone to try to capture (however imperfectly) aspects of the performer’s work 
in performing a given musical work. The ensuing case study is incomplete in 
that sense, yet it draws together the threads of the previous discussion while 
yielding some unforeseen conclusions.
Imagine that I have just played the case-study piece in the context of a “talk-
and-play” event of some kind (for example, a lecture-recital, an “illustrated 
talk,” a workshop, or an informal concert featuring verbal interaction between 
performer and audience). Let us assume that the performance was of a pro-
fessional calibre both expressively and technically.30 The piece in question was 
Rachmaninoff ’s Prelude in G♭ major, op. 23, no. 10, composed in 1903, the 
score of which appears in figure 4.3. Depending on the context, on my aims for 
the session, and on my sense of both the general mood and what felt suitable 
for the occasion, I might embark on an exercise borrowed from my analysis 
teaching, asking either the audience as a whole or individual listeners what they 
heard in the music, by which I mean the music as performed. There is every 
likelihood that the responses on offer would diverge from each other as much 
as from my own, given the vexed nature of “communication” as entailed in and 
through performance (as observed previously). Nevertheless, this sort of con-
sciousness-raising would be enlightening not only in itself but in challenging 
any casual assumptions about unanimity across disparate listeners. What might 
then follow is my own description of the music as I conceive, feel, and seek to 
project it, using words and possibly images to get across what my performance 
alone could not.
Geoffrey Norris (2001, 715) refers to some of Rachmaninoff ’s preludes as 
“small tone poems” noteworthy for their “vivid portraiture,” and this prelude 
exploits an introspective, contemplative mode of expression also found in 
the Second Piano Concerto, to which it is sometimes thematically compared. 
A quick glance at the score in figure 4.3 might lead one to conclude that the 
music is technically straightforward at least until the rhapsodic outpouring 
in bars 49–52, when the writing becomes more complicated. It might surprise 
my audience to hear that, at least for me, learning the piece was by no means 
straightforward. The left- and right-hand parts are inverted, with the melody 
often in the bass and the accompaniment in the treble, and though this is hardly 
of earth-shattering difficulty, it involves a delicate balancing act complicated by 
the manifold contrapuntal tendencies within the accompaniment. That is cer-
tainly true in bars 11–18, where the left hand leads and a right-hand obbligato 
follows in canon, with a variegated middle texture also vying for the ear’s atten-
tion. Similarly, a great deal of activity takes place in bars 35–42, though this 
passage seems like child’s play compared with the almost orchestral effusion 
seconds later in the rhapsody. In learning the piece, I was not helped by the lack 
of pedal markings, given the subtle intricacies of voicing and connection that 
 30 Without wishing to seem immodest, I should observe that alongside my work as a musicologist I regu-
larly perform professionally, having received the Premier Prix and the Concert Recital Diploma in piano 
from the Guildhall School of Music & Drama in 1981.
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come to a head in the fascinating build-up from bar 19 to the climax around 
bars 29–31, where the pianist’s hands continually interlock and awkwardly but 
tellingly compete within the same space and for the same notes. The pedalling 
must be highly refined elsewhere as well so that contrapuntal textures are not 
obscured or evocative dissonances resolved too quickly.
I gradually came to imagine, hear, and embody this deceptively complex music 
in a form different from the published score. I now regret that I did not follow 
my habitual advice to students (whether performers or not) to log their evolving 
impressions in a diary as they get to know a piece; nevertheless, it is possible to 
reconstruct the process by which I grew more familiar with this music. Early on I 
was aware of a fundamental thematic idea: the falling iambic figure announced 
in the bass at the beginning. This continually crops up in various intervallic 
guises and at different registral levels, demonstrating Rachmaninoff ’s tech-
nique of building his preludes “from tiny melodic or rhythmic fragments” 
(Norris 2001, 715). I also revelled from the start in the ingenious counterpoint, 
the rhythmic play during the approach to the climax, the rich timbres made 
palpable by all the black notes, and the lushness of attack invited throughout, 
especially in the chordal figurations. But only later did everything coalesce into 
a sense of the music’s “shape”—a property difficult to define but essential to, or 
at least characteristic of, coherent performance, as I have argued over the years.31 
Rachmaninoff seems to have held a similar view. Professing what Norris ([1976] 
2001, 78) calls a “theory of performance centred on the idea that every piece 
has a culminating ‘point,’” Rachmaninoff himself declared: “This culmination, 
depending on the actual piece, may be at the end or in the middle, it may be 
loud or soft; but the performer must know how to approach it with absolute cal-
culation, absolute precision, because if it slips by, then the whole construction 
crumbles, the piece becomes disjointed and scrappy and does not convey to the 
listener what must be conveyed” (quoted in ibid.).32
This extraordinary manifesto leads one to question where the “culminating 
point” might be in the musical “narrative” of this prelude, and how to approach 
and then move beyond it. Such were the complexities of the score that I had 
to engage in analysis away from the piano, rather than rely on my ear alone, in 
order to develop a feel for the music’s shape and thus meet the challenge set by 
Rachmaninoff—as well as to memorise the music, for only when it was learnt by 
heart could I really begin to hear it. The analysis involved teasing out the mani-
fold contrapuntal implications by constructing a new score (discussed below) 
which explicitly showed the various textures. I also devised a profile of contra-
puntal texture (see figure 4.4) to trace the progression from two active parts or 
strands at the opening through three in bars 11–18, one in bars 19–34, four then 
three then four in bars 35–56, and back to two in the coda (bars 56–62), with 
a brief contraction to one just before the end. This diagram reveals an innate 
textural rhythm, a process of expansion and contraction that is embedded in 
the music while also impinging on, indeed shaping, the music as performed. It 
is the basis of the performance’s physiognomy as well as its breathing.
 31 See, for example, Rink (1990, 2002a); see too the essays in Leech-Wilkinson and Prior (2017).




Figure 4.4. Rachmaninoff, Prelude op. 23, no. 10: contrapuntal texture in proile.
Figure 4.5 shows my reworked score, which preserves everything in 
Rachmaninoff ’s original apart from its standard layout on two staves. In a 
sense, it is more a reconfiguration than an analysis, yet it has analytical import 
as well as constituting a performing edition of sorts. Bars 1–10 conform to the 
published score, while at bar 11 the canonic obbligato enters in an additional 
upper system—an altogether new voice in sometimes strained dialogue with 
the ongoing left-hand melody, even as the accompaniment continues (by no 
means neutrally) in the middle. At bar 19, the music contracts to a single sys-
tem: strictly speaking, there are two parts here, not one (as shown in figure 4.4), 
but the two are so physically proximate as almost to be conjoined. Four parts 
come into play in bars 35–46: from bottom to top, the left-hand melody from 
the opening; the ascending line also from the beginning; offbeat chords recall-
ing similar ones earlier; and a different, largely conjunct obbligato coupled to 
the intervallically jagged bass melody. After a new peak of emotional inten-
sity in bars 41–42, the music briefly winds down, reverting to three strands in 
bars 47–48 in a reminiscence of the first two bars.33 The rhapsody then ushers 
forth in four voices, with a version of the melody sounding in the top part (as 
if played by first violins and high woodwinds?), a countermelody in system 2 
(second violins and violas?), “touched-in” accompanimental chords (winds?), 
and surging left-hand triplets. Although somewhat pared down after bar 52, 
the same arrangement prevails in a three-part texture extending to the coda in 
bar 56, whereupon two parts balance out the opening even as the brief return 
to a single, fused part in bars 59–61 recalls the climactic passage from before.
I found the exercise of redrawing the score instructive—as it can be in gen-
eral for performers (see Rink 2002a)—and I even started practising from this 
“edition” apart from the rhapsody, which I could not hear and did not wish to 
look at in this literal, worked-out form, given the considerable technical chal-
lenge of playing so many parts at once with just two hands (especially the right 
hand: note the brace) rather than full orchestra, and also the fact that much of 
what appears here is virtual, only implied in the sounding music. Throughout 
this passage, my “ear” hovered in control within the background as I focused 
 33 I noticed the connection with the introduction at a late stage in learning the piece, such is the richness 
of the writing here.
Figure 4.4.
  








more deliberately on getting the notes out, not only accurately but with suffi-
cient dynamic and timbral finesse to effect the “right” linear connections—and 
within an overall piano. It is possible to hear the rich textural intricacy by playing 
the passage without pedal, which masks the gaps between individual attacks.
Referring again to the reworked score, note the physical properties of bars 
11–18, which constitute the first three-voice passage. For instance, in bars 13 
and 17 the two hands share an accompaniment which needs to sound seamless 
(hence my additional articulation markings), while in bars 12 and 16 the upper 
note of the arpeggiated bass is impossible to play with the left hand except on a 
fairly unresonant piano, as the pedal has to catch the anticipatory lower note so 
“early,” though played with the right hand the upper note might lack linear con-
nection within the melody. Hence the question mark above the G♭ in bar 16—a 
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question that would have to be answered on any given performance occasion in 
terms of the instrument in use and the prevailing acoustic.
As for the build-up to the climax, not only is this difficult by virtue of the ped-
alling and the cumbersome yet meaningful interlocking of the hands, but bars 
27 and 28 present unforeseen rhythmic complexities just as the physical juxta-
positions become most vexed. The implied hemiola has been foregrounded in 
the reworked score by recalibrating the metre as 1/4 + 2/4 in bar 27, then 2/4 
+ 1/4 in bar 28, with the return to 3/4 reinforcing bar 29’s fortissimo. Here, at 
the point of climax, one must employ immensely careful fingerwork and subtle 
pedalling to release and then reapply the G♭s at the end of bar 29 (first melodic, 
then accompanimental), as well as the A♭s in the middle of bar 30 (first accom-
panimental, then melodic). Using Rachmaninoff ’s terminology, this is the 
prelude’s point of “culmination”—or rather, a first point of culmination, as a 
second one occurs in the rhapsody. The passage that follows is intensely felt, as 
if to celebrate the hands’ hard-won but ecstatic union. 
Earlier I cited Rothstein’s comments about the “narratives, tableaux and pro-
grammes” that performers sometimes construct for the works they play. Perhaps 
my references here to ecstasy, celebration, and rhapsody have suggested the 
existence of such a programme on my part, likewise my allusion to the coun-
terbalancing tensions that I sense in the dialogue between the main voices. But 
there is no need to relate the exact story that I have in mind if indeed there is 
one. Instead, I will avow that my overall conception was determined in large 
part by the way the music physically feels and, as a result, sounds—in other 
words, by the positioning and interaction of the two hands as they make their 
way from start to finish. Physicality and texture in the broadest sense are one 
of the keys to musical meaning here, as the prelude moves towards and recedes 
from the “culminating point” of which Rachmaninoff spoke—texture as seen 
in the contrapuntal profile and reworked score, texture as literally embodied 
through the performer, texture as heard and felt. What I have attempted in 
the foregoing analysis is to identify this physical embodiment as the basis of 
the “musical narrative” underlying my performance, to describe how it takes 
shape over time, and to highlight its relation to and—during the actual perfor-
mance—its identity with the musical work itself. (For further discussion, see 
Rink 2017.)
By way of conclusion, I will mention the recording that Rachmaninoff made 
of the prelude in March 1940—a recording that I heard for the first time long 
after learning the piece.34 I subsequently chose not to allow his interpretation 
to influence mine to any significant extent (though the rapidity of his tempo 
proved to be liberating). However inspired it might be, his rendition is of 
course not “the work,” that is, a version that I or anyone else must revere and 
strive to resurrect as a matter of course. In the light of musicology’s dictates 
over past generations, it would seem ironic, if not perverse, to claim that the 
 34 According to Martyn (1990, 489), Rachmaninoff recorded op. 23 no. 10 in New York Studio No. 2 on 18 
March 1940. The recording was originally issued by Victor (V 2124) and HMV (DA 1772) and is currently 




work of the performer must surely be not to reproduce the music, but rather to 
create it as if from scratch. Yet that is precisely what I would be doing were I to 
perform it again now.
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Music as Play 
A Dialogue
Andreas Dorschel
University of the Arts Graz
In the beginning was the sound. What a sound is like depends on its source and 
on the space it has to fill.
The Evangelist St John my patron was, 
Three gloomy courts are his; and in the first 
Was my abiding-place, a nook obscure! 
Right underneath, the College kitchens made 
A humming sound, less tuneable than bees, 
But hardly less industrious; with shrill notes 
Of sharp command and scolding intermixed. 
Near me was Trinity’s loquacious Clock, 
Who never let the Quarters, night or day, 
Slip by him unproclaimed, and told the hours 
Twice over with a male and female voice. 
Her pealing organ was my neighbour too.1
In these verses from The Prelude, book III, William Wordsworth described his 
undergraduate residence of the 1780s at St John’s College, Cambridge. Sounds, 
notes, voices: his room became a musical chamber—of sorts, certainly. By 1947 
it was no longer an obscure nook; it was enlarged, and, thanks to Wordsworth’s 
autobiographical poem, had become famous. On an early spring day of that 
year, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who had been elected professor of philosophy in 
1939, met in that same room with his acquaintances Elisabeth Lutyens, a mod-
ernist composer, Myra Hess, an acclaimed pianist, and Rae Woodland, a young 
singer.2 In the middle of the room stood a Blüthner grand piano from the 1880s. 
Myra Hess had just finished playing the C-major prelude from book I of Bach’s 
Well-Tempered Piano.
 1 Wordsworth ([1850] 2000, 405–6).
 2 Wittgenstein would soon use parts of their conversation in his Philosophical Investigations (§66–71; Witt-





Figure 5.1. Johann Sebastian Bach, Das Wohltemperierte Klavier I, Praeludium no. 1 in C 
major, BWV 846, bars 30–35. 
ElisabEth lutyEns: The way you play this is a marvel.
Myra hEss: And yet it is only “before play”—a prelude. Real play, for Bach, 
would only start with the fugue.
EL:  It would, had he been keen on language. And had he been keen on lan-
guage, he might have become a preacher rather than a musician.
MH:  Which, I must admit, would have been a shame.
EL:  It would. What is a “prelude”? It’s a word. And what’s a word? Air. Air, 
that better serves us in an organ playing a prelude by Bach than in a 
mouth telling us what music really is—its essence.
ludwig wittgEnstEin: My heart sinks when I hear the words “real” or “essence”; 
it doubly sinks when both come up in the same sentence.
raE woodland: What can we do to lift your heart?
LW:  Russell told me there is, in this very room, an English-style humidor of 
mahogany inlaid with ivory that contains Havana cigars.
MH:  One of so many St John’s myths. They have had nearly 450 years to pile up. 
At least there is now more grandeur to the room than in Wordsworth’s 
days. Can we do something else for you?
LW:  Perhaps—play . . .
EL:  I am rather good at chess. Should I get . . .
RW:  You are not going to get away with this. Ludwig plays his own games—
with words. He is rather good at them.
LW:  I am rather bad at them, but otherwise Rae is right. It will have to be a 
game that will rid Miss Lutyens of “real” and “essence.”
EL:  Is there such a game?
RW:  I warned you. He calls it philosophy.
EL:  Has that ever been a game? It does not seem to share much with what we 
call games otherwise.
LW:  Consider what we call games (in a mocking tone) “otherwise.” I mean 
board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. Is 
there something common to them all?
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LW:  What, then, is this “something”?
MH:  They are all amusing, aren’t they?
EL:  I would not say that of the game he is playing with us now. It feels more 
like an interrogation.
LW:  And you would be right. On the same count, also compare chess with 
noughts and crosses.
MH:  There is always winning and losing, or competition between players, 
isn’t there?
LW:  Think of patience. In ball games, there is winning and losing; but when 
a girl throws her ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has 
disappeared.
MH:  There is always skill. I certainly need some for playing Bach.
LW:  Look at the parts played by skill and luck, and at the difference between 
skill in chess and skill in tennis. Look now at games like ring-a-ring o’ 
roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other charac-
teristic features have disappeared! And we can go through all the other 
groups of games in the same way. Similarities crop up and disappear.
EL:  So there is no such thing as a “game”?
LW:  It turns out not to be a thing defined by an essential feature. Instead, we 
see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-cross-
ing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
EL:  But if there is no common core to the concept of a game, then it will be 
open to everything and thus arbitrary. Anything could enter it and claim 
to be a game, as your philosophy already has done. How is the notion 
of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer 
does? Can you identify the boundaries?
LW:  No.
EL:  So you don’t know the boundaries of the concept?
LW:  This is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none 
have been drawn. We can draw boundaries, but for a special purpose. 
Does it need that to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except for 
that special purpose. But you look absent-minded. Wherever have your 
thoughts wandered off to?
EL:  They are still here, contemplating Wordsworth’s lines, from The Prelude: 
“that false secondary power, by which / In weakness we create distinc-
tions, then / Deem that our puny boundaries are things / Which we 
perceive, and not which we have made.”3
LW:  He would not do it for less than that, would he? “False power”! He 
wrenches high drama out of it. I wonder whether too much went on in 
the kitchen beneath when Wordsworth jotted this down.
EL:  You don’t mind the lack of boundaries?
LW:  It never troubled you before when you used the word “game.”
EL:  I had not met you then—that’s why it did not vex me.
LW:  Meeting a philosopher has often been a curse.




EL:  That is part of the game you call philosophy, I guess.
LW:  You will see that the curse proves to be a blessing after a while—a 
therapy.
EL:  Am I ill? Is such a serious state an occasion for playing?
LW:  Do not think play has to be fun. Bach knew one or two things about that. 
Do not think, I say, look!
RW:  “Of sharp command and scolding intermixed.”
EL:  If your philosophical game speaks in an imperative tone, I shall not 
doubt for a moment that playing can sometimes be utterly serious.
LW:  Though I would have given you the benefit of the doubt.
MH:  Pff. If both Bach and Wittgenstein teach us how serious play can be, I 
prefer to take my lesson from the former. In twenty-four keys.
LW:  Unlike other philosophers I at least have more keys than just one. 
Perhaps they do not add up to twenty-four . . .
EL:  Keyless, clueless, stuck with my problem. On your account, Herr 
Wittgenstein, the use of the word “game” is unregulated.
RW:  Why should that bother you, as an Englishwoman?
EL:  It should bother him, as a German.
RW  (stepping deliberately on EL’s foot): Ssshhh. He’s from Vienna.
MH:  That might explain something.
LW:  Philosophers can never be explained.
EL:  But they can explain certain things, can’t they? And there is still that 
thing I wish to be explained. How can the word “game” perform its job, 
if the “game” we play with it is unregulated?
LW:  It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules. There are no rules about 
how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game 
for all that, and has rules too. One might say that the concept “game” is 
a concept with blurred edges.
EL:  I am at a loss. Is a blurred concept a concept at all?
LW:  Isn’t an indistinct photograph a picture of a person, too? Is it even always 
an advantage to replace an indistinct picture with a sharp one? Isn’t the 
indistinct one often exactly what we need?
EL:  I am now getting relieved that you work as a philosopher rather than as 
a passport photographer. Not all arts have reached their impressionistic 
period at the same time. But stay with me; how, on your account, should 
we explain to someone what a game is?
LW:  I imagine that we should describe games to her, and we might add: “This 
and similar things are called ‘games.’” And do we know any more about 
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a 
game is?
RW:  Or a game for a particular situation?
LW:  Imagine someone says to me, “Show the children a game.” I teach them 
gaming for money with dice, and the other person says, “I didn’t mean 
that sort of game.” Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come 





RW:  It would not, since he would have taken so much for granted—to the 
extent of not even thinking of it.
MH:  If the question is over not just what a game is, but rather what is an 
appropriate game and for whom, then matters, it seems to me, are set-
tled within a way of life. Life happens against some backdrop to which 
we constantly refer. Other ways of life can be imagined in which, for 
example, boys were trained to kill enemies and to see that as a sort of 
adventure game.
EL:  They cannot just be imagined. They were real a few years ago—that 
sort of adventure game in the infamous Hitler Youth. Hence I was 
worried about “game” being an open concept that any practice could 
appropriate.
LW:  Concepts are not there to teach us morals. They are in place for the good 
and the wicked alike. Or rather, the good and the wicked put them in 
their place.
RW:  I am glad we are the good ones.
MH:  Good, that is, at playing music.
RW:  I do not play it.
MH:  Why not?
RW:  For one thing, because some of it just isn’t play.
EL:  Professor Wittgenstein will find a beastly “essence” in what you say 
there. Nothing is just what it is. The meaning of something is its use.
RW:  There is use and there is abuse. Yesterday I sang in Beethoven’s Missa 
solemnis at King’s. I did not understand all of it—but that much I under-
stood: It would not have come about without the ambition to be more 
than mere play. Beethoven’s setting of the Mass is itself a religious pro-
fession. It makes the actual church rite superfluous. (Hums Dona nobis 
pacem from the Missa solemnis, op. 123.)
EL:  That’s good for someone. At least.
MH:  If we have learnt anything from Ludwig—
RW:  Which Ludwig?
MH:  Wittgenstein. If we have learnt anything from him so far—who, I beg, 
could resist his teachings?—and if, at the same time, we wish to keep 
up such a spirited conversation, then we shouldn’t ask now: Is all music 
play?
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MH:  We often say that music is play or that music is played—this may already 
imply a difference. What do we mean by it? Do we mean by it one thing 
or many?
EL:  Where Wittgenstein is concerned, always many.
LW:  And is that such a bad thing? “I will teach you differences.”
RW:  King Lear, Act 1, Scene 4.4 Kent speaks these words. At the end of the 
play, when Lear is grieving over Cordelia, Kent tries to explain how he 
had followed him faithfully all the time. Lear does not listen.5
LW:  See in him what happens to those who ignore teachers of differences.
RW:  After the king dies, Albany offers the rule of the kingdom to Kent. Kent 
refuses, hinting that he is going to follow Lear into death.6 See what 
happens to teachers of differences.
LW:  Depending on the audience. You are not like Lear, are you? There is 
something musically wrong with him, after all.
EL:  “O you kind gods / Cure this great breach in his abused nature; / The 
untuned and hurrying senses O wind up / Of this child-changed 
father!”7 Cordelia’s words.
RW:  Being in tune with the teacher, I trust I have learnt some differences. 
We sometimes say that people play because we deem their performance 
entertaining or find it structured towards winning and losing or based 
on competition or requiring skill or springing from luck.
LW:  Praise your memory! But do not think the list is complete. None of the 
features you recorded will be present in all games, and they will be pres-
ent in a host of things that are not games.
RW:  I will recollect that, too.
MH:  And still, with such variety at hand, you say you do not play music, Rae?
RW:  Have you never noticed that we call those who perform on musical 
instruments players, but that this is never said about singers?
MH:  Why is that, I wonder.
RW:  We say that somebody plays with something, say, a child with building 
blocks. An instrument seems to fit this schema, but not a voice: for the 
singer is her voice.
MH:  You know that I am rather fond of jazz. I found my way into it through 
that Californian family, the Brubecks, whom I got to know in London. 
Last night I went to that odd Scottish jazz club on Bishopsgate, Boisdale. 
An American singer performed there, Ella Fitzgerald, of stupendous 
diction, phrasing, and intonation, as well as a tenor saxophone player 
with large, but light, warm and silky tone, a rhapsodist on his instru-
ment, Paul Gonsalves. I call him a player, not her; that’s the way we talk. 
Yet my musical instincts went against it, and still go now. In their musical 
dialogue, Fitzgerald played around with its elements, whether pitch or 
rhythm, just as much as Gonsalves did. She also played with her voice. 
And, finally, I would even say, bewildered: she played her voice.
 4 Shakespeare ([1608] 2005, 916).
 5 Ibid., 941.
 6 Ibid.




RW:  Which of the features from Ludwig’s list makes you think so?
MH:  Skill perhaps. It was so remarkable on both Fitzgerald’s and Gonsalves’s 
parts.
RW:  Remember, we listened together last week on the BBC to Kathleen 
Ferrier singing the Alto Rhapsody by Brahms. Outstanding skill on her 
part, wouldn’t you say?
MH:  I would. Some of that skill was very different from Fitzgerald’s, though 
not all of it.
RW:  But you would never say that Ferrier played the Alto Rhapsody, would 
you?
MH:  I wouldn’t, indeed.
RW:  I know what you mean by playing with one’s voice and even playing 
one’s voice. But the voice is in its own precisely when it is not being 
played with. That’s why Ferrier is so moving. That’s also why I do not 
even aspire to playing my voice.
EL:  Sour grapes? And, by the way, I never try to be moving in music. For mov-
ing, we have public transport now.
RW:  Sour grapes?
MH:  Stalemate. I suggest we have the last three bottles of Weingut Dönnhoff 
Roxheimer Höllenpfad Riesling Kabinett 1921 at St John’s—from grapes 
that were not sour. 82° Oechsle. (She opens the first bottle and pours the oth-
ers, then herself, a glass.)
LW:  You are doing your best to turn the interrogation into a proper 
symposium.
EL:  As long as you are rather silent, that is not very difficult. Even the wine 
would hardly have been needed, much as I welcome it.
LW:  Silence is Cordelia’s virtue, though it isn’t until a long way into the play 
that one discovers that.
EL:  What is virtue in Cordelia could be fatigue in you. And, anyway, it would 
not be much healthier than Kent’s teaching of differences.
MH:  Good health, then. (They all clink their glasses and drink.)
RW:  Do you believe, Myra, it is healthy to turn something into what it is 
not—a voice into an instrument?
MH:  Transfiguration may be a sign of strength. Fitzgerald can do a lot of 
things with her voice that Gonsalves can do with his instrument, whereas 
unskilled voices master very few things that saxophones, played compe-
tently, achieve. Even some differently though highly skilled voices may 
not at all match the peculiar achievements of saxophones.
RW:  Instruments do not use words. For consistency, you should give up on 
words if you wish to turn your voice into an instrument.
MH:  Fitzgerald did, much of the time. It is called scat singing, I have been 
told. She articulates syllables and combinations of syllables like (sings) 
“di yu di dee dee doohdun di di oohnbee” that do not constitute words.
LW:  That reminds me of one of the streaks criss-crossing within the game 
network. Those syllables lack reference and meaning. Sometimes games 




around the two bishops, we do not need to understand the authority 
bishops hold in church hierarchies. What we must understand are the 
rules internal to the game: the bishop is limited to diagonal movement.
EL:  A world of its own. That’s what music should be like, rather than moving 
hearts.
MH:  At a few points, Fitzgerald inserted word shreds into the sequence of 
the syllables, such as, “That was Paul Gonsalves playing.” These, then, 
referred to the actual situation. They also referred to the music itself, 
not to anything beyond it. It appeared spontaneous, and most probably 
was. Spontaneity plays a role in some games, doesn’t it?
RW:  Think of Ludwig’s list. Spontaneity can link the otherwise opposed 
streaks of skill and luck. Playing the lottery or throwing dice requires 
a lot of luck but very little skill; with chess or tennis it is the other way 
round—though again the skills required differ sharply.
MH:  Quite so. Playing the lottery or throwing dice are “games of chance.” 
Their outcome is shaped by some randomising device. They seem spon-
taneous, in one sense of the word, in so far as they are unpredictable. 
In games of skill, by way of contrast, spontaneity takes the character of 
quick-wittedness. That’s what I relished in Fitzgerald’s and Golsalves’s 
performances.
EL:  How much exercise will have been needed to arrive at such spontaneity! 
Bless the philosopher-cum-amateur-clarinet-player . . .
LW:  -cum-whistler . . .
EL:  . . . -cum-whistler who has never gone through such an ordeal. I often 
feel the tension between the enormous discipline professional music- 
making requires and the play element in music. It can tear you apart.
RW:  But discipline has never been incompatible with all kinds of play and 
games. And it has been a precondition for some of them.
MH:  At the bottom of Fitzgerald’s and Gonsalves’s quick-wittedness must be 
years of exercising their musical wit. The performance I listened to grew 
from a practice bound by the ever same “jazz standards” but it had the 
unpredictability of a singular improvisation.
RW:  I take your point. That improvisatory quality is by no means due to 
“chance” and can be due to “luck” only in the remote sense of a fortu-
nate encounter of two congenial performers.
EL:  I trust we never call music “play” from a reference to “games of chance.” 
Even if the composer were to throw dice to determine pitch, or the per-
formers did so right before they play, the audience would receive the 
result very much like a finished composition.
MH:  As the Höllenpfad brings us closer together, Rae, I wonder whether 
there ever has been such a rift between us two—me the player, you the 
singer.
RW:  What do you mean?
MH:  Think of winning and losing. It will be the same for both of us. Whether 
it is a piano recital or an aria recital, the audience wants us to succeed. 




also want us to fail. For that gives them something to gossip about. 
Concert life—it’s not unlike those sports games that people watch. 
What matters is presence: the performance of the actual moment. For 
both of us, audience suspense will set up one and the same game. And 
rarely a fair one at that.
RW:  I know what you mean. But that’s just the social setting for our art. Now 
it is placed in that ambience; it could be placed elsewhere. The setting 
does not touch the art itself.
EL:  Dream on.
RW:  “I was the Dreamer, they the Dream.”8
MH:  Wordsworth forever. Send him down to the kitchen where they prepare 
his cornflakes. There is another matter that definitely touches the art 
itself. It has to do with the history of European music. Instrumental 
and vocal music, at least since the seventeenth century, have each 
instilled features of their own in the other. On the one hand, it has been 
demanded of instrumentalists that they “sing” on their instruments—
even we pianists whose instruments, based on hammers, do not seem to 
be made for that purpose in the first place.
RW:  Poor percussionists that you are . . .
MH:  Well—the demand to sing on the instrument can seem to be a restric-
tion, rather than an expansion; a restriction, though, that has led to 
delightful results.
EL:  Yes, and the piano is better at it than the harpsichord. Let us have more 
of your Bach. And Scarlatti. And Mozart. And Chopin.
RW:  To move your heart, at last?
EL:  To make it stand still, for moments.
RW:  That issue is not that pressing right now. I urge you to tell me of the 
other hand, Myra, as it concerns me.
MH:  On the other hand, singers have been asked to develop their organ so 
that it is capable of all the figures instrumentalists can muster—clearly 
an expansion rather than a restriction. It produced, among other ravish-
ing results, the florid aria di bravura.
RW:  I am glad we singers do not have to imitate pianos.
MH:  Positively. You would never have reached that standard. Either wind 
instruments or string instruments set the yardstick of virtuosic play with 
the voice.
RW:  As a soprano, here I feel at home. Rossini has the mezzo-soprano revel 
in coloratura, too. But poor Kathleen and the other altos—it’s a world 
closed to them. When wind instruments, string instruments, and voice 
are directly set against each other, in the aria concertata, we attend a game 
that corresponds to another one of Ludwig’s streaks: competition.
EL:  Don’t we have enough of that outside art? That’s hard enough to bear.
RW:  It will be all the more welcome in art. We want a safe show of competi-
tion sometimes, to be viewed from the outside. The performing artist 




Figure 5.3. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Die Entführung aus dem Serail, KV 384, Act II, No. 
11: Aria “Martern aller Arten” (Konstanze), bars 61–63.
will then be inside it, of course. When Kathleen and I studied with Roy 
Henderson at the Royal Academy of Music a short time ago, I had the 
chance to sing Mozart’s “Martern aller Arten”—with full orchestra.
MH:  What a feast!
RW:  That aria is really a C-major concerto, or sinfonia concertante, for 
soprano and four solo instruments—flute, oboe, violin, cello. While 
they attempt to outdo each other in bravura, the game keeps the audi-
ence in enchanted disbelief as far as “torments of all kinds” (sings)
 and the final wish for death are concerned.
MH:  Could it be a game if we believed it?
RW:  The instruments take a lot of time to have their first say in the contest. 
Hence whom we must take to be the protagonist, Konstanze—or Rae—
can seem doomed, musically, to twiddling her thumbs at the outset.
MH:  Some stagings fall into unintended comedy, others rise to intended 
comedy at this point of the drama.
RW:  Fortunately, mine was a concert performance. No nasty stage directors 
around. Subsequently, Konstanze’s voice proves master of all leaps and 
figurations within the range of the concertante woodwind and string 
instruments, a sublime player, although, admittedly, at the same time 
something more than a player. Or so I imagined myself to be.
EL:  Honour to whom honour is due. But isn’t the composer here the player 
behind the players?
RW:  You have been keen on this message all along.
EL:  If it is the true one . . .
RW:  I admit it is. The dramatist-composer plays his game with us musi-
cians. Konstanze and the Bassa compete over power. The Bassa has all 
the power in his sexual playground, the Seraglio, but, paradoxically, is 
denied the power of music.
EL:  That he threatens violence demonstrates his only power and thus, ulti-
mately, his powerlessness.
RW:  His impotence.
EL:  I was avoiding that word.
RW:  As the Bassa cannot compete musically, Mozart sets up that other com-
petition, between instrumental and vocal music.
EL:  And what a difference it makes. While the libretto dialogue is immedi-
ate—Konstanze right away takes up the words of the Bassa, “Martern 
aller Arten”—the music breaks that immediacy; the orchestra, but in 
particular its soloists, assert that they can say what is to be said here.
RW:  But then I say it.
EL:  Because the composer makes you say it.
Figure 5.3.
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RW:  Yet it is still I who must say it.
LW:  Games are a family, why shouldn’t players also be one? Especially if they 
drink Höllenpfad together.
EL:  Your no-border policy on concepts relieves us of all embarrassment. So 
do embrace us—composer, pianist, and singer alike!
LW:  I have done so all along.
EL:  And set out the theory of the embrace!
LW:  Philosophy is not a theory. It is a practice. 
RW:  Of embracing?
LW:  With some of its practitioners, the embrace is suffocating. (Sound of 
bells.)
RW:  Oh dear.
LW:  What is it?
RW:  Nothing. “Bells, the poor man’s only music.”9 It’s Trinity’s loquacious 
clock.
EL  (to LW): You have been a fellow of Trinity College, haven’t you?
LW:  I have, since 1930.
EL:  Follow your long loquacious practice, then.
LW:  It is taciturn, by comparison.
EL:  By comparison to whom?
LW:  Look around and choose yourself.
EL:  Go on: speak your few words then.
LW:  When we come across the notion of play, we think of doing something 
first, not of making something. But play can be turned into productions 
rather than performances.
EL:  Di yu di dee dee doohdun—my entry. The performer plays with actual 
sounds, the composer with the material of her musical imagination. 
A composition in the medium of musical notation is written for per-
formance, and that allows direct comparison. A work of this kind is, it 
seems to me, an image of play, born from play, and to be turned into play 
by performers once again.
LW:  Now you are doing the philosophy you asked me to do. What more 
could I wish for? Perhaps I could wish to avoid talk of “an image.” I 
once believed that the sentence was an image of the world. Now I have 
become tired of the image altogether. But how are compositions related 
to performances? To find something better than your image I would 
have to think long and hard.
EL:  Don’t think—look!
MH:  Or listen. One thing that struck me both in Ella Fitzgerald’s improvisa- 
tion and Mozart’s aria concertata—Gwen Catley sang it recently at 
Sadler’s Wells—was a quick movement repeated with small variations. 
This element features widely in children’s play. Take skipping with a 
rope. Often the movement is sought to accelerate, nearing a state of ver-
tigo. There is no dividing line between such play and dance.




RW:  Ludwig mentioned ring-a-ring o’ roses.
EL:  But he wouldn’t play it with us.
RW:  You never tried hard enough to compel him.
EL:  He would not be a philosopher could he be compelled.
RW:  Then try to convince him. Given his preference for practice over theory, 
you might stand a chance.
LW:  Talking about children’s games is no reason to get childish.
EL:  But being childish may be our reason for talking about children’s games 
in Wordsworth’s room at St John’s—that intellectual’s sanctuary.
RW:  Verily I say unto you, Except ye become as little children, you will not 
enter the kingdom of art.
LW:  Little versed in German as you all are, you may be unaware that the 
name of the wine you are drinking cheerily, Höllenpfad, means the path 
to hell.
MH  (opening the second bottle of wine): Take the sober route with me then, 
friends. Ring-a-ring o’ roses is a game, a song and a dance at once. 
Characteristically, there is a penalty for the slowest child.
EL:  She has to go to hell, doesn’t she?
RW:  Surprised? “That thou doest, do quickly,” says the Lord. St John 13:27.
MH:  A motto for music critics.
LW:  Jesus says it to Judas.
MH:  They won’t look that up. Too busy.
EL:  As I used to be a very slow child, I had to go to hell all the time. From that 
position, you end up a modernist composer. Thomas Mann is said just to 
have written a novel about this, Doktor Faustus. I shall read it. Slowly. In 
German.
MH:  The slowest child does not have to go to hell but I am not surprised 
you remember it that way. Another aberration from the path of reason. 
Stay with me. In all cultures, music has its share in dance as it has, at the 
opposite pole, in language. While prosaic language is averse to literal 
repetition—we repeat a sentence precisely when it has not been under-
stood—repetitions form dance. Dance is motion of the living body: 
these repetitions cannot be mechanical. And they allow modification 
and variation, indeed require them, for otherwise boredom is going to 
paralyse the activity. Yet these modifications and variations are modifi-
cations and variations of a pattern that runs through—they can only be 
experienced as modifications and variations by someone who senses the 
pattern.
RW:  Such abstract boulders on the path of reason! Offer us a less arid track, 
even if it leads to hell.
MH:  It could lead to Vienna.
LW:  Isn’t that the same destination?
MH:  Let us talk of waltzing, then, that nineteenth-century game between the 
sexes. Combining repetition and acceleration, it could lead dancers into 
a state of rapture—Joseph Strauss composed one called Delirien.




MH:  A composition like Strauss’s Delirien was made for actual dancing; but 
at the same time composers wrote waltzes for imaginary dancing rather 
than actual—playing a different sort of game.
LW:  It makes me feel much better.
MH:  Chopin was a master of double play in that, for the naive listener, he 
went along with the approved game while, at closer attention, casting 
suspicion upon it.
EL:  Through genre, the rules of a game are laid out; but secretly subverting 
them is yet another game.
MH:  Even the briefest and most popular of his waltzes, the “Minute,” hints at 
such double play. (She sits down at the Blüthner and plays it.)
EL:  Wondrous, as always when you play.
MH:  Just genius loci.
EL:  Your false modesty! You played through the London air raids, so obvi-
ously you do not need favourable circumstances. But what did you mean 
earlier by “a different sort of game”? And what is the common one from 
which it has to be distinguished?
MH:  The common one first. Oddly, the common one turns already against 
the common, the everyday. But that turn against is itself very common. 
Games can offer an escape from ordinary life. In playing them we recede 
from one kind of reality only to enter another kind. The nineteenth- 
century ballroom waltz was such a game. It replaced the straight-on 
movements of the rational, goal-directed individual with circling that, 
ideally, has to offer a little delirium. Precisely that rapture required the 
most regular and foreseeable structure. Unlike riders on today’s roller-
coaster, who are offered a little delirium as a ready-made technology for 
consumption, dancers have to produce the waltz each time by them-
selves and for themselves. Their circling—in six steps around the body 
axis—must be coordinated.
EL:  I see. Regressions have forever thrived on simplicity, not on complication.
RW:  Instead, Myra is getting ever more complicated. Is this going to turn into 
an extended college lesson? I hanker after our quick conversation.
EL:  Let Myra lecture and consummate that peculiar university feel while you 
are all ears.
RW:  Or the particular feel of the dreary flat obdurate Cambridgeshire fens 
in November? Grey sky and black land, boringly repeating themselves, 
separated as if by a ruler.
EL:  What a figure of speech. Don’t talk: look and listen. It takes a while to 
discover the Fens’ bleak beauty. You should manage, though, Queen of 
the Night! If you wish to keep up your distaste, though, I recommend 
Vaughan Williams’s In the Fen Country, composed in 1904, ten years after 
his graduation from Trinity. His first great exercise in orchestral tedium.
MH:  Thanks, Elisabeth. In Cambridge, landscape and academic spirit are 
one.




Figure 5.4. Frédéric Chopin, Waltz in D♭ major, op. 64, no. 1, bars 1–10.
MH:  Subtle works of art keep some distance from the escapist frenzy rather 
than altogether giving in to it: in Chopin’s D♭-major waltz, marking that 
distance, in the gentlest way, itself takes the form of play. (She picks up the 
score from the Blüthner.) Starting a perpetuum mobile, the composer intro-
duces a rotation model, alluding to the circling motion of the waltz. The 
chain of quavers plays around the tone A♭. Listeners may relate the fig-
uration to a waltz metre for the first two bars, but not for those that 
follow. The rotation model consists of four quavers, counteracting the ³¼ metre. But it acts not just against the waltz metre, but also against the 
expected dance periodicity of 4 + 4 bars. Bars 3–4 and 5–6 are identical 
in the right hand. Chopin’s handling of the rotation model produces 
a structure of 2 + 4 + 2. When the left hand comes in regularly in bar 5, 
the uncommon grouping appears to be covered up for the moment; but 
a tension in the right hand remains—the accompaniment has started 
either too late or too early. If the quaver figuration isn’t really dancing, 
although it alludes to the circular motion of the waltz, perhaps it is bet-
ter understood as an attempt to rush off. (She plays the beginning of the piece 
once more.)
EL:  What a lecturer has been lost in you! Alas, Cambridge! You are brilliant. 
Chopin’s oblique art of dancing. I thought I heard an oblique kind of 
singing, too, when you played the entire piece.
MH:  In bar 63, Chopin starts a cantilena. But it is left as a fragment, hanging 
in the air on its highest note. A trill of the right hand on A♭, the central 
tone of the perpetuum mobile, interrupts, followed by the return of the 
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Figure 5.5. Frédéric Chopin, Waltz in D♭ major, op. 64,  no. 1, bars 64–82.
 Vis-à-vis the fine-tuned expectations of listeners in the salon, Chopin in 
1846 toyed with rather than contributed to the game that three decades 
earlier, since its international breakthrough at the Congress of Vienna, 
had become the craze of the bourgeoisie.
RW:  Yet none but the bourgeoisie have come to appreciate the oblique kind 
of games Chopin plays. They are our audience. Aren’t we even part of it?
MH:  I am never too sure who is bourgeois and who isn’t. Even those of whom 
I am pretty sure dress up as something else some of the time.
RW:  That’s true and has a lot to do with what you said before. The ballroom 
has not merely been the venue for the play of whirl and swirl. It has also 
been, and often at the same time, the venue for games of masquerade.
MH:  Indeed. For these, we owe the imaginary counterparts not to Chopin, 
but to Schumann—Carnaval and Faschingsschwank aus Wien. (She plays the 
opening bars of Faschingsschwank.)
(Molto vivace)
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Figure 5.6. Robert Schumann, Faschingsschwank aus Wien, op. 26, bars 1–8.
LW: Did I go to Cambridge in order to be drawn constantly back to Vienna?
MH:  As long as we talk music, you will have to suffer it. Name me even one 
Cambridge composer.
RW:  Sir Charles Villiers Stanford of Trinity College was the most famous one.
MH:  I am afraid Ludwig will not count any talent below towering genius. 
Towering genius and Josef Labor. He grants an exception for him, but 
not for Stanford and Vaughan Williams.
LW:  Perhaps the true Cambridge composers hide, dressed up as something 
else, too—philosophers, say.
EL:  We’ll not suspect you.
LW:  In that case I shall quit my professorship this year. I had hoped our 
assembly would turn out to be more uplifting.
EL:  It might still turn out that way once we three drop our masks.
RW:  Masquerade is just a special brand of a wider phenomenon. As I can tell 
from my classical education, the Latin illudere literally means “to play in.” 
Aren’t we all playing and being played with? Vexing and being vexed?
MH  (opening the last bottle of wine and refilling the glasses): Stay sober! An illu-
sion is play only as long it is recognised as an illusion—children’s threats 
at Halloween, the masquerade in the ballroom, Lear’s death onstage. 
When deception is not seen through as an illusion, it becomes ordinary 
fraud. Fraud is beyond play for the deceived person, otherwise it would 
not work as fraud.
EL:  Could it not be conducted as play by the deceiver?
MH:  It might. For, eerily, there does not seem to be any human activity that 
could not be conducted, by some weird individual, as play. Or, perhaps, 
the individual does not even have to be weird. Cats usually aren’t; but 
what the cat relishes as play is deadly reality for the mouse. Warfare may 
be seen as a tactical and strategic game by those in control, but not by 
those being bombed.
EL:  Reciprocity, in such matters, is not a given. Is that what you are saying?
MH:  It is. The military strategist plays with his soldiers and with the civilians 
of the other side, but they do not play with him. Love is a game for Don 
Giovanni, but not for Donna Elvira. I could imagine a poet playing vir-
tuosically with certain elements of the Gospel, but devout Christians 
would not be willing to join in the game. More than that, they might 
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Figure 5.7. Ludwig van Beethoven, Missa solemnis op. 123, V. Agnus Dei, bars 123–26, 
Soprano. 
EL:  To be play, then, is not a feature of things, but an attitude towards them? 
And that attitude could sometimes be shared by others and sometimes 
not be shared by them, couldn’t it?
MH:  Players may announce the attitude they expect from those who watch 
them. It is the frame, the stage, the screen, the situation, the context 
that allows the pretence to be seen through when and if “the girl plays 
a fairy” or “Vivien Leigh plays Cordelia.” Taking her utterances with 
the attitude that “this is play” on the part of the audience saves Leigh 
from being carted off to the psychiatric ward. And though Leigh must 
be able to distinguish herself from Cordelia—that’s why she is not sent 
to Bedlam—she must be Cordelia for her audience during the perform-
ance of Lear.
LW:  Note the different way in which we are talking here. Confronted with 
such play, we do not say that someone plays with someone or with 
something. In a characteristic turn, we use the simple accusative object 
instead of the prepositional phrase: someone plays someone or, indeed, 
something.
RW:  Something?
LW:  Yes, something. What such play references is not restricted to what is 
ordinarily considered a “person.” Children sometimes take on the 
roles of water, fire, or wind. Such is the case in ring-a-ring o’ roses—it 
includes the pretended metamorphosis of a human being into a plant. 
The slowest child, when it comes to falling down, turns into the station-
ary “rosie,” the rose bush around whom the other children dance.
EL:  No hell there?
MH:  No hell. Your memory played a trick on you.
EL:  Or it wasn’t my memory.
LW:  Your mask seems to be inside rather than outside.
EL:  That will make it difficult to drop it.
RW:  A few rounds of ring-a-ring o’ roses could at least help you to sunnier 
recollections. It is just so much nicer to be a blossoming rose bush than 
to go to hell.
EL  (molto rubato con morbidezza): What if I don’t like it nice?
RW  (agitato): Then go to hell.
MH:  Goodness gracious me. So hostile?
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Figure 5.8. Claude Debussy, Préludes, book 1, no. 6: “Des pas sur la neige,” bars 32-36.
EL:  As long as it is just imitating one thing instead of another, the differ-
ence—hell versus rose—may not be that important.
RW:  Wagner blurred it. In Parsifal, Kundry is called “Höllenrose”—the rose 
of hell.
LW:  I’ll teach you a difference. Another one. Not all imitation is considered 
play-acting. If a girl draws a dog, she must keep a distance from the ani-
mal, and it is because of this quality of “staying outside” that we do not 
call drawing “acting.” But the girl may as well imitate a dog by making 
herself similar to it, creeping into the dog’s body and mind; that sort of 
getting or being “inside” someone or something is imitative play.
MH:  Last Friday, Beecham conducted Strauss’s Alpensinfonie at the Royal 
Albert Hall. Some found it sublime, others banal. Whatever it is, it is 
not a great instance of imitative play. The illustrator stays outside. On 
studying Debussy’s Préludes recently, by way of contrast, I was amazed to 
see that the composer placed the individual titles not above, but below 
the pieces. He took so much care not to limit the imaginative freedom 
of play.
RW:  But, inevitably, players will know the titles beforehand.
MH:  That’s true. Yet the gesture is characteristic and points towards play. A 
title above the piece takes the external object as given and invites com-
parison with it—a procedure as remote from play as it gets. (She sits down 
one last time at the piano and plays Debussy, Préludes, book 1, no. 6: “Des pas sur 
la neige.”)
 (Having finished, she pauses for a moment.) “Footsteps in the snow.” Music 
does not walk. It can perhaps depict walking; Richard Strauss did that, 
and well enough. Debussy’s music, however, gets inside the walker. It 
embodies the steps. Just as Vivien Leigh plays Cordelia, being her, so 
Debussy’s music plays steps on the snow, being them.
LW:  You are right. Acting, or impersonation, is another streak within play, 
and also within the play of music. If we wish to make sense of the claim 
that music, or some music, is play, looking out for such streaks may be 
the least violent way. We cannot find a particular trait that renders all 
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pieces and performances of music that strike us as play into instances of 
play.
RW:  But is that not circular reasoning?
EL:  It is. For there is something wrong with the injunction not to think, 
but to look. The flaw is in the alternative it suggests. We have thought 
already as we look. There are an infinite number of things we might look 
at. Why do we look at a Chopin waltz? Because we have thought, before 
looking, that this might be an instance of music as play. But then such is 
the circle we, thinking animals that we are, cannot avoid. It is, as it were, 
the human game. Man’s real essence.
LW:  How thoughtful. I’ll look into it.10
 10 I am immensely grateful to John Rink (St John’s College, Cambridge) for detailed comments on a 
previous version of this dialogue; I have not been able to do justice entirely to his considerate critique. 
I would also like to thank Paulo de Assis and Edward Crooks (Orpheus Institute, Ghent) for helpful 
suggestions.
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What Anyway Is a  
“Music Discomposed”? 




Compos’d by calms, and discompos’d by winds. 
—Virgil, Georgics1
1. “Must we mean what we say?” 
When I first thought about this essay, I was responding to an invitation to 
speak at a conference on the topic of dissonance and dissidence.2 I determined 
straightaway to juxtapose three broken images: of a music untuned, of a work 
uncomposed, and of a concert disconcerted. I intended to set these images 
in a broader picture in which the prefixes “de,” “dis-,” or “un”—or “ent” in 
German—had long been attached to dominant words offered in dissonant 
discourses of disenchantment in which disasters had been experienced as the 
disorder of the day. Yet, though this was my aim, I quickly became distracted by 
a single phrase from the work of Stanley Cavell. It was simply the title given to 
his essay of 1967: “Music Discomposed” (Cavell [1967] 1976b).
I had read Cavell’s essay more than once over the last decades, but never had 
it grabbed my attention. It had always somehow irritated me; I couldn’t get my 
thought around it. Reading it again recently, I found a key, to read it through 
 1 Dryden’s translation, as quoted in Crabb (1818, 371).
 2 Editor’s note: The present essay is published here for the first time; its first presentation, as “Music 
De-Tuned and Works Dis-Composed,” was delivered at the conference Dissonance and Dissidence: 
Counterpoints in Aesthetics and Politics, 12–13 May 2015, at the University of Toronto; its second 
presentation was at “Nature, Materialism in Adorno,” the fourth annual meeting of the Association for 
Adorno Studies, hosted by the Philosophy Department at the New School for Social Research, New 
York, 9–10 October 2015. Lydia Goehr’s presentation, “A Music Discomposed: Untimely Thoughts on 
Adorno and Cavell,” was followed by a response by Kathy Kiloh (published here at the end of Goehr’s 
text). Jake McNulty, the author of the second comment on Goehr’s essay (see below), attended the 
conference, and offered the comment at Goehr’s request. Details of the event can be accessed at http://
www.adornostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AdornoCircle2015Poster.pdf. From the very 
beginning of the publication process of this book, Lydia Goehr expressed her gratitude for “the time 
and care” both commentators took in reading her essay and regarded both comments as important 




an enigmatic mirror, in fact, the dark glasses of Adorno. A skewed approach I 
grant, but what I saw in Adorno’s writing I saw in Cavell’s: namely, a strategic 
displacement of the subject matter. The apparent subject matter was the state 
of contemporary musical composition; the underlying, even repressed subject, 
was the modernist philosophical subject. If the state of music was discom-
posed, then so, too, was the philosophical subject, when, in writing the essay, 
the author placed himself in contemporary concerts disconcerted by the over- 
and under-composed offerings of his day. 
One clue I found, or perhaps devised, to sustain my reading turned on the 
fact that Cavell never once used the term “discomposed” within the essay. The 
title alone condensed the anxiety that was expressed throughout. The form 
of the essay, as I read it, was a working through of an anxiety by a writer who 
aimed to turn a discomposure into a new form of composure, consistent with 
an ethics of conviction, wherein, from feeling unsafe, one would feel again safe 
knowing that this subject had the capacity to make music still mean. The title 
thus served as an allegory of a subject seeking the key or pitch of a philosophy 
that would forge a path through the contemporary situation. This means, too, 
that Cavell’s term “discomposed” did not issue a self-evident meaning from 
the start. Its meaning was not obviously the same as that of “decomposed” 
or “uncomposed.” This being so, Cavell’s titular phrase performed the same 
role as the first strike of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970, 1997) when Adorno 
declared that what was once self-evident no longer was, not least because the 
very idea of something being self-evident was being subjected to radical doubt.
Cavell included his essay in a volume he published in 1969 with the title Must 
We Mean What We Say?, the year before Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory was posthu-
mously published. All that turns on this particular fact was that both authors 
were writing in and very consciously responding to the post-war challenges of 
the 1950s and even more to the 1960s. To his titular question, “Must we mean 
what we say?,” Cavell answered with an insistent yes, where his insistence 
reflected his anxiety in posing the very question. The “must” of meaning was 
evidenced in our intentions to communicate something through the medium 
of words, paint strokes, or, in the musical case, through structures of harmony, 
melody, rhythm, and counterpoint, but where the anxiety emerged from the 
realisation of how often the intended communications could fail in their trans-
mission or effect. Cavell was interested in the failure not of particular or indi-
vidual intentional acts of communication, but in the larger possibility that (a 
collective) “we” might no longer mean anything in the contemporary musical 
world and thus, by allegorical extension, in any other world of art, science, or 
thought. The possibility of not meaning at all was the urgent question of his 
day, and hence the “must,” the most important word—and the first word—of 
his question. Must we mean? Yes we must—but how and on what terms? 
To articulate the terms of meaning’s success against an apparent world- 
pervasive failure to mean, Cavell sought not a hard foundation in a priori con-
ditions of sufficiency and necessity. He sought a vaguer and more existential 
necessity to serve as an antidote to that which had led communication astray, 
to that which had poisoned the very possibility of meaning. He bottled this 
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antidote in a classical or antiquated glass, speaking of the conviction, sincerity, 
authenticity, and attunement required (or once required) of our communica-
tive acts. It was not therefore a matter of articulating the logical conditions for 
producing referentially meaningful sentences, but a moral-aesthetic matter 
now of laying down secure conditions for the composition of our communica-
tions, be they musical, literary, filmic, or philosophical. 
In his essay on music, as elsewhere in his writings, Cavell brought attention 
to what he called a fraudulence, although he focused not on the individualising 
sort of imposture perpetuated by lonesome tricksters. What he had in mind 
was an atmosphere of the times, a crisis of imposture that saturated a world, 
in this case a world of contemporary music. In this moment of the sixties, it 
seemed to have become well-nigh impossible to say what it meant to catch 
out an impostor red-handed. Drawing from, but also countering, the Anglo-
American analytical aesthetics of the period, Cavell ([1967] 1976b, 190) wrote of 
there being “no one feature, or definite set of features” that one could describe 
“in technical handbooks,” or “no specific tests by which its fraudulence [could] 
be detected and exposed.” We are not, he was saying, in a situation where our 
impostors, like “forgers and counterfeiters, admit clear outcomes [or] conclude 
in dramatic discoveries.” We are not at a masked ball where we raise the masks 
of some—the impostors—leaving others dancing authentically in place. We are 
not in a grimy world in which we catch forgers “signing another man’s name” or 
even in a Dostoevskyean world in which a criminal seeks constantly the oppor-
tunity to confess. No, he was maintaining, we—the collective we—seem to feel 
ourselves now to be in a world with a new sort of imposture, where the only 
evidence given is through the pervasive impression that our communications 
have broken down. 
Critically aware that such fraudulence was impossible to pin down with any 
exactitude, Cavell showed the poverty of the many explanatory terms that were 
being offered mostly by Anglo-American theorists. Again, it was not a matter 
of showing how the necessary and sufficient conditions of what made some-
thing—say, art or music—were not being met by this or that particular produc-
tion. It was a matter now of showing that all such conditions had been blown 
to the wind in a total situation of fraudulence. To get a sense of the broader 
picture, a philosopher such as himself would have to look symptomatically at 
the total range of contemporary experience if an adequate diagnosis were to be 
offered—and then a cure. 
Moving between the more general situation of contemporary art and the 
more specific condition of contemporary music, Cavell ([1967] 1976b, 190) 
wrote of how there were “no such proofs possible for the assertion that the 
art accepted by a public is fraudulent,” because even “the artist himself may 
not know.” This claim was deliberately suggestive. For artists or composers not 
to be aware of the untruth of their productions meant that, though thinking 
themselves sincere, they had been taken in by the times, and even so taken in 
that their sincerity, despite being grounded in fraudulence, was carrying over 
to a public with the result that the public too was somehow accepting what 




acting with sincerity: they seemed to mean what they said, even purposefully 
to be trying to communicate with their publics. Still, the sincerity was decep-
tive given the more basic claim that what they were producing was somehow 
already false.
Here, Cavell implicitly appealed to a modernist false consciousness, a situ- 
ation in which the public could be accepting-yet-discontent with the contem-
porary state of art, and hence intrigued by all the claims of artists, yet suspi-
cious that the whole enterprise was a hoax. Once more, for Cavell, the fraudu-
lence attached to contemporary music or art was not exhausted by a deliberate 
deception on the part of artists—or con artists—aiming to mislead the public 
or trick them into accepting something that either categorically was not art or 
honorifically should not have been accepted as art. He was not merely contin-
uing the general suspicion that Plato had set into action: that artists were on a 
par with deliberately deceiving sophists. Instead, he was describing a new or 
contemporary form of not-knowing—not one deceptively paraded around by 
individual impostors as knowledge, but a not-knowing saturating the entire 
atmosphere of the times, the detection of which required a special sort of 
social-psychopathological analysis. Put like this, he joined those in the same 
period who were trying to capture something like a total or mass deception, a 
full-scale crisis of humanity, though one whose symptoms could then be read 
back through the long history of modernity as a whole.
2. The atmosphere of the 1960s
Many commentators have discussed Cavell’s essay. An entire volume (Kane and 
Decatur Smith 2010) was recently published of essays impressive in breadth 
and insightful in substance celebrating the fortieth year of the essay’s publi-
cation. In the earliest commentaries, beginning with those of Joseph Margolis 
(1967) and Monroe Beardsley (1967), the matter of fraudulence was generally 
thought to have been too vaguely spelt out, leading most to concentrate on 
other concepts in the essay. More recent commentators, contrarily, have stuck 
with the matter of fraudulence, often making sense of Cavell’s use of the term 
by reference to what others were saying about it in the same period. This is my 
approach too, although I emphasise something others have stressed less: that 
if, in reading Cavell’s essay, one finds oneself frustrated by his having under- 
described what he meant by fraudulence, then one benefits by turning the frus-
tration into a dialectical possibility, that the underdescription was a deliberate 
philosophical strategy to capture the pervasive but inexact atmosphere of the 
times. By not saying too much by way of what he meant, or by not clarifying the 
concept, he captured an atmosphere that was phenomenologically impossible 
to put into precise words. To capture the general atmosphere of fraudulence 
without reducing it to detectable acts on the part of deceiving artists was how 
he brought the situation to consciousness in a new way. Hence, not through 
direct description, but through indirect detours with suggestive signposts that 
would lead one through the labyrinths of a contemporary world in which one 
could experience at one extreme all the slogans of sincerity and authenticity 
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posted on the walls, while, at the other extreme, all the deafening cries of crisis, 
scepticism, hocus-pokery, and doubt. 
Of late, I have had several opportunities to consider the atmosphere of 
the sixties that motivated so many thinkers to capture in their philosophical 
thought an urgency that they associated with the then contemporary arts. 
They premised the urgency on their observations that current theories were 
at odds with the practice, the reception with the production, and that the pub-
lic’s expectations, experiences, and judgements were radically at odds with 
the works being produced. Even if the contemporary art was “intoxicating,” as 
for example Arthur Danto liked to use this term, it was often described as too 
“difficult” to understand, or “incomprehensible,” to use the dogged German 
words associated with Adorno. The incomprehension was attributed to a fail-
ure either of experience or of philosophical terms, terms that were either too 
analytic or dreary or too harmonious and outdated to accommodate what was 
actually being produced as art. The question then was how to make sense of 
art’s offerings in ways that would both philosophically and phenomenologi-
cally satisfy those who felt most disenchanted and dispossessed. It was, clearly, 
a far more anxious than celebratory project.
In pursuing this anxiety, I have found that the term “atmosphere” was 
often used to capture not clear and transparent worlds or forms of life made 
explicit or articulated conditions, but worlds rendered opaque by dense and 
deep grounds and backgrounds of bad faith, erroneous habituation, natural-
ised intuitions, and false prejudices and expectations. Used this way, the term 
echoed an earlier use with a most striking effect when George Santayana, first, 
and then John Dewey wrote of an atmosphere and human environment that was 
being denaturalised or debased, or of a Weltanschauung borrowed from across 
the Atlantic that had already reached a breaking point at the apocalyptic start of 
the twentieth century. Terms like “atmosphere,” “environment,” or “worldview” 
were given a special presence in writings of philosophers who sought some sort 
of exit out of a labyrinth covered over by a very German grey fog. 
Cavell wrote of how aestheticians were now incapable of producing criti-
cism, given a perceived inability even to recognise the proper objects of the 
discourse. “It is not clear,” people now think, “what is and is not essentially con-
nected to the concept of music” (Cavell ([1967] 1976b, 204). And also, “I believe 
it is true to say that modernist art—roughly, the art of one’s own generation” 
has become—precisely because it has not yet properly become—“a problem 
for the philosophy contemporary with it (in England and America anyway)” 
(ibid., 183). After this, he asked whether this would be true of any generation 
or particularly of his own. He wanted to have the answer go both ways. The 
problems so acute for his generation would allow him to view the entire dis-
cipline of aesthetics going back, as he put it, two hundred years. And with this 
extended gaze, he would try to come to understand modernist art, then mod-
ernism, then art as a whole. If aesthetics was done right, a path would be forged 
if not to recomposing the world, then to rewarding the philosophical subject, 





3.  Reading Cavell through the dark glasses of 
Adorno 
When Cavell described a music discomposed, he rendered the condition 
extreme. Like many around him and long before him, he pulled on the once 
classical but now antiquated terms of rhythm, poetry, harmony, and compos-
ition as leitmotivic metaphors to restore philosophical sense to a world that 
seemed to have lost all proportion. A world that did not make sense was experi-
enced as bereft of its musicality, leaving only unwitting impostors to conduct 
a discomposed public through the dissonant rhythms of the day. If Cavell did 
not clarify the term “fraudulence,” then just as deliberately he did not clarify 
the term “discomposed”: again, in this second case, he did not even use the 
term beyond the title. Yet, let us consider now all that the term “discomposed” 
might mean.
One is very likely to read a music discomposed first off as pointing to musical 
works that have been or become decomposed, if they were not somehow uncom-
posed to begin with. Consider Adorno’s description of some modernist works 
that, with their refusal to be fully-formed, or to be totally- or through-com-
posed, were produced as fragmented or broken. Or think of the many pro-
nouncements of the likes of John Cage, James Joyce, or Samuel Beckett who, 
in their endgames of chance and improvisation, refused to compose in a way 
that would allow the dominant work-concept to remain comfortably in place.
Or consider another sense, when the term “discomposition” is attached not 
to works but to an experience or a response. “It is in the tranquillity of decom-
position,” wrote Beckett in 1951 in Malloy, “that I remember the long confused 
emotion which was my life. . . . To decompose is to live too, I know, I know, don’t 
torment me” (Beckett [1955] 2009, 22). To this sort of feeling, Cavell ([1964] 
1976, 115) then responded in his own study of Beckett: “Beckett’s perception 
is of a ‘meaningless universe’ and language in his plays ‘serves to express the 
breakdown, the disintegration of language’—by, one gathers, itself undergo-
ing disintegration. Such descriptions are usual in the discussions of Beckett I 
am aware of, but are they anything more than impositions from an impression 
of fashionable philosophy?” Cavell’s remark is odd, even disingenuous, given 
what one would think could have been a shared feeling. But here one has to 
read his remark as trying, with Nietzsche, to separate the feeling of breakdown 
from what follows as a consequence for the philosophy if, as Cavell fears, the 
philosophy will lead persons now to live down in the depths only of a “nay- 
saying” nihilism. Nihilism was not and could not be the right answer for Cavell 
as it was not the right stopping place for Nietzsche.
Given this sort of discourse, many have blamed the fashions of art and the 
fashions of philosophy, but the critique has gone deeper when theorists have 
looked to the changes brought about by social forces—by what Marx had 
described, say, in his Capital: Critique of Political Economy, when a certain sort of 
bartering decomposed a community from the inside out, or when technologi-
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Against this same background, Adorno described the profound changes in 
listening habits when the new technologies closed the doors of traditional 
musical works, such as by Beethoven, to any effective or truthful transmission. 
Listeners were accordingly left either distantly remembering what listening to 
Beethoven’s works once meant or taking in the music through the broken and 
interrupted transmissions of endlessly repeated and variated sound bites. In 
describing the rage, fetish, and regression of the new listening habits, he wrote 
of the erasure of any workable classificatory and evaluative distinction between 
the high and the low, or between a musical production that issued in works 
and one that issued in hits. “If,” he wrote, “atomized listening means progres-
sive decomposition for the higher music, there is nothing more to decompose 
in the lower music” (Adorno [1938] 1973, 37 as translated in Adorno 2002, 
305–6).3 His idea of a music dekomponiert worked alongside Walter Benjamin’s 
declaration of a perceptual attention that had become “deconcentrated” and 
“distracted” (see Benjamin [1968] 2007]. Any perception of an artwork consid-
ered as a whole was now impossible, since the whole—das Ganze—was not even 
offered. The public was given only splintered parts, allowing them to focus on 
and fetishise only what was most striking and immediate. Without any percep-
tion of a binding or glue between the parts, or without any access to the dialec-
tical unfolding of a whole, all that was realised, Adorno wrote, was “What the 
spotlight falls on—striking melodic intervals, unsettling modulations, inten-
tional or unintentional mistakes, or whatever condenses itself into a formula 
by an especially intimate merging of melody and text. Here, too, listeners and 
products fit together; they are not even offered the structure which they cannot 
follow” (Adorno [1938] 1973, 37, as translated in Adorno 2002, 305).4
In his writings, Adorno rarely used the term dekomponiert: he wrote more 
often of subjects and objects as variously zersetzt, zerstört; zersplittert, zerstreut. 
These terms then applied to music and brought attention to music as an alle-
gory of the social subject as both tended toward disavowal, degradation, and 
disassociation. In the extremely polarised expressions of his Philosophy of New 
Music (Adorno [1949] 1975, 2006), he described one sort of modern music as 
dispensing, both seriously and in parody, with music’s essential temporal 
unfolding as it approached the stasis of painting. “The Gordian knot is simply 
severed” (Es wird einzig der gordische Knoten zerhauen), he wrote, which he 
followed up by using the term Zerfallen in an awkward passive construction to 
speak of something as having been or become disintegrated or discomposed. 
The knot—the work—is severed when an opposition “is created between the 
objective-geometrical division of time and its subjective decay, without any 
constitutive connection between the temporal dimension and the musical 
content. In the spatialization of music, time, brought to a standstill, is disin-
tegrated the same way that, in the expressive style, [time] is decomposed and 
 
 3 “Bedeutet bei der oberen Musik das atomistische Hören fortschreitende Dekomposition, so gibt es bei 
der unteren schon nichts mehr zum Dekomponieren.”
 4 “Auch darin stimmen Hörer und Produkte zusammen: die Struktur, der sie nicht folgen können, wird 




transformed into lyrical moments” (Adorno [1949] 1975, 196n34, translation by 
Susan H. Gillespie).5 
In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno wrote further of how “the unfolding” of art-
works is the same as, or is at the same time, their decomposition (Adorno 1970, 
266, as translated in Adorno 1997, 256; Am Ende ist ihre Entfaltung eins mit 
ihrem Zerfall). Adorno was addressing how the dialectical unfolding requires 
a decomposition so that the work may be recomposed in the act of structural 
listening or performing. But what if there was no work given to decompose and 
recompose because decomposition was already the given state of the work? 
Adorno took up this question also in his essay “Extorted Reconciliation: On 
Georg Lukács’ Realism in Our Time” (Adorno [1958–74] 1974, 1991–92), when he 
criticised Lukács for ignoring how far the avant-garde had gone in decomposing 
the unity of the subject through a new literary form—where the subject stood 
doubly for the subject matter and subjective agency in the text. He singled out 
Proust’s interior monologues as exemplary for producing this literally shatter-
ing effect of the literary. Proust, he wrote, “decomposes [dekomponiert] the unity 
of the subject [die Einheit des Subjekts] by means of the subject’s introspection 
[vermöge dessen eigener Introspektion]: the subject is ultimately transformed into an 
arena [es verwandelt sich schließlich in einen Schauplatz] in which objective entities 
manifest themselves [erscheinender Objektivitäten]” (Adorno [1958–74] 1974, 262, 
as translated in Adorno 1991–92, 125). Adorno saw the Proustian arena as a stage 
or scene of observation—ein Schauplatz—over which one would find senseless 
objects strewn, being picked and invested with new but random sorts of sen-
sibility here and there, momentarily consumed with secret pleasures. Clearly, 
decomposition was not entirely a bad thing. But when it was, it was because 
further developments of the decomposition left objects not there to be picked 
up for reminiscences of things past, but worn out or threadbare as though they 
were merely grey shards washed up in storms at sea. He wrote, accordingly, not 
of a wasted world placed before one for the performance of memory, but there 
for the expression of a despair discoloured through the splintered gaze of the 
shipwrecked. 
Another revealing use of the idea of decomposition is found in Minima 
Moralia, in the eighth section, titled by Adorno “Wenn dich die bösen Buben 
locken”—“If bad boys should tempt you.” He described an amor intellectua-
lis for a kitchen staff of thinkers and artists who were tempted to “relax” the 
tension of their Bildung, given the pressure to conform, to produce strings of 
platitudes and banalities. He wrote: “The center of intellectual/minded [geisti-
gen] self-discipline as such is understood to be disintegrating” (Adorno [1951] 
1980, 26, translation modified from Adorno 2005; Das Zentrum der geistigen 
Selbstdisziplin als solcher ist in Zersetzung begriffen). Resuming the same 
thread in a later passage, no. 39, “Ego is id,” he described the historical decay, 
dissolution, and demolition of an ego whose repression had been shaped by a 
 5 “dem subjektiven Zerfall der Zeit ihre objektiv-geometrische Aufteilung entgegengestellt, ohne daß 
zwischen der Zeitdimension und dem musikalischen Inhalt ein konstitutiver Zusammenhang bestünde. 
In der Verräumlichung der Musik ist Zeit, durch ihre Stillstellung, ebenso zerfällt, wie sie im expressiven 
Stil sich in lyrische Momente dekomponiert.”
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bourgeois individualism, which with its beginnings in antiquity had worked its 
way through the Renaissance to end up in ideologies of super-personalities, at 
which point the ego splintered as it fell prey to a mass fraudulence or deception 
of a fascistic and overcapitalised proportion. Beyond the kitchen staff, Adorno 
sought a resistance in the very few individuals who refused to play along. Such 
resistance would stand for a social moment in a “moral superego” that was not 
content merely to be or become “understandable to others” (ibid., 63–64).
Finally, in his Negative Dialectic, in his discussion directed toward breaking the 
spell of false totality, Adorno wrote: “The straighter a society’s course for the 
totality that is reproduced in the spellbound subjects, the deeper its tendency 
to dissociation. This threatens the life of the species as much as it disavows 
the spell cast over the whole, the false identity of subject and object” (Adorno 
[1966] 1973, 337, as translated in Adorno [1973] 2007, 346).6
4.  Ancient and antiquated uses of the term 
“decomposition” 
To what extent, now, do we find similar threads of modernist critique sewn 
into Cavell’s essay? Before describing a world of contemporary music, Cavell 
articulated in his book of 1969 the terms of what he took to be the two domi-
nant problems in aesthetics. He treated the first in some detail and the second 
“more swiftly and crudely,” in part because the first said something also about 
the second. The first concerned the issue of paraphrase. Sentences, utterances, 
or works mean much more than what they say or display. As they engage rheto-
ric and metaphor, they become bottled up with psychic tension. And so, too, I 
believe, may we say this of his title “Music Discomposed”—so that the psychic 
tension becomes the very issue of his essay. His second problem asked how per-
sons have dealt with atonality. Have they found only a negation, dismissal, lack, 
or loss of tonality? Have they sought a tonal key to guide them through despite 
the explicit rejection of such a key in this sort of music? Have they read “atonal-
ity” as standing for an incoherence, despite coherence being its central tenet—
and this just because it sounds nothing like anything they have heard before?
Cavell articulated the questions to have an explicitly Wittgensteinian and 
Austinian tone so that he could capture the sense of persons having lost their 
way in a musical form of life, where all the utterances, though forceful, were 
experienced as though bricks were falling all round. Of course, persons would 
seek desperately familiar threads in the unfamiliar material, but at what cost 
to the unfamiliar material? Would it remain unfamiliar in any useful way? Or 
would it simply be brought into safety zones of comfortable comprehension? 
Cavell spoke with Wittgenstein of the happy person looking at the world not 
as the unhappy person looks. He could also have spoken of persons as being 
composed and discomposed in the face of the new music. Cavell ([1965] 1976, 
 6 “Je mehr die Gesellschaft der Totalität zusteuert, die im Bann der Subjekte sich reproduziert, desto 
tiefer denn auch ihre Tendenz zur Dissoziation. Diese bedroht sowohl das Leben der Gattung, wie sie 




86) wrote of needing to find the right “form of account”—a Weltanschauung or 
way of listening to atonality that competitively challenged the one that was not 
working. The new form would entail, he said, a specific sense of revolution: the 
“reconception of the subject,” according to a correction in how one asked and 
answered the philosophical question. 
But what did reconceiving or recomposing the subject mean if the philosoph-
ical subject were starting out from a seat of discomposure or of having become 
discomposed, a seat of what Cavell far more often broached as a problem of 
scepticism? To answer, it serves my purposes now to consider the ancient and 
antiquated uses of the term “decomposition” and hence a world or an atmos-
phere in which the very idea of a musical work was finding its explicit articula-
tion in Classical musical practice. If the discipline of aesthetics went back two 
hundred years, so, as I have argued elsewhere, did the disciplinary regulation of 
the musical work-concept and hence of the strongest idea that there has ever 
been of a music “composed.” In different terms, returning to the revolutionary 
moment in the dialectic of Enlightenment around 1800 clues us into the ten-
sion and anxiety of the moment that was marked as “the sixties.” 
Just after 1800, one George Crabb published a book titled Synonymes 
Explained. Many entries under the letter “D” were prefixed by “dis,” not the least 
of which was the word “discoMposE” (Crabb 1818, 370). This word was imme-
diately preceded by the term “disconcErt.” To disconcert, he wrote, signifies 
a situation in which something or someone “is put out of the concert or har-
mony,” whereas to discompose fits a situation in which something or someone 
falls out of “a state of composure.” In both cases, something or someone begins 
whole, but then the whole is broken. Although both terms “express the idea 
of putting [something or someone] out of order,” the disorder finds multiple 
expressions. Of “disorder,” Crabb noted, it has a use “in a perfectly indefinite 
form” that might “be applied to any object”—to anything. “As every thing may 
be in order, so may every thing be disordered.” Yet “disorder” is “seldom used 
except in regard to such things as have been in a natural order,” which, how-
ever, contrasts with the terms “deranged” or “disconcerted,” for they usually are 
“employed for such things as have been put into an artificial order.” Hence “to 
derange is to disorder that which has been systematically arranged, or put in a 
certain range; and to disconcert is to disorder that which has been put together 
by concert or contrivance.” So “the body may be disordered,” whereas a per-
son’s “affairs or papers” may be “deranged”—we would probably say nowadays, 
dis- or rearranged—and a scheme may be “disconcerted.” 
Seeking examples, Crabb noted that derangements could apply to most 
things as when “a tucker, a frill, or a cap” is discomposed, or when the “slight-
est change of diet” disorders persons of “tender constitutions” (Crabb 1818, 
370). Or persons may be deranged when by (tragic or comic) misfortune, their 
prosperity turns to poverty, or when domestic servants are caught out by the 
unexpected return of a master to his home. Crabb then turned to the sort of 
derangement with which we still associate the term: when the mind becomes 
temporarily or permanently deranged, such that persons neither think nor act 
with a collectedness of reason or temper. Crabb associated the state of being 
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discomposed with an incapacity, with sudden interruptions of regular patterns 
of doing and feeling, leaving persons shamed and overheated, and thus with-
out the cool or coolness—the clarity—of the regular beat. Discomposure does 
violence to the mind and brings confusion to a life of both work and leisure. 
He drew this thought from a common eighteenth-century view of the passions: 
that when passion is untethered from reason, society and culture discompose 
into confusion. And then Crabb (1818, 371) quoted even earlier lines, drawn 
from Dryden’s translation of Virgil’s Georgics. 
But with the changeful temper of the skies,  
As rains condense, and sunshine rarefies,  
So turn the species in their alter’d minds,  
Compos’d by calms, and discompos’d by winds. 
Crabb (1818, 265) earlier described three terms that he regarded as nearly syn-
onymous: consonant, accordant, and consistEnt. He began with consonant, 
noting how, from the Latin consonans, the participles of con and sono bring 
sounds together in “unison or harmony.” accordant signifies an accordance of 
meaning—hence, an agreement, whereas consistEnt, made from con and sisto 
is, as is the term itself, a placing or putting together. We speak of consonance, 
he wrote, “in matters of representation,” of accordance in “matters of opin-
ion or sentiment,” and consistence “in matters of conduct.” Drawing his exam-
ples from the Old and New Testaments, and so also his temper and tone, he 
added that the “consistency of a man’s practice with his profession is the only 
criterion of his sincerity.” Although each of the three terms has its opposite—
consonant to dissonant, accordant to discordant, and consistent to inconsist-
ent—together they are unequal in value. “Consonance is not so positive a thing 
as either accordance or consistency, which respect real events, circumstances, 
and actions.” For whereas “consonance mostly serves to prove the truth of any 
thing, . . . dissonance does not prove its falsehood until it amounts to direct dis-
cordance or inconsistency.” Thus, “there is a dissonance in the accounts given 
by the four Evangelists of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of all 
collusion and imposture, since there is neither discordance nor inconsistency 
in what they have related or omitted.” But instead of telling us to what collusion 
or imposture might lead, Crabb concluded with three quotations regarding 
the consonance, accordance, and consistency toward which we rather should 
strive. 
Crabb (1818, 265) drew the first and second quotations from British sermon-
ist and professor of rhetoric Hugh Blair. The first read: “Our faith in the discov-
eries of the Gospel will receive confirmation from discerning their consonance 
with the natural sentiments of the human heart.” This sentence appeared in 
Blair’s sermon on the Last Judgment (Blair 1802, 462). To counter the idea that 
persons prosper by injustice without conscience, Blair alerted his readers to 
the truth that never has there been a nation on earth “among whom there did 
not prevail a consciousness that, by inhumanity and fraud, they justly exposed 




secret invisible power that ruled the world” (ibid., 463). Aware of their crime, 
they seek out their punishment as a fact of human nature. “The difference of 
good and evil in actions is [therefore] not founded on arbitrary opinions or 
institutions, but in the nature of things, and the nature of man: it accords with 
the universal sense of the human kind” (ibid.). Crabb (1818, 265–66) quoted 
this sentence as exemplary for the idea of accordance. Then, for “consistency,” 
he offered this much briefer prescription drawn from Joseph Addison “Keep 
one consistent plan from end to end.” Addison’s sentence was a reduction of 
lines drawn from Horace’s De Arte Poetica (11:126–27). The matter at hand was 
how a poet or philosopher remains consistent from the beginning to the end of 
a poem, an argument, or indeed any extended expression of a thought. Horace 
had noted, however, the hermeneutic struggle where, if one does not begin in 
the proper place or on the right note, one would not reach the end in a way 
according with the beginning. To give greater consonance and consistency in 
the development of character and plot, he instructed, one sometimes must 
begin in medias res: hence, not at the beginning or at the end, but somewhere in 
the middle.
Crabb’s explanation of synonyms reflected a discourse of common terms, 
but terms that were constantly being challenged given the tendency toward 
their misuse. This, too, is something that was taken up by another writer in the 
same period: namely Ralph Waldo Emerson and particularly in his essay “Self-
Reliance” ([1841] 2015). This was an essay that would later come to influence 
Cavell when, tending toward an autobiographical pitch for his philosophical 
writing, he moved from the expressions and experiences of one’s own subject or 
self to rethink the condition of a transcendent self, a philosophical self granted 
some sort of universal insight or perspective through the foggy atmosphere.
Emerson sought a consistency in the inner sincerity with which a writer or an 
artist expresses him- or herself, for such a “latent conviction,” he wrote, shall 
be or produce a “universal sense” ([1841] 2015, 127). For always “the inmost 
becomes the outmost,—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the 
trumpets of the Last Judgment” (127). Emerson found this sincerity and con-
viction of voice in Moses, Plato, and Milton, who spoke not what others, but 
what they themselves thought. The greater the genius of a person, the more 
thoughts, both inspired and rejected, entered into the minds and works of 
artists. Immediately distinguishing the true geniuses from the cowards and 
impostors, he wrote that “it needs a divine man to exhibit anything divine. A 
man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his 
best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give him no peace. It is a 
deliverance which does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no 
muse befriends; no invention, no hope” (128).
Emerson addressed the necessary non-conformism of the true thinker, the 
necessary solitude of place and thought that someone must find in a world that 
conspires as a “joint-stock company” (Emerson [1841] 2015, 129–30) to take 
away the freedom from persons in the name of compliance. “Self-reliance” 
was the term for the aversion to a compliance or bartering that relies rather on 
stock names and customs. Self-reliance is equal to a thoughtful integrity, of an 
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inner constitution freed from a constitution artificially founded on laws. “I am 
ashamed,” he wrote, “to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to 
large societies and dead institutions. Every decent and well-spoken individual 
affects and sways me more than is right. I ought to go upright and vital, and 
speak the rude truth in all ways” (130). Following a rude description of all that 
conformity brings by way of a life of untruth, Emerson dismissed the demand 
for the sort of consistency that, upheld as a principle, prevents any contradic-
tion of thought or action. “A foolish consistency,” he wrote in what has almost 
become a proverbial saying, “is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little 
statesmen and philosophers and divines” (133) Or: 
With [a pedantic] consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well 
concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Out upon your guarded lips! Sew them 
up with packthread, do. Else if you would be a man speak what you think to-day 
in words as hard as cannon balls, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in 
hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day. Ah, then, exclaim 
the aged ladies, you shall be sure to be misunderstood. Misunderstood! It is a right 
fool’s word. Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, 
and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and 
every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood. 
(133)
5. Intentionality and purposiveness 
When Cavell wrote in his essay of “objects composed,” he introduced notions 
of experiment, risk, improvisation, and chance not so much, or solely, as tech-
niques of musical composition or works decomposed, but more as virtues in 
the ancient sense that had led persons “to act successfully” from the beginning 
to the end, “to follow the distance from an impulse and intention through to 
its realization” (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 198). He placed the virtue of this sort of 
intentionality or purposiveness on a par with the aim to be courageous and 
temperate, because only with such virtues would one overcome the many 
obstacles that aimed to trip one up. “A world,” he observed, “in which you could 
get what you want merely by wishing would not only contain no beggars, but 
no human activity” (199). This thought was a way of extending Wittgenstein’s 
own Aristotelian thought that intention is never enough—one needs also the 
preparation, foresight, or know-how that allows one to carry an action through. 
“The success of an action is threatened,” Cavell explained, “by the lack of prepa-
ration or foresight; by the failure of the most convenient resources, natural or 
social, for implementing the action (a weapon, a bridge, a shelter, an extra pair 
of hands); and by a lack of knowledge about the best course to take, or way 
to proceed. To survive the former threats will require ingenuity and resource-
fulness, the capacity for improvisation; to overcome the last will demand the 




In a world that has no space for such improvisation or chance, there is, Cavell 
observed, no dissonance or antagonism, and where there is no dissonance, 
there is no consonance worth having, because the consonance achieved is 
really no achievement at all. Likewise, and I find this argument also through-
out Adorno’s work, there is no sense of improvisation where the intention is 
missing or claimed no more to count in overly controlled procedures of mak-
ing music. The form sustained by intention and improvisation is missing. 
Cavell spelt out one must of meaning as a must of composing where, from and 
through tensions, imbalances, shocks, surprises, risks, and dangers, we are led 
to a fulfilment, a calm, or a release, a sublimity of experience, almost a divin-
ity of vision. He articulated the terms of improvisation and chance as an ethi-
cal inventiveness and resourcefulness that displayed itself as virtuous over the 
safer option, the latter being a cop-out from being human as when one merely 
imitates in academic ways. Producing what is obvious in the face of things is not 
to produce at all. It is merely or coldly to repeat what is already in evidence or 
already the case. Of such an obvious or repetitive production, he added, we do 
not use words of praise: we do not speak of the act of composing or its result 
with aesthetic predicates of achievement or virtue, as having been, say, “master-
ful, elegant, subtle, profound. . . .” (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 199).
To take a chance, to improvise, or to experiment is to issue an invitation to 
others to accompany one on one’s way. Cavell saw this invitation not as an 
authoritative command or as resting on a deontological foundation. Still, the 
invitation exacts an obligation in the only way exactitude should be. “The price 
for freedom in this choice of commitment and accountability is,” he wrote, 
“that of an exactitude in meeting those commitments and discharging those 
accounts which no mere morality can impose” (200). So when one makes a 
promise, for example, one asks for the trust of others that the risks one is pre-
pared to take are worth taking. To compose or to create is ethically to commit 
oneself as one does in any action when one puts one’s values on display, when 
one embodies or enacts one’s values. When commitments and choices work 
out from beginning to end, we have assumed responsibility for them; we speak 
of them as consistent or coherent. And when we do not, we speak of a loss of 
coherence. 
6. Ethical consequences
To flout the ethical demand was consequential. It was what led most to the 
condition of being discomposed. Cavell described how listening to a work 
one recomposes it, much as Dewey and Collingwood described listening and 
learning as a re-enactment, and much as Adorno wrote of a dialektische Bewegung 
wherein in the discomposing of the work one recomposes it in an act of lis-
tening or performing. Where and when there was a failure of re-enactment or 
recomposition, there was a failure of communication or comprehension. To 
explain the failure, Cavell described the loss of conventions or the stable back-
ground—a known background—against which we understand new moves in 
a practice. If the ground is taken from us, we do know how to go on—we lose 
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our bearings: we are groundless or discomposed. We cannot grasp the purpo-
siveness or end of the action either because there is no end or because there is 
no path—no “unfolding” in Adorno’s terms. We need to know the problem to 
know what counts as a solution—which was a thought that, having been shared 
by Schoenberg and Wittgenstein, was later shared by Adorno and Cavell. For 
both said, in the context of their times, that we need now and more than ever 
before to be able to recognise what counts as a mistake. For when “the entire 
enterprise of action and of communication has become problematic,” we no 
longer know “what you want” or “what would satisfy” us (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 
201). Convention, Cavell concluded, 
as a whole is now looked upon not as a firm inheritance from the past, but as 
a continuing improvisation in the face of problems we no longer understand. 
Nothing we now have to say, no personal utterance, has its meaning conveyed in the 
conventions and formulas we now share. In a time of slogans, sponsored messages, 
ideologies, psychological warfare, mass projects, where words have lost touch with 
their sources or objects, and in a phonographic culture where music is for dreaming, 
or for kissing, or for taking a shower, or for having your teeth drilled, our choices 
seem to be those of silence, or nihilism (the denial of the value of shared meaning 
altogether), or statements so personal as to form the possibility of communication 
without the support of convention—perhaps to become the source of new 
convention. (201–2)
As evidence for the new fashion and fetish for formulaic conventions, Cavell 
looked at an avant-garde that had retreated into academia and into producing 
journals for pre-chosen readers, where preaching for a new music in technical 
and arcane language was preaching to the already converted. Composers for 
composers; writers for writers—but all in the conspicuous absence of a public. 
What were construed as problems of our time were turned into problems only 
for those now already in the know. Only when there was an admission that com-
posers or artists had lost their way in their own procedures did Cavell sense an 
honesty in the critical discourse. He did not buy the adage that time would tell 
or that in a thousand years (and this is Schoenberg’s language) we would come 
to whistle Schoenberg in the subways. Waiting for time to tell, Cavell wrote, is 
to ignore “what the present tells” ([1967] 1976b 188).
7. A dis-discomposed music?
Cavell asked after the situation when art only seems to trigger disappointment 
and dissatisfaction. Could and should we even trust that the triggers are real? 
Could not the discomposure itself be a fake? How, he asked, with Wittgenstein, 
do we ever know that those who express pleasures and pains are not faking it? 
Do we ever know another person at all? We feel disoriented—unstringed—
when we discover something about another person in whom we have placed 
our trust. Our alienation from ourselves, triggered by our distance from others, 
allows us to experience the world—or our environment—as disharmonious. 




crisis of humanity, all feel unstrung? Cavell recalled what the composer Saint-
Saëns had said about the emperor of the avant-garde, as having no clothes, and 
of how history had stripped him naked. But if waiting for time to pass could 
not now perform the revelation or reveal the truth behind the fancy clothes of 
imposture, what, if anything, could?
One possible answer was philosophy—thinking the truth through to the end. 
Describing what the present tells, Cavell ([1967] 1976b) moved to a telling of all 
times: that, in the end, “the dangers of fraudulence, and of trust, are essential 
to the very experience of art” (188–89). “If anything . . . should count as a thesis,” 
he wrote, “that is my thesis” (189). He constantly reconfirmed this generalising 
move: “Contemporary music is only the clearest case of something common to 
modernism as a whole, and modernism only makes explicit and bare what has 
always been true of art” (189). Or “It is not merely a modern problem; it is, one 
could say, the problem of modernism, the attempt in every work to do what has 
never been done, because what is known is known to be insufficient, or worse” 
(195–96). 
But still, though he had his philosophical thesis in hand, he did not count it 
as the cure. For the last time, the title offered the clue that had become now 
also the cure. One way out at least for music seemed to be to detach itself from 
the state of having become discomposed. Cavell wrote of modern taste being 
defeated not by new commandments of taste or by re-disciplining taste, but by 
allowing music or art to de-discipline taste—and hence our entire response 
structure. We were reading the entire situation in the wrong way. Turning to 
music and art, he seemed to fall back on what in music and art could not be 
defeated: namely, its power to resist its social discipline. Hence, if a music dis-
composed was the problem for the modern subject and the modern world, 
then perhaps a music that was dis-discomposed would be the cure. The cure 
was presented as revolutionary and radical. It had to be so presented in the 
extreme condition of the sixties against those who held on to so anxious a com-
portment in the world.
But from another perspective, the utopian cure was as old as the hills, and 
walking in those hills, the decomposed philosophical subject of modernism 
suddenly felt very safe: as calmed as the winds. Sitting in the world, the phil-
osophical subject could now listen to tonal and atonal music anew, as an art 
expressive of a condition of scepticism overriding the dominant impression 
that the world now was lost as once it had not been. A music composed had 
always been also a music threatened by discomposure. [Or as my critics showed 
me, I was mistaken to write of a music dis-discomposed, for, all the time, I had 
really meant to refocus the target onto the philosophical self as the discom-
posed subject who looks toward the very idea of composition as a riddle or 
enigma of modernism, the enigmatic relation of subject to object where the 
dark glasses do not throw forth a clean and clear light.]
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Three Responses to  
Lydia Goehr’s Essay 
“What Anyway Is a  
‘Music Discomposed’?”
In what follows, three responses to Lydia Goehr’s essay are presented to the 
reader. The first two—by Kathy Kiloh and Jake McNulty—were delivered at the 
fourth annual meeting of the Association for Adorno Studies, which was hosted 
by the Philosophy Department of the New School for Social Research in New 
York on 9 and 10 October 2015. Both comments are to be seen as an impor-
tant complement to Goehr’s text. The third response—actually an extended 
comment—written by myself is a direct result of the editing process of Goehr’s 
essay. Fascinated by the topic, I read Cavell’s original essay and all subsequent 
discussions at the very beginning of 2017, coming to a rather critical view on 
Cavell’s original essay from 1965. It was sent to Lydia Goehr, Katy Kiloh, and 
Jake McNulty, who read it carefully. On the one hand, this extended comment 
slightly departs from the main topic of this volume; on the other hand, it argues 
for the making of music as the most compelling way to reply to Cavell, thus 
establishing a bridge to the performances and installations presented during 
the Orpheus Academy 2016, which are described in the appendix with hyper-













Lydia Goehr’s paper ends by characterising Cavell’s “cure” for a music discom-
posed as a strategic move that would be particularly at home in eighteenth- 
century aesthetic philosophy. She suggests that Cavell’s solution to the problem 
of a music discomposed (and by extension a subject discomposed) would be a 
music dis-discomposed. Although I feel fairly confident in my understanding 
of what it might mean to be discomposed (both music and subject), I remain 
unsure about what a music dis-discomposed would possibly be. I’m going to 
attempt to explain what I think that phrase might mean, with the assumption 
that my inability to hear what Goehr means, and the misconceptions that 
might result from this partial deafness, will be corrected or mitigated in the 
conversation that this paper and my response to it will open. 
So there are three concerns that I want to clarify: (1) what would it mean for 
(music, the subject) to be dis-discomposed, (2) what is it about Cavell’s “cure” 
that reeks so openly of a conservative philosophical modernism, and (3) what 
happens when we bring all this back into conversation with Adorno? I will have 
to bring several key words into this conversation in order for me to try to hear 
what Goehr means, although I know that by applying these terms to what she 
has already said, I may misrepresent her meaning. Nonetheless, by deploying 
the terms autonomy and heteronomy and, alongside these terms, narcissism 
and love, transcendence and universality, I hope to make explicit the links and 
distinctions, connections and disconnections between Cavell and Adorno that 
Goehr has so eloquently indicated in her paper. 
The atmosphere of fraudulence that Cavell attributes to the aesthetic pro-
duction contemporary to the time of the composition of this essay (and, as 
Goehr suggests this atmosphere extends beyond the realm of aesthetic pro-
duction to shape the human condition itself ), is nicely articulated by her turn 
to the eighteenth-century writings of George Crabb. Crabb suggests that the 
meaning of the word consonance implies a proof of truth, whereas this is not 
true of its opposite: dissonance. Dissonance cannot act as a proof of falsehood 
unless it leads to complete inconsistency. The dissonance of atonal music 
therefore, because it remains an effect of a consistent aesthetic programme, 






proven to be “true” in any sense. We the public, and the artists as well, are left 
then with the feeling that all might not be right with the new music, and yet, we 
can’t prove it to be wrong. There is no real way to judge this work. And because 
of the dissonance that exists between the subject of modern philosophy and 
the subject experienced through modern literature and modern life, there is 
no way to produce and communicate meaning within this situation; we wade 
in a sea of fraudulence. In turning to Crabb’s dictionary of synonyms, Goehr 
also highlights the anxiety that emerges alongside the eighteenth-century dis-
course of aesthetics—this anxiety is the need for clarity in language—it is the 
desire to ensure that the speaking (or writing) subject can mean what he or 
she says, and that, in doing so, will be able to make him- or herself understood 
to the public at large. This anxiety should be understood as a reaction to the 
growing subjectivisation of the world that Luc Ferry (1993, 7) has identified 
as the hallmark of modernity. Communication of universal values and feeling 
becomes increasingly problematic in a world that rejects tradition as the enemy 
of individual freedom.
According to Crabb’s definition, to compose—that is, to impose an order 
upon that which has no “natural” order of its own—requires a subject endowed 
with the capacity to commit itself to seeing a piece through from the beginning 
to its end, and to thereby create and attempt to communicate meaning. As an 
antidote to the atmosphere of fraudulence, Cavell seems to argue for a heroic 
subject capable of taming chance and cultivating it into experimentation and 
improvisation. As Goehr points out, this is an ethical commitment, in that it 
requires the composer to expose his or her values for all to see, and potentially, 
for those values to be misinterpreted by others. When this meaning is created, 
and achieves the desired effect, then, Cavell argues, what results for the art-
ist and the viewer/listener/reader is a sublime, divinely transcendent point of 
view. But for Adorno, the transcendence of the work of art can’t provide us with 
this sweeping view of history and the present as a totality: “Artworks . . . pro-
duce their own transcendence, rather than being its arena, and thereby they 
once again become separated from transcendence” (1997, 111). The transcend-
ence produced by art is what provokes the shudder (ibid.): that which shakes 
us out of our identification with this subject conceived of as autonomous and 
masterful by reminding us of our very constitution as subjects, and of the suf-
fering of the nonidentical left behind in this identification.
In Cavell’s essay, much is made of the new music’s conformity to technical 
prescription—in fact, Cavell also refers to the way this prescription has come 
to dominate literary production, specifically in the case of the nouveau roman. 
The author of the work no longer “composes” work—he or she merely follows 
a philosophically pre-determined programme. The work becomes a mere illus-
tration of the overly technical directive published in academic periodicals—it 
is secondary, an afterthought that has no real bearing on the aesthetic theory 
itself. This perspective certainly shares something in common with Adorno, 
who writes in Aesthetic Theory: “the fatal aging of the modern: a result of the 
tensionlessness of the totally technical artwork” (1997, 452).
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What Cavell describes is, in fact, a situation in which subjective autonomy has 
capitulated to the heteronomous constitution of the work of art in an attempt 
to guarantee universal aesthetic agreement, but in guaranteeing this agree-
ment, the work communicates no subjective content. In response to this situ-
ation, Cavell proposes that what is needed are strong individuals (Goehr uses 
Emerson’s term, “self-reliant,” but we could also throw in Kant’s term “mature” 
here)—in any case—strong individuals who are capable of saying what they 
mean, even if this means that they may not be understood. This requires sub-
jects who are capable of turning away from the adoration and respect of others 
in order to isolate themselves with their own genius. But, as Adorno points out 
in “Opinion, Delusion, Society,” in an atmosphere of fraudulence, when there 
are no clear truths to cling to, individuals cling all the more tightly to what they 
perceive to be their personal opinions, justified by “experience” (Adorno 1998). 
This is because in a world in which (quoting from Negative Dialectics) “none . . . 
are capable of love” (Adorno [1973] 1997, 363), opinion is always (here from 
Opinion Delusion Society) “invested with affect” (Adorno 1998, 107)—a tendency 
that Adorno believes to be based on a collective narcissism, defined as “the fact 
that human beings to this day are obliged to withhold a measure of their ability 
to love from, for instance, other loved ones, and instead to love themselves in a 
repressed, unacknowledged, and therefore, insidious manner” (ibid.). It is dif-
ficult, then, to determine whether what we experience as genius is, in fact, an 
original act of creative autonomy in which meaning is produced, or a delusion 
that arises from and returns us to the “collective narcissism” that “compen-
sates” (ibid., 118) us for our lack of individuality.
I think it is precisely Cavell’s reliance upon this heroic subject and his invest-
ment in the sublimely transcendent—even omnipotent—perspective afforded 
by the work of art that makes his cure for a music discomposed “as old as the 
hills” (see, Goehr above, p. 146 ) and so (falsely) comforting to the modernist 
philosophical subject, made anxious by its own discomposition. And I think 
also that there would be no need to paint Adorno as a postmodern thinker in 
order for us to recognise that the modernist philosophical subject should feel 
anything but safe within the pages of his books and essays. As Goehr points 
out, Adorno, somewhat like Cavell, appeals to the few individuals still capable 
of performing the role of “moral superego”: whose aim is decidedly not to be 
understood by others at the expense of his own attempt to produce and express 
meaning. But from my perspective, the composing (or dis-discomposing) sub-
ject that Cavell calls for and the exemplary subject that Adorno appeals to look 
quite different. Adorno understood that when a work of art or a subject makes 
a claim to autonomy, we need look upon this claim with suspicion, with “dark 
glasses” perhaps. To assert one’s autonomy is useless if this exercise of so-called 
autonomy leaves the system it rails against intact. And while this most certainly 
does not appear to be Cavell’s intention, his reliance upon antiquated aesthetic 
forms and concepts ultimately reinforces the system as a whole.
On Cavell’s account, the atmosphere of fraudulence can’t be blamed on a 
lack of philosophical aesthetics; rather, philosophy dominates aesthetic pro-




to suggest that we need to develop a new Wittgensteinian “language game” in 
order to make sense of music discomposed, and this new discourse can only be 
composed from the transcendent perspective that can view the present situa-
tion in its relation to the two-hundred-year-long history of aesthetics. But with-
out the aesthetic release provided by the composed work, we cannot achieve 
the transcendence craved by the modern philosophical subject. Therefore, we 
need not only a heroic subject, but also to harness the rebellious powers of art 
to kick away at the disciplining strictures of society; to quote Cavell’s “Music 
Discomposed” here, “What modern artists realize, rather, is that taste must be 
defeated, and indeed that this can be accomplished by nothing less powerful 
than art itself ” ([1967] 1976b, 206). By my reading, what Cavell is referring to 
here as “taste” is both the traditionalist views that cannot hear anything but the 
absence of what they expect from music in the atonal, and the academic dis-
course that attempts to legitimate, and ends up dictating the terms of the new 
music. For Cavell, a music dis-discomposed would then be a music that uses 
its inherent power to resist the disciplining discourse of that “taste” (thereby 
destroying it) so that it might be replaced by a more adequate aesthetic the-
ory, developed from the sublime and transcendent perspective he attributes to 
composed music.
But for the Adorno of Aesthetic Theory (roughly contemporary, as Goehr 
points out with the Cavell of “Music Discomposed”) taste is already an obsolete 
aesthetic category (Adorno 1997, 452). In this light, the rebelliousness of art 
and the heroism of the autonomous subject appear like so many Don Quixotes 
battling windmills. Is it too much to assert that this championing of autonomy 
over heteronomy in the composition of modern art, much like what would 
appear to be its opposite—the aesthetic theory Adorno accuses of becoming 
“art’s necrology”—is itself an abdication in favour of “one sort of barbarism 
that is no better than the culture that has earned barbarism as recompense for 
its own monstrosity” (ibid., 4)?
Back to Adorno’s exemplary individual: we can, I think, oppose the heroic 
autonomous subject that Cavell calls for to Adorno’s invocation, in his essay 
on Eichendorff in Notes to Literature, of the poet’s “power to be weak” (Adorno 
1991–92, 70)—the poet’s ability to relinquish the self to language, and, as well, 
philosophy’s ability to relinquish itself to the object. Here we have an individ-
ual who is strong enough to resist the pull of narcissism that potentially makes 
“kitchen staff ” of us all, and strong enough to be able to relinquish his or her 
right to impose order upon matter, a right bestowed on the philosophical 
subject of modernity by the (particularly Kantian and Hegelian) discourse of 
aesthetics. In the modern lyric poetry of Baudelaire, Adorno sees in the turn 
away from others and inward the emergence of a universality that is not ideal or 
abstract, or frankly, easily understood, but rather the recognition and expres-
sion of the universal conditions of alienation of the subject under late capital-
ism. In this sense, the song of Baudelaire seems to me to be the best example of 




Krenek, Cage, and  




Lydia Goehr’s piece offers a strikingly original explanation of the significance 
of Cavell’s title, “Music Discomposed,” to the theme of his essay. Goehr’s piece 
does so mainly, though not exclusively, by viewing Cavell’s essay through an 
Adornian lens, situating it in a post-war cultural context and reconstructing 
the etymological history of the term “discomposed.” In revisiting Cavell’s essay, 
however, I found myself drawn to a different explanation of the titular phrase: 
I think “music discomposed” is Cavell’s pejorative label for a certain misun-
derstanding of the significance of modern music—a misunderstanding mainly 
found in Cage’s interpreter Krenek. I will summarise that alternative explana-
tion here. Then, I’ll briefly note what I think are some suggestive discrepancies 
between it and Goehr’s own.
1. What is music “discomposed”?
Understanding the meaning of Cavell’s title (“Music Discomposed”) requires 
taking account of his discussion from Section VI of what it means for music 
to be “composed” in the first place ([1967] 1976b, 189–93). For Cavell, musical 
works are “composed” in the specific sense that they are (and are encountered 
by the listener as) products of human intention (“they are, in a word, not works 
of nature but of art,” as he says [ibid., 198]). Moreover, Cavell argues, the great 
achievement of many modern musical works is to vividly encapsulate phenom-
ena connected with human agency. In particular, Cavell stresses the way they 
alert us to certain disconcerting facets of our encounters with the deeds of oth-
ers. As Cavell explains, modern musical works confront us with the ever-present 
possibility of a certain kind of fraudulence in such encounters. Moreover, these 
works suggest we can never fully eliminate the suspicion that the trust we nec-
essarily place in others may have been betrayed in a given instance. Ultimately, 
then, Cavell maintains that our encounters with modern musical works model 
almost perfectly our encounters with other people. They are no less fraught 
with opportunities for misunderstanding, alienation, and miscommunication, 




As Cavell stresses, this account implies a novel view of the relation of these 
modern works to past ones. In particular, it implies that the possibility of fraud-
ulence has always been present. If that possibility is inherent to human action, 
artistic or not, then it follows that it will have been present in all past musical 
works, since all were products of agency. At least in this one respect, modern-
ism’s break with the past is less radical than either its detractors or its defend-
ers might have us believe.
The truths about our condition encapsulated in modern musical works are 
disconcerting; we therefore have a tendency to repress their true significance, 
a tendency Cavell finds in certain (then) contemporary critics and compos-
ers. One of the great themes of Cavell’s work of this period is that many of the 
more extreme ideas in both traditional philosophy and contemporary criticism 
(those in the periodical Die Reihe, for instance) represent misbegotten attempts 
to evade these truths about our condition. This is a facet of one of Cavell’s cen-
tral preoccupations in Must We Mean What We Say?: philosophy’s flight from the 
human. 
It is against this backdrop, I suggest, that we should understand the mean-
ing of the phrase “music discomposed.” If music “composed” is music that is 
a product of intention, then music “discomposed” is modern music and crit-
icism that mistakenly strives to eliminate intention from theory and practice. 
Although Cage is clearly implicated in attempts to create music of this kind, 
his interpreter Krenek is the main culprit here. For Krenek, “chance” displaces 
human responsibility completely and therefore divests music of its status as 
a product of the human will (Cavell explicitly labels Krenek a “nihilist” and 
includes Stockhausen in this camp, too). Put crudely, Krenek, Stockhausen, 
and, to a lesser extent Cage, are fleeing the human. 
If this answer to Goehr’s question (“What anyway is a music discomposed?”) 
seems plausible, then I think that Goehr’s argument should be qualified in a 
certain respect. Goehr’s essay often equates “music discomposed” with mod-
ern music and, more specifically, its radical break with convention; moreover, 
the essay seems to include Cavell in the chorus of authors who lament the 
breakdown of convention, bemoan the disorientation modernism creates, and 
so on. In my view, however, Cavell’s reaction to modern music is not conven-
tionally conservative but more nuanced and complex. What Cavell bemoans is 
not the break with convention itself but rather the wrongheaded attempts of 
certain critics, composers and philosophers (e.g., Krenek and Cage) to under-
stand this break as having rendered human intention obsolete. 
There is textual evidence that this is what Cavell meant by his title. Admittedly, 
he does not explicitly say so, but he comes very close. For Cavell, critics and 
composers like Cage and Krenek, with their appeals to “chance,” threaten 
music with “discomposition” in the following way: “When a contemporary the-
orist [Stockhausen, Cage, Krenek, et al.] appeals to chance, he obviously is not 
appealing to its associations with taking and seizing chances, with risks and 
opportunities. The point of the appeal is not to call attention to the act of com-








2.  Atonal music: disorienting modern subjects? Or 
reorienting them? 
Goehr’s piece emphasises Cavell’s preoccupation with the challenge “atonal-
ity” poses to modern listeners who may find it inaccessible. In my view, how-
ever, it is just as important to emphasise a countervailing theme in Cavell’s 
treatment of atonal music. For Cavell, atonal music represents one of two paths 
that can be taken by modern composers. The atonal music of composers like 
Schoenberg, inaccessible as it may be, actually represents the last hope for a 
certain kind of accessibility. Such accessibility, says Cavell, is unachievable in 
the other main form of modern music—the “total organisation” of composers 
like Stockhausen. Atonal music represents a heroic attempt to re-establish con-
vention in an era of “mass-deception” in which tradition has become an object 
of profound (perhaps justified) mistrust. Responding to the challenge posed 
by late Romantic extensions of chromaticism that eventually overwhelmed 
tonality entirely, atonal music finds a new, non-tonal basis and substitute for 
the structure and organisation that characterised traditional musical works. In 
this respect it both breaks with and preserves tradition, and indeed does so 
in the interest of preserving the possibility of communication between artist 
and audience. By contrast, the “total organisation” of Krenek and Stockhausen 
renounces convention of even the most minimal kind. It therefore completely 
forecloses the possibility of shared understanding between artists and their 
audience—it rules out the possibility of saying (or better, playing) something 
that means anything at all to another person (it is, as Cavell says, “nihilism”). 
3.  Cavell’s “historicisation” of the category of 
improvisation 
In the closing section, Goehr discusses Cavell’s elevation of the musical phe-
nomenon of improvisation to the status of an ethical ideal (a virtue reflecting 
resourcefulness, courage, and other praiseworthy human qualities). I wonder, 
however, if this section should have included an engagement with Cavell’s “his-
toricisation” of improvisation. I ask because it seemed, at points, as if the essay 
implied that Cavell celebrates improvisation and even looks to it as a “saving 
power” to redeem us from the disorientations of modernism; although that’s 
partly right, Cavell also appears to maintain that improvisation is no longer a 
possibility in modern music and may never be again. 
Among Cavell’s most provocative claims in the essay is the seemingly para-
doxical one that improvisation, which seems spontaneous, unstructured, and 
free from various strictures, can actually only take place where an agreed upon 
and stable set of shared conventions exists. As I understood it, the rationale for 
this claim is that the novel gestures of the improviser achieve their aesthetic 
effect only by virtue of tacit reliance on such conventions—even if, or maybe 
especially if, they are relied upon only in order to be subverted. Accordingly, 
improvisation, which we often associate with certain trends in modern music 
(jazz, for instance), actually has its home in a much earlier “convention-bound” 




where convention has (more or less) completely broken down. With Bach, 
Cavell says, improvisation is still possible: his music, although not ordinar-
ily improvised, can at least be imagined to have been improvised or to be the 
product of the composer’s improvisational experimentation. With Beethoven, 
however, improvisation is no longer possible: not because there is, in fact, less 
improvisation in his works but because we can no longer hear his pieces as if 
they were improvised. Here, Cavell draws a distinction between what is a prod-
uct of “improvisation” (for him, an honorific) and what is merely a product of 
“chance” in Cage and Krenek’s sense (for him, a symptom of decline, as we saw 
earlier). Cavell does so in an effort to express his conviction that what appears 
improvised in modern music—Stockhausen’s Klavierstück XI, for instance—is, 
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When I received Lydia Goehr’s note of acceptance to my invitation for the 
Orpheus Academy 2016—on musical ontology—I was surprised by her choice 
of topic: a paper providing a new interpretation of Stanley Cavell’s 1965 essay 
“Music Discomposed.” The reference to Adorno in the subtitle, and my know-
ledge of Lydia Goehr’s erudition and sophisticated argumentation, made me 
believe that there would be a “secret path” from Cavell’s apparent discussion 
of the state of musical composition in the 1960s to the subject matter I had 
imagined she would broach, namely a revisitation of musical ontological ques-
tions twenty-five years after the publication of her book The Imaginary Museum 
of Musical Works (1992). If Cavell, according to Goehr, operated a “strategic dis-
placement of the subject matter” in his essay, so she would do the same with 
the topic of the Orpheus Academy 2016. And indeed, after hearing her pres-
entation, and after reading her essay, I was able to discern that secret link, one 
that is not obvious but crucial. Goehr introduces it at the end of her second 
paragraph: the origin of Cavell’s “strategic displacement of the subject mat-
ter” (the real matter being the “repressed . . .  modernist philosophical sub-
ject” and not really the “state of contemporary musical composition”; see, 
Goehr above, p. 132) is Cavell’s uneasy relationship to, or “disconcert” with, 
“the over- and under-composed offerings of his day.” Music that according to 
Cavell is “over-composed” (Krenek and Stockhausen with their “total organi-
sation” being his examples) or “under-composed” (Cage and the Stockhausen 
of Klavierstück XI) obviously challenges the dominant notion of the regulative 
work-concept, raising questions of what a musical work is and what it is not. If 
under-composed, a piece cannot claim to have a fully prescriptive, normative 
instance of reference, therefore having literally as many different renderings as 
performances. If over-composed (be it by extreme rationalised compositional 
algorithms and/or by electroacoustic, mechanical renderings), it loses any pos-
sible variability from performance to performance, becoming something fixed, 
frozen, dead. Thus, under- and over-composed music seems to exist outside 
the classical paradigm of the work-concept, which among other qualifiers 




ings (“interpretations”). Cavell’s essay critically (and openly in a negative man-
ner) addresses, therefore, a kind of music that undermines the work-concept 
as it would be defined by Lydia Goehr twenty-seven years later, in 1992. Cavell’s 
quick solution was to dismiss such works altogether as not being music, as 
being the result of the fraudulent and nihilistic tendencies of his day—nihilism 
being defined as “the denial of the value of shared meaning altogether” (Cavell 
[1967] 1969b, 202). Cavell’s problem (at least as Cavell put it) was that musical 
works that operated outside the classical paradigm of the work-concept did not 
seem able to partake in structures of “shared meaning.”
Goehr’s reinterpretation of Cavell’s essay, through the lens of Adorno, but 
crucially through her own theoretical apparatus, offers a more elaborated, 
nuanced, and intelligent outcome, suggesting that out of an apparent “discom-
posure” a “radical new form of composure” can emerge. Her line of thought—
more or less as she explained it in the discussion following her presentation in 
Ghent—is that Cavell worked his way from a state of discomposed music/sub-
ject to producing an “ethics of decomposition” such that one would end up feel-
ing “safe.” “Music Discomposed” would thus be an attempt to restore Cavell’s 
ethical conviction—the certainty that he had the capacity to make music still 
have meaning. This is, in my opinion, Goehr’s very interesting but highly com-
plex interpretation of Cavell’s essay, making a point that is difficult to argue in 
the face of the original text. It seems far more straightforward to see Cavell sim-
ply aiming at discrediting certain modes of doing art (and music) as not being 
art at all, as producing fraudulent objects, characterised by “the denial of the 
value of shared meaning altogether” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 202). If there is any 
doubt about Cavell’s negative (and even personal) intentions, it suffices to read 
the very last sentence of Section VI (the core section of the essay), which reads 
like a passionate, anti-analytic, almost melodramatic assault on both Krenek 
and Stockhausen. Coming to a “new form of composure” from that extremely 
negative position seems to require a very arduous line of reasoning, which 
might generate a new and rich thesis, but loses reference to Cavell’s hope-
less condemnation of the avant-garde. In this sense, Goehr’s essay on Cavell’s 
“Music Discomposed” suggests to me the Borgesian idea that Cavell (in 1965) 
would have benefited from having read Goehr’s Imaginary Museum of Musical 
Works and Jacques Rancière’s definitions of the “aesthetic regime of the arts.” 
Both situate an epistemic rupture in the late eighteenth century, somewhere 
between 1750 and 1800: Goehr points to the emergence of the work-concept as 
a regulative force in music composition, performance, and reception; Rancière 
describes a post-Kantian (and very Schillerian) mode of producing and relating 
to the arts in general. Interestingly, and in total agreement with this view avant 
la lettre, Cavell starts his essay with a reminder of the birth of aesthetics: “It is 
a widespread opinion that aesthetics, as we think of it, became a subject, and 
acquired its name, just over two hundred years ago” ([1967] 1969b, 180). Cavell 
was thus very close to what Goehr and Rancière would theorise thirty years 
later. Both would have given him a horizon of thought that was obliterated by 
his obvious ressentiment against the avant-garde and by a human, all too human 
belief in a shared language, in “the familiar,” in authenticity, intention, serious-
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ness, sincerity, honesty, profundity, and other “virtues” that are explicitly pre-
sented by him as “necessary to act coherently and successfully at all” (ibid., 198).
2
The gregarious, conservative, and reactionary perspective of Cavell’s text can-
not be overlooked, and I am not totally convinced that “Music Discomposed” 
deserves the respectful attention we are giving to it. The essay was written in 
1965 for the Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, and published in 1967 in the 
proceedings of that conference (Capitan and Merrill 1967). Already in that vol-
ume, two comments by no less than Joseph Margolis and Monroe C. Beardsley 
pointed out some significant problems in Cavell’s argumentation. Margolis 
(1967) focuses on Cavell’s central notion of fraudulence and his hyper-judge-
mental considerations of what is art and what is non-art, while Beardsley (1967) 
struggles with Cavell’s peregrine idea that one should treat works of art like 
people, and disagrees with his stated thesis that “the dangers of fraudulence, 
and of trust, are essential to the experience of art” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 188–
89). Cavell’s response to Margolis and Beardsley appeared in that same volume, 
just after their comments under the title “Rejoinders” (Cavell 1967), and was 
later reprinted as “A Matter of Meaning it” (Cavell [1967] 1969a, 213–37) in Must 
We Mean What We Say? More recently, in 2010, Brian Kane and Stephen Decatur 
Smith edited a special issue of the Journal of Music Theory under the suggestive 
title “Cavell’s ‘Music Discomposed’ at 40” (which was in fact at 45), with con-
tributions by Amy Bauer, Brian Kane, Dmitri Tymoczko, Eric Drott, Franklin 
Cox, Lawrence Kramer, Michael Gallope, Richard Beaudoin, and Stephen 
Decatur Smith. I will not enter into the details of that excellent volume, nor 
of any of those brilliant contributions, as they are easily available to the reader 
and do not deserve to be summarised out of their respective contexts of argu-
mentation. In terms of a precise critique of Cavell’s essay, I find particularly 
relevant the contributions by Franklin Cox, Amy Bauer, and Michael Gallope, 
which sharply articulate some significant shortcomings and factual mistakes 
in Cavell’s argumentation. Thus, in what follows, I shall simply present three 
further critical points that were not mentioned in the debate (or at least not 
sharply enough): (a) Cavell’s reliance on a quotation by a secondary figure, (b) 
the now visible historical defeat of his position, and (c) the underlying (uncon-
scious?) presence of Schopenhauer in Cavell’s notion of improvisation and 
musical “discovery.” 
3
In “Music Discomposed” Cavell alludes to Kant’s aesthetics, Nietzsche’s The 
Birth of Tragedy, and Tolstoy’s What Is Art? and makes references en passant to 
Thomas Kuhn, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and René Wellek; however, the only 
extended quotation (211 words long!), the one that constitutes the core “proof ” 
of his anti-modernist argument, is by Ernst Krenek (see Cavell [1967] 1969b, 




tive of “modern” or “contemporary” music, and a paragraph extracted from his 
“Extents and Limits of Serial Techniques” (Krenek 1960) is treated as a para-
digmatic statement on the “impersonal mechanicity” of contemporary compo-
sition. Two remarks must be made: first, Krenek’s quotation is presented here 
without any contextualisation, ignoring Krenek’s own remarks on the “limits of 
serialism,” and his personal artistic trajectory from a late Romantic composer 
(in the first two decades of the twentieth century) to a neoclassical one (in the 
early 1920s), to an eclectic one (in the late 1920s, integrating elements from jazz 
and Renaissance modal counterpoint), to an adherent of the twelve-tone tech-
nique (1930s), and finally to a composer of electronic music in the 1950s. To 
condense Krenek to that particular quotation is incomprehensibly reduction-
ist. Second, and more importantly, Krenek cannot be seen as a porte parole of 
modernity (nor of contemporaneity). To say that Krenek “was for years a faith-
ful disciple of Schoenberg” (Cavell [1967] 1976b, 195) is not sufficient argument 
to give him any special authority, and to proclaim that he “has emerged as an 
important spokesman for total organization” (ibid., my emphasis) is very doubt-
ful—at least, and for sure, not in continental Europe, where his theoretical and 
artistic output played and still play a very minor role. Other pieces of writing, 
and crucially other authors, would have been more relevant to Cavell’s argu-
ment. In view of Cavell’s focus on under- and over-composed music, the crucial 
text that exactly addressed that question was Luigi Nono’s 1959 Darmstadt lec-
ture, “The Presence of History in Music Today” (Nono [1959] 1975). Nono’s plea 
for engagement with and responsibility toward the historical moment was an 
explicit attack on John Cage’s aleatoric procedures, but also on Stockhausen, 
who was advocating graphic scores and propagating the idea of artistic pro-
cesses totally independent of historicity. In fact, that lecture marked the violent 
and ferocious rupture between Nono and Stockhausen, who is said to have left 
the room in the middle of Nono’s talk. Had Cavell known Nono’s essay, many 
of his critiques toward Cage and Stockhausen would have found more solid 
arguments and a couple of clarifications, which, significantly, would have come 
from a composer who can be seen as a porte parole and as one of the major fig-
ures of integral serialism of the 1950s, a composer who knew how to perfectly 
integrate the most rigorous organisation of musical structures with the utmost 
expressive materials (for details about this intrinsic relationship, see Wolfgang 
Motz’s [1998] book on Nono’s 1956 work Il Canto Sospeso).
4
Nevertheless, the crucial point is not so much that Cavell’s essay was already 
outdated when he wrote it but that his thesis and his perspective were defeated 
by history. As Franklin Cox (2010, 38) put it: “History appears to have proven 
Cavell wrong.” Today, fifty-two years after the composition of Cavell’s essay, 
Cage’s and Stockhausen’s works have already become classics of the twenti-
eth century, their musics being played somewhere almost everyday, and with 
great success. It seems as if the “nihilists” managed to “act coherently and 
successfully.” This story also applies to other artists Cavell explicitly referred 
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to as not producing art, or as making fraudulent art: Raymond Roussel, Alain 
Robbe-Grillet, Pop Art, Jackson Pollock, Frank Stella, Kenneth Noland, and 
Jules Olitski. But this historical confirmation of the intrinsic quality and futu-
rity of Cage’s and Stockhausen’s approaches to music (and art) was obtained 
not through theoretical comments or critiques, not through musicological or 
music-philosophical exercises of interpretation and reinterpretation of argu-
ments, but blandly and more strongly through musical composition itself, by 
the innumerable pieces of music composed in the last fifty-two years. By the 
time of Cavell’s writing, Stockhausen was working on Momente (1962–69), a 
piece that addressed many of Cavell’s doubts about contemporary art, achiev-
ing a refreshing fusion between freedom and constraints, between the ritual of 
the concert and the abstraction of autonomous musical forces. György Ligeti 
and Helmut Lachenmann (as Amy Bauer so eloquently describes in her essay 
[Bauer 2010]) were about to shake some foundational aspects of music-making 
and listening. Brian Ferneyhough, Wolfgang Rihm, Gérard Grisey, and Morton 
Feldman’s late works, among many, many others, were going to continue the 
adventure of Western music in unprecedented ways, condemning any form of 
post-Hegelian “end of history,” or “end of art,” to the role of the academic fan-
tasies of art critics. Music was never so florescent as in the second half of the 
twentieth century. And that is an achievement of the diverse, pluralistic, and 
highly creative forms of the avant-garde. Had music remained within Cavell’s 
categories of the “familiar” and the “common language,” looking to identify 
(and condemn) “mistakes” (see Cavell [1967] 1976b, 201), looking for “inspi-
ration,” had composers improvised hoping to “discover” some metaphysically 
hidden sound structure, had composers gone that way, there would have been 
no new music at all—just repetition of the already known, sterile epigones of a 
lost age, impotency masked as criticality, true nihilism.
5
Cavell never provides a definition of “music discomposed,” but he offers a 
romantic view of “composed music” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 198, 200). This is 
music that results from inspired improvisations: “One can hear, in the music 
in question [“composed music”], how the composition is related to, or could 
grow in familiar ways, from a process of improvisation; as though the parts 
meted out by the composer were re-enactments, or dramatizations of successes 
his improvisations had discovered . . . containing essentially only such discov-
eries” (Cavell [1967] 1969b, 200–201, my emphasis). Cavell thus places himself 
on the side of those who pretend that sound structures are “discovered” and 
not “invented.” “Composed music” would be, paradoxically, one that sounds 
as if it were improvised (200), a music where improvisation and chance play 
a crucial role (198). In a certain sense “composed music” would be music that 
sounds as if not composed, as if coming from unknown areas of creativity, from 
some sort of secret origin of art. Inventiveness, the “artificial” generation and 
manipulation (by humans or by an algorithm) of sounds and structures, would 






music,” because it supposedly operates beyond the “shared codes” of a com-
mon language. 
I do not want to invert Cavell’s terms “composed” and “discomposed,” 
though his argumentation would allow us to do it. What I wish to point out 
is that there are vague (and problematic) echoes of Schopenhauer in Cavell’s 
ideas. His “discoveries” would come out of intuitive improvisations, which 
would act as a connector to some sort of oceanic pre- or unconscious. An oce-
anic dimension that would escape articulated knowledge, making of music that 
“special” form of art that also for Adorno occupies a particular sphere of intan-
gibility. Here Cavell and Adorno are indeed problematically close to each other 
(as Goehr said in the discussion following her presentation), suggesting an 
obscure zone of creativity where artists are delivered to mysterious, enigmatic, 
and uncontrollable forces. 
It is true that Foucault once said (in an interview) that he could have saved 
himself a lot of work had he read the Frankfurt School. Conversely, I think that 
Foucault has a lot to say to post-Adornian philosophies of art. In the five lec-
tures he gave in Rio de Janeiro in 1973, published under the title “Truth and 
Juridical Forms” (Foucault 2002), Foucault stressed the fundamental differ-
ence between the “invention” and “origin” of both knowledge and religion, 
showing how “invention” is the term used by Nietzsche and “origin” the one 
employed by Schopenhauer. We know how Schopenhauer elevated music to 
a quasi-religious human activity, and it is in relation to religion that Foucault 
notes, “Nietzsche says that Schopenhauer made the mistake of looking for the 
origin—Ursprung—of religion in a metaphysical sentiment present in all men 
and containing the latent core, the true and essential model of all religion. . . . 
[But] things didn’t happen like that. Religion has no origin, it has no Ursprung, 
it was invented, there was an Erfindung of religion. . . . Between the great conti-
nuity of the Ursprung described by Schopenhauer and the great break that char-
acterizes Nietzsche’s Erfindung, there is a fundamental opposition” (Foucault 
2002, 7). It seems to me that Cavell’s insistence on the “discovery” of sound 
structures and on commonly shared and shareable musical codes are indebted 
to Schopenhauer’s idea of “origin” and of music as a proto-religious human 
activity. Cavell’s reiteration of the importance of conventions, rules, and famil-
iarity with a common language disclose his profound, existential need for gre-
gariousness, precisely in Nietzsche’s meaning of the term, as dependence, as 
being servile to others for the sake of being servile, to become part of a herd. 
In this sense any form of modernity, not even necessarily contemporaneity or 
the avant-garde, with its will to critically rethink the order of things, the rela-
tionships between things and persons, to fundamentally operate a redistribu-
tion of the sensible, and to creatively open up new avenues for thought and 
practices, obviously will be seen as a dangerous phenomenon for all those per-
sisting in having things as they have “always” been before. This was the case 
with Artusi against Monteverdi, with Saint-Saëns against Stravinsky, and with 
Cavell against Cage and Stockhausen.
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Furthermore, were time and space to allow—which they don’t—I would have 
liked to include in this comment three more topics, which I simply list here as 
very problematic, and as a possible guide for future work:
(a)  Cavell’s repugnance for precompositional work, drafts, and schema, a 
“problem” he associates with modernity, ignoring not only Beethoven’s 
sketches, but also Old-Flemish imitational processes, Bach’s canons, 
and so on.
(b)  His apparent belief in an uncorrupted “I.” Cavell ([1967] 1969b, 198) 
sustains that “a work of art . . . celebrates the fact that men can intend 
their lives at all . . . , and that their actions are coherent and effective 
at all in the scene of indifferent nature and determined society,” as if 
Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx had not existed and had not written the 
books they did.
(c)  His essentialist, controlling, and disciplining credo that art must 
have “a definite set of features” that one could describe “in technical 
handbooks,” whereby “fraudulence could be detected and exposed.” 
The question for me is not What counts as art? but Who decides what 
counts as art? or Who decides what is “false”?
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As a final remark, I think it is fair to say that Lydia Goehr’s choice of topic was 
obviously pertinent. The responses to her paper, including this one, prove that 
Stanley Cavell’s essay “Music Discomposed” still provokes reactions and is, 
therefore, somehow still “alive.” Philosophically and compositionally, it seems 
to me completely dated and outdated, but it poses questions with which we—
composers and performers of new music—are still confronted today. Those 
questions, even if anachronistic and reactionary, as I believe they are, must 
nevertheless be answered. Goehr’s attempt to move from Cavell’s “discompo-
sure” into a “radical new form of composure” is certainly one of them, to which 
every respondent to her paper is adding newer and different ones. Let’s only 
hope that one day such questions will vanish, as it will be clear to everybody the 
positive, energetic, and luminous power of creativity, the constructive force of 
desire production—and no longer a discourse on dark forms of negative dia-
lectics, on intricate interpretations and reinterpretations of obscure academic 
terminologies, on unproductive reiterations of past subject matters and prob-
lems. Instead of revolving the past, we should be making the future.
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The International  
Orpheus Academy for  
Music and Theory 2016:
Concerts and Installations
In addition to the guest faculty lectures, discussions, and dialogues out of which 
the six chapters of this book evolved, the International Orpheus Academy for 
Music and Theory 2016 included several performances, music interventions, 
and installations. These were intended not as subsidiary or decorative moments 
within a substantial theoretical debate, but as an integral part of the discourse, 
contributing concrete sonic and visual materials to the topic. Considering 
the performative moment not as a place for representation (of already known 
sound structures), but of problematisation of the musical objects under consid-
eration, the three concerts explored unknown and unpredictable encounters 
between music, texts, and imagery. Prepared by the ME21 Collective, con-
cretely by Paulo de Assis, Lucia D’Errico, and Juan Parra C., these performances 
were further explorations of experimental performance practices of Western 
notated art music, problematising major works not only by Robert Schumann, 
Ludwig van Beethoven, John Cage, and Bruno Maderna, but also by Athanasius 
Kircher, Nicola Vicentino, and Sigismondo d’India. Furthermore, there were 
four installations that displayed diverse sets of material objects related to the 
works played in the concerts. These included a table with copies of materi-
als that led to the composition of Luigi Nono’s .....sofferte onde serene..., a video 
installation documenting a previous performance by the ME21 Collective of 
music by Friedrich Nietzsche, a video documentary on “Hyperion’s Explosive 
Compression,” a piece by Juan Parra C. after Bruno Maderna’s Hyperion, and a 








All these concerts and installations have been devised and realised with a 
strong focus on their immediate physical materiality, and it is very difficult to 
describe and to communicate them a posteriori, especially in written format. 
Thus, in what follows, the reader can find hyperlinks to video recordings that 
simply function as documentation of the concerts and performances, as well 
as the introductory texts to them, as they were printed during the Orpheus 
Academy 2016.
Video recording/documentation of the performances
To watch the video recordings of the three performances follow the QR code 
below, which links to a multimedia repository hosted by the Orpheus Institute 
web server.
1. Musical performances
I. Opening Session—4 April 2016, 10:00–10:30 | Orpheus Institute, Auditorium
Video recording available at: https://www.researchcatalogue.net/profile/
show-work?work=350826.
Rasch14 Loving Barthes(3), for piano, tape, and video projector
Paulo de Assis: concept and piano
Juan Parra C., sound and video projection
Lucia D’Errico, intertitles
Music: Robert Schumann, Kreisleriana, op. 16 [1838] (movts. 1, 2, and 3) 
Texts: Roland Barthes: “Loving Schumann” (1979), “Rasch” (1975), “Musica 
Practica” (1970)
Raschx is a series of performances, lectures, or lecture-performances based upon 
two fundamental materials: Robert Schumann’s Kreisleriana, op. 16 (1838), and 
Roland Barthes’s essays on the music of Schumann (1970, 1975, 1979), particu-
larly “Rasch,” a text exclusively dedicated to Schumann’s Kreisleriana. To these 
materials, other components may be added to each particular version: visual 
elements (pictures, videos), other texts, or further aural elements (recordings, 
live-electronics, etc.). All these things are treated as parts of different strata of 
an assemblage, which are destratified following the notions of substrata (socio- 
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historical contexts), parastrata (documentary sources), epistrata (editions, 
writings, theoretical discourses), and metastrata (future performances). The 
main goal is to generate an intricate network of aesthetic-epistemic cross- 
references, through which the listener has the freedom to focus on different 
layers of perception, be it on the music, on the texts being projected or read, 
on the images, on the voices, and so on. The purely “aesthetic” experience is 
therefore “disturbed” by the “intellectual” moments; at the same time, these 
reflective moments would remain senseless without the aesthetic dimension. 
Beyond “interpretation” and beyond “aesthetics,” the series Raschx is part of 
wider research on what might be labelled “experimental performance prac-
tices”—practices that urge us to think (during the performative moment) 
about what we do know, about what we do not know, and about what we think 
we know about a given piece. 
II. Evening Concert—5 April 2016, 20:00–21:30 | Orpheus Institute, Concert 
Hall
Video recording available at: https://www.researchcatalogue.net/profile/
show-work?work=307388
Diabelli Machines #5, after Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations, op. 120
New works by Lucia D’Errico (WP), Paolo Galli, David Gorton, Tiziano Manca, 
Juan Parra C., Bart Vanhecke
Paulo de Assis: concept and artistic direction 









Paulo de Assis, piano
Lucia D’Errico, guitars
Juan Parra C., live electronics
Special guest: Benjamin Widmer, actor/singer and video projection
Diabelli MachinesX is a series of performances developed by Paulo de Assis and 
his team in the framework of the artistic research project Experimentation ver-
sus Interpretation: Exploring New Paths in Music Performance for the Twenty-
First Century (MusicExperiment21), hosted at the Orpheus Institute, Ghent. 
Inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (1969) and Difference and Repetition 
(1968), by William Kinderman’s essay “Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations” (1987), 
and by Michel Butor’s Dialogue avec 33 variations de Ludwig van Beethoven sur une 






120, to several musical encounters, letting other times and styles interfere with 
Beethoven, making unconnected connections happen. In the time frame of 
the original piece, diverse techniques of elimination, suppression, substitu-
tion, and replacement are used. Alongside interventions from other times and 
styles, including from composers such as Bach, Mozart, and Cramer, to which 
Beethoven openly related, new pieces are regularly composed for every particu-
lar instantiation of the project. 
More specifically, Diabelli Machines5 is the first outcome of a collaboration 
between the MusicExperiment21 Collective and Ensemble Interface, a collabo-
ration that was preceded by a two-week long residency by Ensemble Interface at 
the Orpheus Institute. In addition to recently composed pieces by Paolo Galli, 
David Gorton, Tiziano Manca, Juan Parra C., and Bart Vanhecke (which were 
composed as part of the previous collaboration between MusicExperiment21 
and the Antwerp based HERMESensemble), Lucia D’Errico composed a fully 
new piece. All the “new” pieces are intended as variations on the variations, 
including musical reflections or glosses on the original. The composers are all 
researchers at the Orpheus Institute, affiliated either with its research centre 
or with the docARTES doctoral programme. Juan Parra C. worked on live- 
electronic comments on Variation 20. Lucia D’Errico prepared not a score 
but a “sonic image” of Variation 8 that has to be re-enacted by the performers. 
Tiziano Manca composed a musical reflection on the entirety of the Diabelli 
Variations, placed after Variation 10. David Gorton wrote a set of three vari-
ations to replace Variations 12, 13, and 14. Bart Vanhecke prepared a dark 
comment on Variation 20, and Paolo Galli wrote a problematisation of the third 
part of the work, that is, of Variations 21 to 28. More than simple commissions, 
these compositions are part of a collaborative endeavour that was built through 
a series of team meetings involving the core team of MusicExperiment21, all the 
musicians of Ensemble Interface, the six composers, and the choreographer 
Kurt Dreyer—a regular collaborator with Ensemble Interface who embraced 
this project with incredible energy, the highest professionalism, and conta-
gious communicative skills.
III. Closing Performance—6 April 2016, 17:00–18:15 | Orpheus Institute, 
Concert Hall
Part I
Shadows from the Empty Centre, after pieces by Athanasius Kircher, Nicola 
Vicentino, and Sigismondo d’India
Lucia D’Errico: concept, guitars, and electronics
The current model of production in notated art music, based on the distinction 
between composer and performer, is designed to make the function of the lat-
ter redundant: the sonic result is already envisioned by the projection of sound 
on a visual medium—the score. Is it possible to retain a correspondence with 
past musical works while departing from the—supposedly—faithful reproduc-
tion of a score? The research project Shadows from the Empty Centre experiments 
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with the production of sonic instantiations that retain a resemblance through 
non-resembling means with past musical works, mainly but not only from the early 
Italian Baroque. Starting from the experience of notated repertoire, it attempts 
to overcome the distinction between notation and improvisation, as well as 
that between composer, performer, and listener. The model that is looked for 
is an alternative to the performer as an intermediary between text and sound: a 
new figure of a musician, an operator who combines the functions of instrumen-
tal performer, composer, and listener. Such functions can also be regarded as 
implicitly contained in the role of the traditional performer, but only if his or 
her attitude shifts from interpretational (delving into the text and connecting to 
its meaning) to experimental (diverging from the text and activating unexpected 
potential). This project aims at radicalising such a shift and making it explicit 
through sonic instantiations that can be considered from the angles of compo-
sition, performance, and perception, but that unfold their full potential only as 
a hybrid of the three.
Such a quest is backed up by investigations into the idea of empty centre, 
devised as a concept that encompasses momentous traits of Baroque art, 
music, and thinking. The shift between the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries was informed by the loss of a centre in many respects. The renewed 
relationship between man and the world, between subject and object, is a use-
ful tool to experiment with in the search for a different possibility in musical 
performance. The change towards an art based on the depiction of sensation, 
rather than of semblance, is the byword for a desired change in the relationship 
between performers and scores: what if works from the past were approached 




Reinterpretation: On John Cage’s Aria/Fontana Mix
Juan Parra C.: electronics
This case study deals with the notion of reinterpretation, understood as the 
process of recovering not only a particular piece of music but also the circum-
stances of its composition and original performance in order to adapt it for a 
performance with electronic instruments. Although today they are considered 
and performed as individual compositions, Aria and Fontana Mix were first per-
formed together as a single work. This was the point of departure for me to (a) 
review the compositional procedures behind the creation of Fontana Mix, (b) 
apply them in the design of a musical instrument to be used in performance, 
as a complement to Aria, and (c) propose a simultaneous performance of both 





I. Con Luigi Nono: An Archaeology of Things (curated by Paulo de Assis)
Con Luigi Nono: An Archaeology of Things displayed copies of the crucial materials 
that led to the composition of Luigi Nono’s .....sofferte onde serene..., as well as 
further materials that were generated after the original piece was done. Such 
things include sketches, working tapes, manuscripts, the final score, the final 
tape, editions, recordings, books, and articles, the digitalisation of the tapes 
and the new critical edition and its transcoding for orchestra. Inspired by 
Michel Foucault’s concept of “archaeology,” this installation exposed the mate-
rial things that can make .....sofferte onde serene..., a part of a “discourse-object.” 
II. Rasch11+1 Re-notations by Einar T. Einarsson
Re-notations is a project that re-notates classical piano masterpieces from a 
specific angle and with an entirely different aim from the original scores. 
Re-notations focuses on the materiality and physical context of these works 
and gives us a specific perspective on these classical pieces, a perspective that 
maps out in space and time the activity of the physical materials involved: the 
specific locations of hands and fingers on the piano keyboard. Through this, 
the intensity and density of the involved activity is revealed as an overcrowded 
space of movements and entanglements. Music seen from this perspective 
is constantly occupying the same locations where actions keep folding one 
another, repeating differences. A performance of spatio-temporal multiplicity 
is disclosed. Each keystroke (depression) is accounted for as a link between a 
spatial location on the keyboard and a temporal axis. Overpopulated location, 
excessive quantity, and interpenetration become the subjects of this notational 
act where the relationship between hands and keyboard are highlighted. The 
“score” becomes an abstract, virtual, diagrammatic “recording” of the actuality 
of performance: a limited number of space-points are occupied and activated 
in specific temporal order. Thus, notation reverses its direction and becomes 
an active post-performance activity, not instructional but speculative, reflec-
tive, and itself performative.
(Einar Torfi Einarsson)
III. Hyperion’s Explosive Compression, after Maderna, by Juan Parra C.
Online version available at:  
https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/262403/262404
HERMESensemble and Muta Imago
Claudia Sorace | director
Jonathan Schatz | actor, dancer
Valérie Vervoort / Hanne Roos | soprano
Karin De Fleyt | flute
Juan Parra C. | electronics
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HYPERION is a production by HERMESensemble and Muta Imago in collab-
oration with Sagra Musicale Malatestiana, Fondazione Romaeuropa, Music 
Theatre Transparant, and the Orpheus Institute.
The larger goal of this research project is to look at the performance practice 
of electroacoustic music as reflected by the mirror of traditional instrumental 
interpretation, and by a specialised performer rather than by the composer. 
Specifically, it aims to present a number of strategies to analyse, reconstruct, 
reinterpret, and create electroacoustic music that is actively situated in a larger 
historical context and either is informed by or is a rendering of pre-existing 
repertoire. In doing so, the positive aspects of the notions of “core repertoire,” 
so commonly used in traditional instrumental contexts, can be adapted and 
utilised by electronic music practitioners, in all three aspects of their practice: 
technical, compositional, and performative.
In Juan Parra C.’s collaboration with the Italian theatre company Muta 
Imago, these notions of interpretation are activated by the needs, constraints, 
and challenges of producing a new version of Bruno Maderna’s Hyperion, focus-
ing on the double dramaturgical and dramaturgical-musical roles of the solo 
instruments, and the use of recordings of the orchestral parts as a sound object 
that both contributes to the musical structure and provides a dramaturgical 
character: an aural representation of a different temporal and spatial plane, 
one that both sustains and collides with the “live” performers. In the process of 
creating the electronic processing system, selecting the orchestral recordings, 
and reconstructing the final timeline for the work, the dramaturgical needs, the 
logistical constraints, and Parra’s own considerations when approaching inter-
pretation in live electronic music equally contributed to the decision-making. 
IV. Nietzsche6+1: The Weight of Music (documentation curated by the ME21 
Collective)
Online version available at:  
https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/262403/262404
Between 1854 and 1874 Friedrich Nietzsche composed a substantial number of 
musical works, including fragmentary pieces for solo piano, several songs, and 
even a sketched opera. His activity as a composer remains essentially unknown 
and his musical pieces are rarely performed. Moreover, they are usually consid-
ered, at best, as juvenilia. Indeed, when Nietzsche decided to be first a philolo- 
gist, then a philosopher, he stopped composing music. Nevertheless, beyond 
aesthetic judgements, his musical compositions disclose a character and per-
sonality quite different from the far better known Nietzsche-the-philosopher. 
Nietzsche-the-composer understands himself as a “medium,” an agent domi-
nated by transcendent powers of inspiration and creation submitting him to 
pre-existing values; on the other hand, Nietzsche-the-philosopher was a desta-
bilising constructor, the inventor of new images of thought, the active operator 
of a fundamental redefinition of values. For Nietzsche, music had the prob-




used to refer to one of his compositions, and, later on, to Wagner’s music in 
general. This weight he increasingly associated with the idea of “swimming,” to 
which he proactively opposed the notion of “dancing.”
In this performance, which took place on 28 November 2015 in the 
Tanzquartier Wien, the ME21 Collective presented musical works by Nietzsche 
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